scholarly journals Study of Chinese carbon emission trading market mechanism based on the game theory

2021 ◽  

<p>In order to provide corresponding suggestions for the establishment and development of China's carbon trading market mechanism, the three-party game model of the competent government departments, carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution in the initial allocation of carbon emission rights and the rotation bargaining game model in the secondary carbon trading market are solved and analyzed in this paper. The results show that the competent government departments should improve the review efficiency effectively to reduce cost by outsourcing the review work to universities, research institutes and other scientific research units and increasing punishment for the collusion behavior between the carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution. At the same time, the competent government departments should adopt the regular regulatory policies to deal with collusion behavior and reduce the sampling proportion to cut cost of government review. The trading center should directly determine transaction price in combination with the forces of buyers and sellers, and make matchmaking trading directly by selecting the qualified buyers and sellers at the secondary carbon trading market in process of bilateral open bidding.</p>

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (19) ◽  
pp. 6438
Author(s):  
Dan Nie ◽  
Yanbin Li ◽  
Xiyu Li

In 2020, China proposed the goal of achieving carbon emission peaks by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. For China, whose energy consumption structure has long been dominated by fossil energy, carbon trading and new energy are crucial for the realization of the emission target. By establishing a connectedness network model, this paper studies the static and dynamic spillovers between the Hubei carbon trading market, new energy stock market, crude oil market, coal market, and natural gas market in China, and draws the following conclusions: (1) the static spillover index of the carbon–energy–stock system is 3.57% and the dynamic spillover index fluctuates between 7.67% and 22.62%, indicating that the spillover effect of the system is low; (2) for the whole system, whether from a static or dynamic perspective, the carbon market always plays the role of net information receiver, while new energy is the net information transmitter; (3) the new energy stock market and the coal market always act as net information transmitters to the carbon market; and (4) the spillover effect of the system is asymmetric, wherein the system is more sensitive to negative information about price returns, and this asymmetry is much greater when the system is active.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 7843
Author(s):  
Lu Li ◽  
Jie Dong ◽  
Yan Song

Recently, the environmental and resource crisis caused by excessive energy consumption has aroused great concern worldwide. China is a major country of energy consumption and carbon emissions, and has attempted to build a carbon emission trading market to reduce carbon emissions. This practice helps to promote the carbon trading projects for both regional carbon emission reduction and sustainable development in the pilot areas, as well as having important theoretical and practical significance for the further improvement of carbon emission trading policies. In this study, we first used the difference-in-difference (DID) model to evaluate the impact of carbon emission trading on the carbon emission intensity of construction land (CEICL). The results showed that the carbon emission trading policy can significantly reduce CEICL in the pilot areas. Furthermore, we adopted the quantile regression model to explore the mechanism and acting path of carbon emission trading on CEICL. The results show that the increase in carbon trading volume (CTV) can effectively reduce the CEICL. However, a high carbon trading price (CTP) tends to reduce the suppressing effect of carbon emission trading on CEICL. Additionally, carbon emission trading also affects CEICL through the indirect acting paths of industrial structure and energy intensity. Finally, we propose to promote regional low-carbon development from the perspective of developing a carbon emission trading market nationwide, rationalizing the carbon quota and trading price mechanism, optimizing the regional industrial structure, and improving the energy consumption structure.


2014 ◽  
Vol 496-500 ◽  
pp. 2760-2763
Author(s):  
Zhong Fu Tan ◽  
Tao Lei ◽  
Huan Huan Li ◽  
Li Wei Ju ◽  
Zhi Hong Chen

Rational scheme of initial allocation of carbon emission rights is the key to the smooth running of carbon trading market. Based on the traditional carbon emission rights allocation mode, this paper combining China’s actual development of power industry and characteristics of the distribution of generation resources, put forward the impact of initial allocation of carbon emission rights on power generation replacement analysis model. By studying the impact of initial allocation of carbon emission rights on power generation rights trade, and comparing the different results of power generation rights trade, respectively, based on installed capacity allocation and power generation allocation, it is found that the mode that based on power generation allocation can better promote the power generation rights trade.


Author(s):  
Jinpyo Lee

This paper considers a carbon emission cap and trade market, where the carbon emission cap for each entity (either government or firm) is allocated first and then the carbon trading price is decided interdependently in the carbon trading market among the non-cooperative entities which make their production decision. We assume that there are n entities emitting carbon during the production process. After allocating the carbon (emission) cap for each participating entity in the carbon cap and trade market, each participant makes a production decision using the Newsvendor model given carbon trading price determined in the carbon trading market and trades some amount of its carbon emission, if its carbon emission is below or above its own carbon cap. Here, the carbon trading price depends on how carbon caps over the entities are allocated, since the carbon trading price is determined through the carbon (emission) trading market, which considers total amount of carbon emission being equal to total carbon caps over entities and some fraction of total carbon emission should be from each entity participating in the carbon cap and trade market. Thus, we can see the interdependency among the production decision, carbon cap and carbon trading price. We model this as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game in which carbon cap for each entity is allocated in the first stage and each entity’s production quantity is decided in the second stage considering the carbon trading price determined in the carbon trading market. First, we show the monotonic property of the carbon trading price and each entity’s production over the carbon cap allocation. In addition, we show that there exists an optimality condition for the carbon cap allocation. Using this optimality condition, we provide various results for carbon cap and trade market.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuwei Du ◽  
Songsheng Chen

Abstract Building a carbon emission trading market is an effective way to control carbon emissions. The carbon emission trading price is the key to the carbon trading market, and it will affect the carbon emission reduction behavior of enterprises. This study use the vector autoregression (VAR) model, the cointegration analysis, and the Granger causality test to analyze the influence of industrial development index (Shanghai Stock Exchange Industrial Index (000004.SH)), coal price index (National Coal Price Index), air quality index (AQI), and economic index (Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)) on the carbon emission trading price in Tianjin. Empirical research results based on data from January 2014 to December 2019 show that the Shanghai Stock Exchange Industrial Index and AQI are positively correlated with Tianjin carbon emission trading price, and the National Coal Price Index and PMI are negatively correlated with Tianjin carbon emission trading price. Finally, some suggestions are made to promote the rapid maturity of the national carbon emission trading market of China.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mowmita Mishra ◽  
Soumya Kanti Hota ◽  
Santanu Kumar Ghosh ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar

Considering the increasing number of end-of-life goods in the context of improving the ambience and health of a population and their destructive impacts, recycling strategies are important for industries and organizations. In this article, a closed-loop supply chain management containing a single manufacturer, a single retailer, and a third party is introduced in which the manufacturer first propagates newly finished goods and then dispatches some of the finished goods to the retailer considering a single-setup multi-delivery policy. Due to shipping, carbon emission is taken into account as well as a carbon emission trading mechanism to curb the amount of carbon emissions by the retailer. For recycling through collection, inspection, remanufacturing, and landfill, the third party collects the end-of-life goods from its customers and ships perfect products to the manufacturer after a two-stage inspection. In this model, major sources of emissions such as shipping, replenishment orders, and inventory have been taken care of. The minimizing of the total cost relating to the container capacity, shipment numbers, and replenishment cycle length is the main objective of the closed-loop supply chain management for making the system more profitable. Expository numerical explorations, analysis, and graphic representations are conferred to elucidate this model, and it is observed that this model saves some percentage of the cost compared to the existing literature.


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