A STUDY ON INDIVIDUAL CARBON TRADING MECHANISM BASED ON CARBON REDUCTION BONUS IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINA'S MOTOR VEHICLE RESTRICTION POLICY

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-81
Author(s):  
Lihong Jiang ◽  
Miaomiao Wang ◽  
Tongna Liu

In the context of the development of China's carbon emissions trading market, research into individual-based carbon trading markets is gradually gaining momentum. But due to the diversity of individual carbon emissions and the difculty of quantifying them, there are many challenges to realising a personal carbon trading market, and China has yet to develop a complete personal carbon trading system. Therefore, based on Beijing's tail number restriction policy, this paper designs a personal carbon trading market mechanism based on the carbon emissions generated by car use as a commodity, with a focus on trading mechanisms, and supported by incentive systems, regulatory systems and compensation systems. With the help of the "carbon reduction red envelope" trading platform to achieve the participation of two main bodies, multi-benet. The changes in carbon emissions under different scenarios are also analysed, and some of the conditions for the operation of the personal carbon trading mechanism proposed in this paper are calculated. The individual carbon trading mechanism proposed in this paper,solves the inconvenience caused by the license plate restriction policy to Chinese people, promotes the exible and systematic development of urban management, and provides ideas for the development of China's individual carbon trading market.

2013 ◽  
Vol 411-414 ◽  
pp. 2505-2510
Author(s):  
Qi Wei ◽  
Man Man Tian

Along with the rapid development of economy, China has become the leading emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. Carbon emissions trading system is an important tool and means to response to climate change effectively and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At present, Chinese carbon trading market is still in its infancy, and there are many deficiencies: legal system is imperfect and carbon source monitoring regulation is lax, the variety of trading is single, China does not have pricing power of carbon emissions and the layouts of trading platform are not reasonable. Through using the implementation experience of the EU emissions trading system, we construct Chinese carbon trading mechanism based on total control principle: voluntary trading market should be carried out fist and mandatory transaction will be implemented when market condition is sufficient. According to the quotas allocation from free to auction, mandatory transaction shall be implemented in there stages.


2016 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 1650024
Author(s):  
Shuang ZHENG

Both The 12th Five-Year Plan and the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC have proposed the establishment of a national carbon emissions trading market, which will be a major institutional innovation in China's efforts to address climate change. By exploring the necessity of implementing carbon emissions trading in China, this paper summarizes the practices and experience of carbon trading pilots in seven provinces and cities since 2013, put forward the purposes, roadmaps, and main content in the construction of carbon emissions trading systems in China.


2010 ◽  
Vol 113-116 ◽  
pp. 484-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Ming Wu

As one of the carbon trade mechanisms ratified by Tokyo Protocol, the Carbon Emission Permits Trade has played a significant role of offsetting the global warming problem. This paper introduces the international carbon emissions trading market mechanisms, transaction type, and volume and price, and then analyses the status of carbon emissions trading at home and abroad. Finally, the author puts forward construction carbon emissions trading in China.


2021 ◽  

<p>In order to provide corresponding suggestions for the establishment and development of China's carbon trading market mechanism, the three-party game model of the competent government departments, carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution in the initial allocation of carbon emission rights and the rotation bargaining game model in the secondary carbon trading market are solved and analyzed in this paper. The results show that the competent government departments should improve the review efficiency effectively to reduce cost by outsourcing the review work to universities, research institutes and other scientific research units and increasing punishment for the collusion behavior between the carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution. At the same time, the competent government departments should adopt the regular regulatory policies to deal with collusion behavior and reduce the sampling proportion to cut cost of government review. The trading center should directly determine transaction price in combination with the forces of buyers and sellers, and make matchmaking trading directly by selecting the qualified buyers and sellers at the secondary carbon trading market in process of bilateral open bidding.</p>


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