scholarly journals La justificación normativa de la Renta Básica universal desde la filosofía política y el Derecho.

2019 ◽  
pp. 81-94
Author(s):  
Borja Barragué ◽  
Luis Arroyo Jiménez ◽  
Mª Celia Fernández Aller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Panoramic View ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Normative Justification ◽  
Domestic Law

This paper analyzes various reasons coming from political philosophy and positive law, which can justify the establishment of a universal basic income. First, a panoramic view of the normative justification of universal basic income is offered: three models that respond to many other conceptions of social justice are presented. The article then focuses on arguments that come from positive legislation (international, european and domestic law) and which can become relevant in the discussion about the establishment of a universal basic income and, precisely, about its strengths or weaknesses against other quite similar measures such as minimum insertion income.

Utopophobia

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sound Theory ◽  
Theory Versus ◽  
History Of ◽  
Practical Guidance

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.

Systematicity and Normative Justification

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Unique Form ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Normative Justification ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.

“I Don't Get No Respect

Dialogue ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. E. Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Critical Theory ◽  
Political Sociology ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Advanced Students ◽  
To Come

The author struggles to come to grips here with the philosophical complexities and personal tragedies that disorient us when we reflect on the great and pervasive inequalities in human societies. His egalitarianism is radical in denying the justice of the inequalities that liberals like Rawls would countenance, and in denying that justice and capitalism are compatible. Nielsen displays a masterly knowledge of the literature of social justice, especially that which bears on Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, the celebrated philosophical flagships of liberalism and conservatism respectively; this feature of the book should be useful for advanced students of social and political philosophy who need to acquire a sense for the texture of contemporary argument in the field. The thicket of sturdy arguments in Equality and Liberty should convince Rawlsians to accept many tenets of Nielsen's radical egalitarianism, or else to re-examine their thinking about social justice. And the extended critique of Anarchy, State and Utopia should persuade Nozickians of the need for “a reasonably sophisticated political sociology and a sound critical theory of society” if one is to philosophize adequately about social justice (5). Many will find this critique the most valuable part of the book.

Social Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-122
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Integration Policies ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Multicultural Policies

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.

Social democracy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Democracy ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Practical Politics ◽  
Post War ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The idea of social democracy is now used to describe a society the economy of which is predominantly capitalist, but where the state acts to regulate the economy in the general interest, provides welfare services outside of it and attempts to alter the distribution of income and wealth in the name of social justice. Originally ’social democracy’ was more or less equivalent to ’socialism’. But since the mid-twentieth century, those who think of themselves as social democrats have come to believe that the old opposition between capitalism and socialism is outmoded; many of the values upheld by earlier socialists can be promoted by reforming capitalism rather than abolishing it. Although it bases itself on values like democracy and social justice, social democracy cannot really be described as a political philosophy: there is no systematic statement or great text that can be pointed to as a definitive account of social democratic ideals. In practical politics, however, social democratic ideas have been very influential, guiding the policies of most Western states in the post-war world.

“Back into the Days of Slavery”: Freedom, Citizenship, and the Black Family in the Reconstruction-Era Courtroom

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-161
Author(s):  
Giuliana Perrone
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Black Family ◽  
The South ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Reconstruction Era ◽  
Domestic Law

This article analyses domestic law cases brought by former slaves during the decade following the Civil War. It argues that ending slavery was a long and complex process that included not only granting rights to freedpeople, but also subtracting the incapacities previously imposed by bondage and applying certain rights retroactively. Reconstruction-era judges, throughout the era and across the South, overlooked the realities of slavery as a lived institution. Instead, they reimagined slavery as a collection of legal disabilities that could simply be subtracted and summarily resolved. This is how they would carry out abolition. The notion that slavery had to be undone stands in contrast to prevailing scholarship that emphasizes the acquisition and exercise of rights as demonstrative of consummate freedom. Instead, this article shows that even when positive law and judicial rulings were used to deconstruct the peculiar institution, slavery, as a legal construct, could not be fully demolished. Judges and freedpeople alike were left to face troubling legacies for which there was no remedy. No performance of legal acrobatics could alter, undo, or fully resolve the myriad ways slavery continued to affect many former slaves and influence the direction of their free lives. Abolition would remain incomplete.

Anarchism

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall Shatz
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
William Godwin ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Enlightenment

Anarchism rejects the state as an inherently despotic institution that must be abolished in order for human nature to flower. This does not mean the absence of social order, however, for anarchism also contains a positive vision of the kind of community it expects to arise when political authority is eliminated. Although it shares liberalism's commitment to individual autonomy and Marxism's commitment to social justice, anarchism claims that it can implement those principles more fully and effectively without utilizing the mechanism of the state. Anarchism as a secular political philosophy originated as a product of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and anarchist thought was the cumulative product of a number of different individuals in different countries who elaborated its basic principles. This article examines the views of several thinkers on anarchism, including William Godwin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, and Prince Peter Kropotkin. It also considers the link between anarchism and terrorism.

Kosovo to Kadi: Legality and Legitimacy in the Contemporary International Order

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruti Teitel
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
National Level ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
State Consent ◽  
United Nations Charter ◽  
Domestic Law

Whence does international law derive its normative force as law in a world that remains, in many respects, one where legitimate politics is practiced primarily at the national level? As with domestically focused legal theories, one standard answer is positivistic: the law's authority is based on its origin in agreed procedures of consent. This is certainly plausible with respect to treaty obligations and commitments that derive from the United Nations Charter, but it leaves customary international law vulnerable to legitimacy critiques—of which there is no shortage among international law skeptics. Even with respect to conventional international norms, such as treaty provisions, there is often a sense that such consent is democratically thinner than the public consent to domestic law, particularly fundamental domestic law, constitutional norms, and derivative principles of legitimate governance. State consent in international law, in this view, is often a very imperfect proxy for democratic consent to international legal norms. While it is obvious to international lawyers why (as a matter of positive law doctrine) state consent should make international norms prevail over domestic norms to which there is arguably deeper democratic consent, persistent critics of international law have questioned whether this should be so as a matter of legitimacy.

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