Administrative and judicial remedies of EU on civil servants’ rights protection

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv ◽  
Andriy Kotenko

Problem setting. The modern pandemic reality makes all the citizens of the European Union vulnerable, especially in terms of employment and employment disputes. European civil service framework has been existing for more than 50 years, but until now some fundamental issues need to be tackled. Transparency is what the international community is striving for nowadays. The numerous tools for legal protection available to the EU servants offer completely different solutions to the one problem. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain the sound practice, according to the principle of sustainable development. The problems of the pre-trial administrative disputes resolution are questioning the mere ability of this mechanism to provide protection impartially and within sound terms. On the one hand, European Court of Justice stands as an effective remedy, which compensates the drawbacks of administrative way of rights protection. But on the other hand, the European Ombudsman institute shows, that both of the aforementioned remedies are not capable of giving up-to-date protection to the EU servants. That’s why substantial changes in this framework are needed, including reconsideration of the procedure of appeals prescribed under the Council of the EU Staff Regulation. Target of research is to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the remedies available to the EU servants for today in the EU acquis framework. Article’s main body. The article is devoted to the research of administrative and judicial means of remedies available to the EU servants. The analysis of the Court of Justice of the European Union case practice has been conducted. The procedure of resolution of administrative disputes between the EU servants and the EU institutions via the European Ombudsman institute has been investigated. The analysis of disputes concerning the protection of EU servants’ rights within the administrative framework within the institutions has been carried out. Conclusions. After analyzing various types of remedies on the protection of civil servants’ rights, a couple of issues to tackle has been revealed. The administrative remedies under Staff Regulations of the Council are not transparent enough to consider them sufficient for being the main way of protecting Staff rights prescribed in the Regulation. The European Ombudsman, along with judicial practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union might be the relief for the institutional mechanism of civil servants rights protection due to the strategic investigations the European Ombudsman is capable to undertake. Further recap of the administrative means of remedies available under the Staff Regulation is explicitly urgent to conduct as soon as possible.

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1187-1220
Author(s):  
Francisco de Abreu Duarte

Abstract This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU’s external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 884-903
Author(s):  
Kathleen Gutman

AbstractThis contribution examines the developing contours of the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in the light of salient case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is divided into three main parts. The first part provides an overview of the meaning of the essence of fundamental rights in EU law and the scope of the inquiry in relation to Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”). The second part evaluates the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in connection with justified limitations that may be placed on its exercise as provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter within the framework of the EU system of fundamental rights protection, which in turn implicates the relationship with the Court’s case-law on national procedural autonomy, equivalence, and effectiveness. The third part delves into the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial within the framework of the EU system of judicial protection, as illustrated by the Court’s case-law in several areas, including standing for individuals in direct actions before the EU courts, judicial independence, and restrictive measures in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Through this analysis, the author argues that, while much awaits further refinement, certain recent developments in the Court’s case–law indicate that the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial can play a meaningful role in the EU system of fundamental rights protection and the EU system of judicial protection more broadly, and thus the best may be yet to come as that case-law progresses in the future.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-116

The present article is dedicated to one of the most debatable aspects of human rights protection in the European Union (EU), specifically the question of whether the EU should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This article analyzes the maintained deficit in the functioning of the European Union in terms of the important parameters of democracy as a result of the failed EU accession to the ECHR as well as the new reality created in the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after the negative Opinion no. 2/13 of the CJEU and the changes in the nature of the interaction between the two European courts in this changed situation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (91) ◽  
pp. 117-139
Author(s):  
Boris Tučić

As a part of its specific policies, the EU creates and implements numerous restrictive measures against different subjects. In recent years, the most interesting ones, especially from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have been the autonomous restrictive measures against natural and legal persons and other non-state entities within the Union`s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). After years of legal wandering in this regard, the Lisbon Treaty finally offered an explicit legal basis for this kind of measures, envisaging, as well, for the first time, the CJEU`s jurisdiction in the field of CFSP in some cases, including the one related to reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council of the EU on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty of the European Union. In this regard, the subject matter of this paper are the activities of the EU courts related to the autonomous restrictive measures against individual subjects, analyzed at several relevant although inseparable levels. The first one considers the intention of the CJEU to "use" the situation regarding the autonomous restrictive measures in order to strengthen its position and competences within the CFSP. The second one is oriented to the efforts of the courts to secure the balance between the effectiveness of the CFSP instruments, on the one hand, and the protection of some of the major principles and values of the EU legal order, on the other hand, such as the rule of law, legal certainty, effective judicial protection or the protection of human rights as guaranteed by the EU Law in general. Thirdly, a very important step in this context has been the jurisprudential identification of the key procedural requirements that the Council`s decisions providing for restrictive measures must fulfill as well (aka the designation criteria, statements of reasons criteria and supporting evidence criteria). By constantly insisting on the fulfillment of these criteria, the EU courts exerted a pressure on the Council to improve its decisions providing restrictive measures in a qualitative manner. Recent jurisprudence, such as the Rosneft or Bank Refah Kargaran cases, shows that there is still enough space for the Court`s interventions in this field, and that some interesting Court`s decisions, related to its position within the CFSP or the general relation between the CFSP and other forms of Union`s external activities, could be expected in the years to come.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-116

The present article is dedicated to one of the most debatable aspects of human rights protection in the European Union (EU), specifically the question of whether the EU should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This article analyzes the maintained deficit in the functioning of the European Union in terms of the important parameters of democracy as a result of the failed EU accession to the ECHR as well as the new reality created in the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after the negative Opinion no. 2/13 of the CJEU and the changes in the nature of the interaction between the two European courts in this changed situation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85
Author(s):  
Dragoş Călin

Abstract The Constitutional Court of Romania has subjected the introduction of a norm of European Union law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm. On the one hand, the norm should be sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution - the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control - by national law. However, the experience of the Constitutional Court of Romania over the eight years (2007-2014) since the EU accession, does not seem to be very convincing, irrespective of the way in which European Union law, including the case law of the CJUE has been used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 468-495
Author(s):  
Auke Willems

AbstractMore than any other EU institution, the Court of Justice of the European Union has upheld the presumption of mutual trust in EU criminal law cooperation. Surprisingly though, despite mutual trust’s centrality in the Court’s jurisprudence, it has long not qualified nor properly elaborated the notion of trust, but rather held on to its presumed existence based on a high level of fundamental rights protection throughout the Union. This article will assess the important role of the Court in establishing, upholding and ultimately qualifying the trust presumption in the EU criminal justice context. Along the lines of a number of key cases, the narrative of a strong defence of (the presumption of) mutual trust appears, but also of an evolution toward more room for rebuttal in recent cases. This signals the increased weight given to fundamental rights protection in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.


Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


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