Strategic Management to Prevent Money Laundering

Author(s):  
Yurdagül Meral

In this chapter, the SWIFT, which is the financial communication system used by all financial institutions, will be explained. Today, most of the countries and financial institutions take precautions to avoid money-laundering and financial crimes. The SWIFT system will be examined in relation with financial communication, compliance, money laundering, know your customer, and sanctions. Public became aware of the sanctions when HSBC has agreed to pay $1.92 billion dollars to state authorities in 2012 for transfering dollars illegally into US. Banks apply “Know Your Customer” procedures to avoid such risks. In relation with sanctions, precautions of SWIFT system will be defined. SWIFT has started a new application namely KYC Registry which enables to have necessary information about the customers in international trade, through cross borders. The reasons why this applicatiıon must be used, how risk will be mitigated, by sharing information with maximum transparency and SWIFT's new KYC application will be defined.

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Mugarura ◽  
Emma Ssali

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to decipher the law relating to cybercrimes regulation and benchmarking best practices that could be adopted to address regulatory weaknesses in some countries. In many countries, cybercrimes regulation is undermined by a lack of robust regulatory regimes. The few regimes that are available are fragmented with no coherent global strategy to deal with these offences across countries and regions. There is a lot of scholarly literature to corroborate the fact that lack of requisite laws on cyber and financial crimes has rendered states lame ducks when faced with well-organized and resourced criminal organizations. Design/methodology/approach This paper articulates intricacies of regulating money laundering and cybercrimes using data from selected African countries and beyond. Generic issues on financial crimes, cybercrimes, case law and policy documents drawn from different jurisdictions have been examined based on the objectives of the study. Cybercrime activities and anti-money laundering (AML) regulatory models have been evaluated drawing on experiences of selected countries in Africa and other countries. Questions whether suspicious activity reports are appropriate as a model to counter incidences of cybercrime activities or whether other options should be considered were also examined. Most notably, the risk-based assessment model such as profiling of high-risk clients rather than reporting every transaction will be compared and possibly suggested as a suitable alternative in financial crimes regulation. The authors have evaluated the data and AML regulatory approaches and other policy measures to curtail the foregoing threats. There is a possibility that AML tools used by financial institutions and banking activities could be used to prevent the growing threat of cybercrimes. The paper has also been enriched by case studies of tenuous legal systems and fragmentation of laws on cybercrimes and financial crimes and how these gaps have been exploited to fuel incidences of illicit criminal activities around the globe. The paper has also used empirical data including visits to banks and financial institutions on the nexus between the threat of cybercrimes and money laundering prevention. The authors have been selective, evaluating cases from 2000s to date. This timeline was particularly important because of the increased incidences of computers and money laundering threats globally. After analysing the data, the authors were able to delineate that there is a close connection between the foregoing two crimes, how they operate in practice, differences and similarities in the counter-measures used to mitigate their negative effect globally. Thus, in the authors’ contention, this is a novel study that is likely to spur farther research on law and policy against cyber and AML crimes not only in Uganda but also in other jurisdictions. At the same time, the findings of the study could complement, and perhaps also complete, the work of scholars who have written papers on cybercrimes to advocate for regulatory changes fight against these offences. The study will also complement the work of other researchers who have challenged the segregation of cybercrimes and financial crimes in local and international regulatory discourses. This research aims to make a significant contribution to the study of cybercrimes and how they are regulated in international law. Findings The findings of the paper have confirmed that the high incidences of money laundering and cybercrimes today are partly fuelled by inherent weaknesses in the global regulatory system and partly fuelled by weaknesses at an individual state level. Many countries have enacted a raft of anti-cyber and AML legislation but this notwithstanding, these laws have not been used to stem cross-border crimes globally. This is partly explained by the fact that many enforcement institutions lack the requisite capacity to institute measures through which to implement engendered laws and policies easily. The regulatory capacity of many countries has been eviscerated by deficiencies in infrastructure and systems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-368
Author(s):  
Fitriya Fauzi ◽  
Kenneth Szulczyk ◽  
Abdul Basyith

