Huawei, China, and Ideological Tensions in the 5G Telecommunications Platforms

Author(s):  
Bruno Mascitelli ◽  
Mona Chung

While the COVID 19 pandemic has captured the attention of the geo-political agenda throughout 2020, pushing the Huawei controversy off the front pages of the news, the hysteria and suspicions around Huawei providing their lower cost telecommunications equipment to Western nations reached new crescendos in the move towards 5G communication platforms. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the recent series of escalating tensions between Huawei and Western nations. While there was a first run of tension with the 4G networks, it was to be repeated with the preparations for the 5G telecommunications platforms. Alongside this expansion was the parallel development of geo-political tensions between China and Western powers. This included ongoing tensions over the South China Sea, Taiwan's relationship with China, the Hong Kong issue, the trade war with the United States, and general diplomacy between China and the West. The chapter seeks to provide the likely result on how these tensions would be resolved.

Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Terence Roehrig

In 2020, the United States sought to implement its policy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific to address the challenge of a rising China. US–China antagonism increased, spurred on by economic tensions and concerns for Beijing’s actions with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Uighurs, with all this occurring in the context of the global pandemic. As the Trump administration came to a close, the most pressing question was how the turn to great power competition, which intensified in 2020, would evolve under a Biden administration.


2021 ◽  
pp. 242-248
Author(s):  
David Bosco

The disagreement between China and the United States over maritime rights in the South China Sea has become the leading maritime point of friction. But that dispute is just one part of more fundamental change at work in how the world governs the oceans, one that has moved away from the idea of freedom of the seas. A central question is whether the UN Convention’s compromise on the oceans can endure. The Convention increased national sovereignty over parts of the oceans but also created mechanisms of international control. What emerged from that compromise is a complex, hybrid system of governance that relies on national governments but also a variety of international and regional organizations and international courts. Part of that compromise is a narrower version of freedom of the seas, but pressure from multiple directions is rendering even a limited version of that long-standing doctrine increasingly fragile.


Significance However, China's navy already has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent based on Hainan Island. The deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, and their need to reach the mid-Pacific to threaten the continental United States, makes the South China Sea an arena not just of maritime disputes but of US-China military rivalry. Impacts The strategic importance of the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore to the United States will increase. A new defence agreement with the Philippines will, as of last month, support US military activities in the area. Washington will encourage greater Japanese involvement in the South China Sea; as long as Shinzo Abe is prime minister, Japan will oblige.


2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 15-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng-Chwee KUIK

If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing’s growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its “militarisation” activities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 1049-1053
Author(s):  
Alfred W. McCoy

“Your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United States … both in military, but economics also,” said Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte to a burst of applause from an audience of officials in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, the symbolic seat of China's ruling Communist Party. At the Philippine-Chinese trade forum that same day, October 20, 2016, Duterte opened his speech by asking, “What is really wrong with an American character?” Americans are, he continued, “loud, sometimes rowdy, and they have this volume of their voice … not adjusted to civility…. They are the more forward commanding voice befitting obedience.” Evoking some deep Filipino racialist tropes, Duterte then mocked the flat, nasal American accent and rued the time he was questioned at the Los Angeles airport by a “Black” officer with a “black” uniform, “black shoes,” and a “black” gun. Moving from rhetoric to substance, Duterte quietly capitulated to Beijing's relentless pressure for bilateral talks to settle the dispute over the South China Sea, virtually abrogating Manila's recent slam-dunk win on that issue before an international court (Demick and Wilson 2016; DU30 News 2016).


Author(s):  
D.V. Mosyakov ◽  

The author analyzes the situation in the South China Sea at the height of the global Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic and concludes that the pandemic only exacerbates long-standing conflicts. The author also examines the position of China, the United States and the ASEAN countries in relation to disputes in the South China Sea, highlighting Vietnam, which has long been a "bone of contention" between Beijing and Washington.


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