Anarchism

Author(s):  
Marshall Shatz

Anarchism rejects the state as an inherently despotic institution that must be abolished in order for human nature to flower. This does not mean the absence of social order, however, for anarchism also contains a positive vision of the kind of community it expects to arise when political authority is eliminated. Although it shares liberalism's commitment to individual autonomy and Marxism's commitment to social justice, anarchism claims that it can implement those principles more fully and effectively without utilizing the mechanism of the state. Anarchism as a secular political philosophy originated as a product of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and anarchist thought was the cumulative product of a number of different individuals in different countries who elaborated its basic principles. This article examines the views of several thinkers on anarchism, including William Godwin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, and Prince Peter Kropotkin. It also considers the link between anarchism and terrorism.

Author(s):  
Viriato Soromenho-Marques ◽  

In this paper the philosophical foundations of the first Portuguese Constitution are submitted to critical analysis. Drafted in the aftermath of the 1820 Revolution, the Constitution of 1822 is deeply determined by contradictory tensions and forces. We may see in it the trace of the freedom trends developed in the Enlightenment period and led to practical terms in the dramatic battleground of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 reflect also the energetic resistance from the conservative sectors and values of the Portuguese society and also the coming influence of the Restoration Age political philosophy, aimed to fight the rationalistic paradigm of natural right constitutional theories.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-332
Author(s):  
Eilís Ward

If the concept of social justice posits equality and fairness between subjects in the social order, then the presence of those subjects within that order must first and foremost be acknowledged. In Ireland’s recent reform of prostitution law contained in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017, the presence of the sex worker as a rights-bearing subject or citizen, with access to justice in that capacity, was denied. In this article I focus on the use of data by the neo-abolitionist ‘Turn off the Red Light’ campaign to ‘flatten out’ the complexity of sex workers lives and present the figure of the ‘vulnerable prostituted woman’ and the ‘trafficking victim’: tragic, abject, a necessarily violated person and in need of ‘protection’ from the state. I argue that this data, entering public and political discourse as uncontestable truth, constituted what I call, ‘framing figures’, framing an inevitable outcome and precluding certain subjects from the status of equality and fairness. The data allowed campaigners for the Sex Purchase Ban (SPB), and, in turn the state, to eclipse a social justice approach to sex work, such as proposed by the Sex Workers Alliance of Ireland and other actors.


Rural China ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39

Ne’er-do-wells are a common feature of rural society and have long existed. Before the establishment of new political authority in 1949, constraints on ne’er-do-wells came mainly from endogenous customs and leaders of the ruralities. After 1949, with unprecedented penetration of state authority into the countryside, those endogenous control mechanisms underwent profound changes. In Village A in Shanxi during the collective era, brigade and commune organizations representing the authority of the state served as important checks on unruly behavior by village ne’er-do-wells. Since the coming of the Reform period, traditional checks no longer exist while the authority of the collective state has dissipated. The new village self-rule entities have not enough authority, while the township governments operate under “reversed accountability” (to those above and not those below), leading to “passive inaction” toward the ne’er-do-wells. The result is a nakedly exposed social order, while ne’er-do-wells, ruffians and rogues thrive. This article is in Chinese. 无赖群体是乡村社会的共生体,在乡村社会长期存在。1949 年新政权成立以前,乡村公共秩序空间内,对无赖的约束主要依靠乡村中自发形成的习惯以及内生的权威领袖来维持。1949年以后,国家政权史无前例地深入乡村,村庄内生的控制机制发生了深刻变动。在山西A村,集体化时期,代表国家权威的队社组织对村庄无赖的不轨行为起了重要的约束作用。改革开放以来,传统的对无赖的约束机制丧失,代表国家的集体化时期的权威不复存在。新的乡村自治组织自治力不足,乡镇政府“逆向问责”制度的运行逻辑使其与基层社会疏离,对无赖群体“消极不作为”。乡村社会秩序处于近乎裸露的状态,无赖痞棍异常活跃。


1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Neuhouser

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel's claim that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does not simply negate but rather incorporates, or preserves, crucial elements of the Enlightenment conception of moral subjectivity that Hegel associates with the standpoint of Morality (Moralität). More specifically, the part of Hegel's view I want to examine here is his claim that individual moral conscience (Gewissen) has its place within the rational social order as depicted in Part III of The Philosophy of Right, “Ethical Life”. There is a widespread perception among Hegel's liberal critics that his vision of the rational social order allows no place for the genuine expression of moral conscience. This is the view expressed, for example, in Ernst Tugendhat's recent charge that Hegel's view excludes the possibility of “adopting a rational perspective” on a society's prevailing norms and practices’: “Hegel does not allow for the possibility of a responsible, critical relation to the … state. Instead he tells us that existing laws have an absolute authority. The independent conscience of the individual must disappear, and trust takes the place of reflection. This is what Hegel means by the Aufhebung of morality into ethical life”.


1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Weiler

Rhetorical criticism examines ideology as a form of strategic argumentation that functions to legitimize political authority. Ideology presents itself as political philosophy in a way that calls attention to its argumentation. Ideological arguments support claims (1) that those who wield political power represent the interests of all, and (2) that the existing social order is natural and inevitable in light of human nature. Functionally, ideology is indispensible, but perverse. Formally, ideology is argumentation that obscures its partiality under claims to universality.