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify current measures taken for financial crime’s prevention and detection in the context of Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach This study is based on data from articles in Indonesian newspapers relating to the current financial crimes, current measures of preventing financial crimes in Indonesia and based on the literature review. Findings There are some attempts to combat financial crimes in Indonesia, both internally and externally. The attempts that have been made for the internal scope are the enactment of anti-money laundering law, the new monitoring system of financial institutions and the formation of a superintendent institution. The attempts that have been made for the external scope are the agreement between Indonesia’ financial intelligence unit Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (PPATK), and other countries’s financial intelligence unit, the affiliation member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to combat financial crimes through strengthening its anti-money laundering and terror financing capabilities. Originality/value This paper presents an overview of current prevention and detection measures in the context of Indonesia, and it is hoped that this paper will contribute to the current discussion of eliminating financial crimes.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippa Duncan

Purpose This paper aims to provide an easy to follow, practical guide for small traditional banks and credit unions to conduct an enterprise-wide risk assessment of the financial institution’s anti-money laundering compliance program. Design/methodology/approach Information was collected from relevant documents published by global standard setters in the disciplines of anti-money laundering, financial crime prevention and risk management. The data was integrated with common challenges experienced by small financial institutions to produce an application-based guide that practitioners can readily implement. Findings Though not a new concept, macro-level financial crises and institutional level financial crimes have influenced the rapid evolution of risk management in financial institutions over the past three decades. Small unsophisticated banks and credit unions are expected to now perform an internal risk assessment. An abundance of information is available on risk assessment, but small institutions remain challenged in finding a turnkey document that is readily actionable to stimulate a less arduous undertaking, especially given the institutions’ limited resources. Research limitations/implications The setting reflects small deposit-taking institutions with traditional services. It is tailored for easy understanding and practical use by the institutions. Originality/value This could influence small institutions to conduct enterprise-wide risk assessments and formulate and use more specific risk management policies.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew James Perkins

Purpose This paper aims to contend that when tackling financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing, international regulators are seeking to hold offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands to higher standards and that this detracts from the pursuit of detecting and prosecuting money launders. Design/methodology/approach This paper will deal with the following perceived issues: firstly, to offshore jurisdictions as a concept; secondly, to outline the efforts made by the Cayman Islands to combat money laundering and to rate these changes against Financial Action Task Forces’ (FATAF’s) technical criteria; thirdly, to demonstrate that the Cayman Islands is among some of the world’s top jurisdictions for compliance with FATAF’s standards; and finally, to examine whether greylisting was necessary and to comment upon whether efforts by international regulators to hold offshore jurisdictions to higher standards detracts from the actual prosecution of money laundering within the jurisdiction. Findings Greylisting the Cayman Islands in these authors’ view was something that should have never happened; the Cayman Islands is being held to standards far beyond what is expected in an onshore jurisdiction. There is a need for harmonisation in respect of international anti money laundering rules and regulations to shift the tone to prosecution and investigation of offences rather than on rating jurisdictions technical compliance with procedural rules where states have a workable anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Research limitations/implications The implications of this research are to show that offshore jurisdictions are being held by FATAF and other international regulators to higher AML standards than their onshore counterparties. Practical implications The author hopes that this paper will begin the debate as to whether FATAF needs to give reasons as to why offshore jurisdictions are held to higher standards and whether it needs to begin to contemplate higher onshore standards. Originality/value This is an original piece of research evaluating the effect of FATAF's reporting on offshore jurisdictions with a case study involving primary and secondary data in relation to the Cayman Islands.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 962-968 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic Compin

