Product Choice and Channel Strategy for Multi-Channel Retailers

2011 ◽  
pp. 310-332
Author(s):  
Ruiliang Yan ◽  
John Wang
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Product Choice ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Online Channel

With the explosive growth of online sales, multi-channel retailers are increasingly focused on finding ways of integrating the online channel with traditional retail stores. The need for the development of effective multi-channel strategies is strongly felt by the retailers. The present research normatively addresses this issue and using a game theoretic approach, derives optimal strategies that maximize profits under different competitive market structures. Managerial implications are discussed and probable paths of future research are identified.

A game theoretic approach to optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Moeen Sammak Jalali ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Congestion Pricing ◽  
Influential Factors ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic

Purpose This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports. Design/methodology/approach In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models. Findings The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis. Research limitations/implications The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database. Originality/value The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

Portfolio-Maximizing Strategic Voting in Parliamentary Elections

2017 ◽  
pp. 264-282
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Decision Theoretic Approach ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
First Offers

This chapter reviews work on portfolio-maximizing strategic voting in parliamentary systems. It first offers a typology of strategies, sorting them into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. This helps organize the literature and identify gaps. It then considers the equilibrium levels of portfolio-maximizing voting. Taking a game-theoretic perspective (where most of the literature takes a decision-theoretic approach) helps clarify how much strategic voting should be expected and also the interconnections between different varieties of strategic behavior. Finally, the chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the incidence of portfolio-maximizing voting, concluding with some thoughts on fruitful ways forward for future research.

Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War by Terrence L. Chapman

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-149
Author(s):  
Thomas Knecht
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Short Review ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
Multilateral Institutions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Why do states go through the trouble of seeking authorization from multilateral institutions to use military force when they are not required to do so? How do states choose the international organization through which to work? Why do citizens sometimes demand a multilateral response to an international crisis, yet at other times seem content when their leaders act unilaterally? Terrence Chapman takes up these questions in his persuasive and important book Securing Approval. The answer, he says, is domestic politics. Using a game-theoretic approach supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, Chapman shows that international organizations (IOs) provide important information to domestic publics. This information can affect public opinion and, by extension, foreign policy. A short review does not do justice to this nuanced and smart book. Nevertheless, I will outline the author's central argument before discussing the book's contribution to the literature. I conclude by raising three issues that might serve as avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Horizontally Differentiated Store Brands: Production Outsourcing to National Brand Manufacturers

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Shindo ◽  
Nobuo Matsubayashi
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Store Brands ◽  
National Brand ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Degree Of Differentiation ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

We study a retailer's strategic decision with regard to outsourcing the production of such types of store brands (SBs) to national brand (NB) manufacturers. The wholesale price of NB is assumed to be set by the manufacturer, while that of the SB is assumed to be set by the retailer. When a retailer outsources SB production to an NB manufacturer, the NB manufacturer might suffer from cannibalization due to offering both the SB and the NB, implying that a strategic interaction between the retailer and manufacturer is an important issue. Based on this motivation, we mainly focus on the strategy of a dominant retailer in such a situation and investigate it with a game-theoretic approach. We show that the optimal strategy for the SB retailer sensitively depends on the degree of differentiation between the SB and the NB. In particular, if both products are less differentiated, the retailer benefits from offering only the SB, and, in this case, the retailer should offer its wholesale price, after the manufacturer sets the NB wholesale price. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal strategies of the retailer are socially efficient, if and only if the SB and the NB are sufficiently differentiated.

scholarly journals The rich-to-poor vaccine donation game: When will self-interested countries donate their surplus vaccines during pandemics?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lampert ◽  
Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan ◽  
Pieter Vanhuysse ◽  
Markus Tepe
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Will Self ◽  
Parameter Ranges ◽  
Rich Countries ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

When will self-interested vaccine-rich countries voluntarily donate their surplus vaccines to vaccine-poor countries during a pandemic? We develop a game-theoretic approach to address this question. We identify vaccine-rich countries' optimal surplus donation strategies, and then examine whether these strategies are stable (Nash equilibrium or self-enforcing international agreement). We identify parameter ranges in which full or partial surplus stock donations are optimal for the donor countries. Within a more restrictive parameter region, these optimal strategies are also stable. This implies that, under certain conditions (notably a total amount of surplus vaccines that is sufficiently large), simple coordination can lead to significant donations by strictly self-interested vaccine-rich countries. On the other hand, if the total amount that the countries can donate is small, we expect no contribution from self-interested countries. The results of this analysis provide guidance to policy makers in identifying the circumstances in which coordination efforts are likely to be effective.

Children's Perceived Value: Conceptualization, Scale Development, and Validation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Williams ◽  
A Gazley ◽  
N Ashill
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Internal Consistency Reliability ◽  
Future Research ◽  
New York University ◽  
Consumer Decisions ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Stage Process ◽  
Development And Validation ◽  
Value Measure

© 2020 New York University Perceived value among children is an important concept in consumer decisions, yet surprisingly no research has operationalized value for this consumer group. To address this omission, and following the guidelines of DeVellis (2016), this investigation reports the findings of a seven-stage process to develop a valid and reliable instrument for measuring perceived value among children aged 8–14 years. Value for children is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct capturing perceptions of what is received and what is given up, which differs from adult measures in terms of its composition and complexity. A 24-item scale is developed that shows internal consistency, reliability, construct validity, and nomological validity. We also demonstrate the validity of the new scale beyond an existing adult perceived value measure. Directions for future research and managerial implications of the new scale for studying children's consumer behavior are discussed.

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