Author(s):  
Klaus Ries

This chapter challenges the widespread assumption that terrorist ideology was invented in the mid-nineteenth century by such figures as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin. Instead, the chapter argues, the foundations of terrorism were laid at the end of the eighteenth century by the Enlightenment philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his disciples, who in turn exerted a strong influence on later radical thinkers. In showing how the intellectual reverberations of the French Revolution gave rise to anarchist ideology as well as acts of terrorism in Germany, the chapter traces a link between the state terror of the French Revolution and the emergence of insurgent terrorism.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Moggach

Abstract.This paper explores eighteenth-century German debates on the relation of freedom and perfection in the course of which Kant works out his juridical theory. It contrasts the perfectionist ideas of political activity in Christian Wolff and Karl von Dalberg (a historically important but neglected figure), with Fichte's program inThe Closed Commercial State(1800), distinguishing logics of political intervention. Examining insufficiently recognized aspects of the intellectual context for Kant's distinction between happiness, right and virtue, the paper demonstrates Fichte's (problematic) application of Kantian ideas of freedom to political economy and contests current interpretations of the politically disengaged character or attenuated modernism of German political philosophy in the Enlightenment.Résumé.Ce texte étudie le rapport entre liberté et perfection dans la pensée allemande du dix-huitième siècle. C'est dans le contexte de ces débats que Kant élabore sa propre théorie juridique. En examinant les fondements théoriques de l'intervention politique, le texte fait une distinction entre le perfectionnisme éthique de Christian Wolff et de Karl von Dalberg (personnage historiquement important mais peu étudié), et le programme d'inspiration kantienne proposé par Fichte dans sonÉtat commercial fermé(1800).L'objectif du texte est de reconstruire le contexte intellectuel de la distinction kantienne entre bonheur, droit et vertu, et de démontrer l'usage problématique qu'en fait Fichte dans le domaine de l'économie politique. Le texte remet en question des interprétations récentes qui dévalorisent l'engagement politique et le modernisme des Lumières allemandes.


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Drydyk

It probably comes as a surprise to no one that Hegel's political philosophy is difficult to interpret. But his political thought clearly poses problems which the rest of his work does not (especially), and these problems arise from apparent political ambivalence on his part towards the French Revolution, towards monarchy, towards the doctrine of popular sovereignty, towards public opinion and press freedom - well, there is scarcely a reader of Hegel who could not add some additional topic to this already lengthy list. For instance, Hegel sometimes noted how crucial it is for a state to be decisive; every state needs a reservoir of decisiveness, supplied preferably by a monarch, who ‘has become the personality of the state,’ who ‘cuts short the weighing of the pros and cons between which it lets itself oscillate perpetually now this way and now that, and by saying “I will” make its decision and so inaugurates all activity and actuality.’


Author(s):  
Charles Townshend

What are the origins of terrorism? ‘The reign of terror’ explains that the notion of terrorism, or terror, came from the French Revolution. The terror transformed the Revolution from a liberating to a destructive force. Those who instigated the terror had to find justification for their violent killing. Their motivation provides a key to the distinctive nature of modern terrorism. The revolutionaries may have seemed to act as crusaders, but the Reign of Terror was informed by the Enlightenment assumption that human agency can change the social order. The French Revolution’s use of violence created a model for the application of terrorizing force by state actors that lasted two centuries.


Author(s):  
Daniel Tröhler

“Progressivism” is a collective term used in historiography to characterize historical phases in which particular ways to think about progress are detectable. Hence, “progressivism” is more a historiographical label used by historians than a term used by those thinkers identified as being part of a progressive phase in history. Even though important scholars have argued that the idea of progress can be traced back to antiquity, others have argued that ideas of progress—as a more or less linear alternative to a cyclical way of thinking—are found for the first time in the transition from the early modern period to modernity (ca. 1700). These ideas of progress can be linked to the advancement of knowledge, to the perfecting of the soul or then of the social order, and they link the notion of “progress” with notions like “perfection” and “development.” As a rule, “progress” did not include notions of future chaos or imponderability but rather was understood as an ordered proceeding to the future that was interpreted either as the redemption or materializing of a more or less predetermined road (individually and/or socially), as a contribution to adjustment of social development understood as dangerous or wrong, or as resulting from a forecast and planned future. All of these attempts over the last three and a half centuries to conceptualize progress in one way or another were connected to research, and they affected ideas on education; most of them were even closely related to educational aspirations, methods, programs, and/or policy. The two great and independent motives of “progress” can be identified first around 1700 in France and England with regard to advancement in knowledge and the sciences (1), and in Germany with regard to the perfection of the soul. The idea of human perfection and the advancement of the knowledge based on modern sciences were merged in the Enlightenment prior to the French Revolution and its philosophical legitimation (2), leading in the German realm to a philosophy of history that subordinated all of human and natural history to a great narrative from the past to the future (3). The emergence of sociology gave the narrative a national frame that was supported by the erection of modern schooling, but by the end of the 19th century, the modern conditions of social and political life as actual expressions of progress were perceived as not redeeming the promises of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of history, which led to a schism in the interpretation of “true” progress. These critical perceptions triggered a reaction labeled the Progressive Era, which aimed to readjust the modern conditions of life to particular, often religious ideals of social order in which progress was more tightly connected to (idealized) visions of the past (4). The educational ideas and ideals of this Progressive Era proved to be sustainable, but they were attacked during the Cold War period, which saw an emphasis on technocratic aspects of governance and specific ideas of economic and social development. The ramifications of this focus, which called for planning the future and adjusting education to these plans, can be seen in the case of the OECD (5).


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