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse how terrorism financing can be assimilated with money launderning when the amounts ofmoney involved differ so markedly. Not only is the cost of financing terrorist attacks minimal compared to the huge sums often at stake in financial crimes, but also the psychological profile of terrorists, who are reclusive by nature, contrasts starkly with that of financial criminals, who are usually fully integrated members of society. When terrorism financing is equated with money laundering this represents a utilitarian approach in that it facilitates the creation of a security strategy and stifles criticism of criminogenic capitalismthat turns a blind eye to tax evasion. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is conceptual, focussing on the assimilation of terrorism financing with money laundering. There is an interview with a French magistrate, specialized in the fight against corruption and white-collar crime, and data have been collected from international organizations and scholarly articles. Findings The fight against money laundering and money dirtying has clearly sparked numerous controversies around evaluation, scope, criminal perpetrators and a lack of vital cooperation between administrative and judicial services. Social implications This paper raises questions about the reasons behind the linking of money laundering and money dirtying by states and players in public international law and why the fight against money laundering is very much overshadowed by their focus on terrorist financing in dealing with the growing threat of Islamic State, otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, in the Middle East and West Africa. Originality/value The paper enables the reader to raise the question of similarities between the fight against money laundering and the fight against terrorism financing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 65-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Ravenda ◽  
Maika M. Valencia-Silva ◽  
Josep M. Argiles-Bosch ◽  
Josep García-Blandón

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Buno (Okenyebuno) Emmanuel Nduka ◽  
Giwa Sechap

Purpose Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are important actors both in the formal and informal sectors owing to the nature of services they offer. The DNFBPs are key players in financial and economic development and thus are highly vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. Globally, and indeed, within the West African region, typologies studies have indicated several instances of misuse of DNFBPs for the laundering of proceeds of crime and to a lesser extent, TF. Factors that make DNFBPs vulnerable to ML and TF in the region, include limited understanding of ML/TF risk and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, and poor implementation of AML/CFT measures by the sector. As reporting institutions, DNFBPs are required to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk facing them. Mutual evaluation reports (MERs) of countries in the region noted weak implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs compares to financial institutions. These coupled with the general poor monitoring and supervision of DNFBPs for compliance, make them a weak link in member states’ AML/CFT regime. This study examined how Economic Community of West African States member states can plug the loopholes in the DNFBPs to strengthen their AML/CFT regime and thus improve their performance during mutual evaluation. This study reviewed data from the publications of Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other credible sources. Design/methodology/approach This study is more of desk-review based on secondary data, including information obtained from GIABA, and FATF publications, and websites as well as information obtained from reliable sources on the internet. The authors reviewed the MERs of GIABA member states that have been assessed under the second round, especially that of Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali and Burkina Faso, with particular focus on sections of the reports relating to preventive measures and supervision. In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. Findings This study found that there is a general lack of information on the exact size of DNFBPs across member states, the risk of ML/TF associated with DNFBPs is generally identified as high across member states (albeit at different levels), the extent and level of monitoring/supervision of DNFBPs for AML/CFT compliance trails what is obtainable in financial institutions; the institutional and operational frameworks for regulating, supervising and monitoring DNFBPs are either weak or poorly defined in many member states; and the focus of AML/CFT technical assistance has been more on financial institutions than DNFBPs. Although the number of MERs reviewed for this work may be few, the findings and conclusions in the concluded MERs reflect regional peculiarities, including high informality of the economies, preponderance use of cash in transactions, diversity of DNFBPs and the general weak application of AML/CFT preventive measures by these entities, and the weak AML/CFT supervision or monitoring of DNFBPs which cut across all GIABA member states. Although efforts to address the weaknesses in the DNFBPs, including training and supervision, have commenced, in most member states, these are still at rudimentary levels. Research limitations/implications However, this study is limited by the fact that it was desk-based review without direct inputs of industry players (DNFBPs and their supervisors). Practical implications In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. It aims to bring to the fore the weaknesses of the DNFBPs in the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and therefore will be useful to national authorities who are striving toward strengthening their national AML/CT regimes and to DNFBPs who wish to protect the integrity and stability of their system. Originality/value It is imperative to mention that the weak compliance by DNFBPs, and indeed other challenges inhibiting effective implementation of preventive measures, is not peculiar to West Africa. A review of MERs of 17 African countries (eight countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group region, five in GIABA region and three in the Middle East and North Africa region assessed under the current round as on October 2020, show a similar pattern of weak ratings under Immediate Outcome 4.


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