scholarly journals Has The ‘War on Terror’ Put Due Process on the Stand?

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
Patrick Leisure

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck a balance between due process rights and national security in the Kadi II case. Applying the ECJ’s analysis to a case recently decided by the D.C. District Court – the Zaidan case – illustrates that a more rights-protective approach can be attained in US courts too. First, this article will explore due process in Europe via the four different versions of the Kadi case. Then, it will take an in-depth look at the Zaidan case. The article concludes by arguing that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals should adopt a stance on due process similar to that taken by the ECJ in the Kadi II case – which served to uphold the rule of law in Europe by making the actions of public officials reviewable before EU courts in the counter-terrorism context. By exercising a more ‘muscular’ attitude towards the other branches of government’s counter-terrorism measures, the US judiciary might use this case to start a new line of precedent distinct from prior US cases with respect to US citizens’ constitutional rights in the post 9/11 counter-terrorism paradigm.

Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This chapter traces Hague’s appeal through the Third Circuit Court of Appeals into the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, showing how the Hughes court’s inner dynamics explain affirmation of the district court injunction. Observing flux in court personnel and law, the chapter shows that both courts embraced the contemporaneous civil liberties revolution by defending worker speech and assembly rights, but it reveals the Supreme Court as divided over constitutional logic. Justice Owen Roberts’s plurality opinion upheld speech and assembly rights under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concurrence incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment due-process clause, and dissenters rejected federal jurisdiction. The ruling reflected the contentious evolution of civil liberties jurisprudence, not antiboss or labor law politics.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


Author(s):  
Wayne A. Logan

Sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws have been in effect nationwide since the 1990s, and publicly available registries today contain information on hundreds of thousands of individuals. To date, most courts, including the Supreme Court in 2003, have concluded that the laws are regulatory, not punitive, in nature, allowing them to be applied retroactively consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. Recently, however, several state supreme courts, as well as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing challenges lodged against new-generation SORN laws of a considerably more onerous and expansive character, have granted relief, concluding that the laws are punitive in effect. This article examines these decisions, which are distinct not only for their results, but also for the courts’ decidedly more critical scrutiny of the justifications, purposes, and efficacy of SORN laws. The implications of the latter development in particular could well lay the groundwork for a broader challenge against the laws, including one sounding in substantive due process, which unlike ex post facto–based litigation would affect the viability of SORN vis-à-vis current and future potential registrants.


2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-168
Author(s):  
Guillermo A. Montero

In Patel v. Midland Memorial Hospital & Medical Center, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant hospital did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights by suspending his clinical privileges without a pre-suspension hearing, where there were reasonable grounds for assuming that patient safety was at risk. Dr. P.V. Patel, a board-certified cardiologist, brought an action against Midland Memorial Hospital and several of its doctors, alleging that the suspension of his clinical privileges violated his right to a pre-suspension hearing; was the result of racial discrimination; and resulted in anticompetitive behavior in violation of antitrust laws. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Midland's motion for summary judgment. The parties filed cross appeals, Dr. Patel on the ground that there were genuine issues of fact for all of his claims, and Midland on the ground that, with the exception of the civil rights claim, it was immune from all of Dr. Patel's claims under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-828
Author(s):  
Erika Wilkinson

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Simon M. Canick

Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.—Justice William BrennanTwo recent circuit court decisions have reinvigorated the debate over the constitutional, practical and ethical ramifications of physician-assisted suicide. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one’s death. The court found this right to outweigh all asserted state interests, and concluded that, with respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The ruling effectively strikes down laws against assisted suicide in all of the states in the Ninth Circuit.In April 1996, in Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.


2021 ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 14 tells the story of how Jim Obergefell, whose husband John Arthur was dying, sued the state of Ohio to try to force the state to list Obergefell as the husband on Arthur’s death certificate. Ohio was one of many states whose constitution explicitly rejected recognition of same-sex marriages, wherever they were originally celebrated. Obergefell won in federal district court, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated his case with DeBoer v. Snyder from Michigan and cases from two other states, and overturned them all. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision of 2015 made marriage equality the law of the U.S. After the Obergefell victory, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse were legally married in Michigan and then cross-adopted their children.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-396
Author(s):  
Thomas F. King

AbstractTwo court decisions highlight divergent opinions as to what constitutes a “substantial burden” on the practice of traditional indigenous religions in the United States. One decision, in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively defines the term in such a way as to discriminate against indigenous religious practices; the other, by a district court in the 10th Circuit based on other holdings by that circuit court, gives much more latitude for protecting such practices and the landscapes they often involve.


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