scholarly journals Social Peace and Political Pluralism

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 267-270
Author(s):  
Vereno Brugiatelli

In the modern age cultural and political pluralism received the serious consideration of the Enlightenment philosophers. In the contemporary age, it is the centre of attention of several thinkers that tackle the often dramatic problems related with the misrecognition of rights and freedoms in cultural minority groups. Liberalism in its multiple formulations puts the universal principles that ignore differences at the base of its reflections. Philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer often insisted on the political necessity to face the problem of differences, denouncing the historical and cultural limits of the different forms of liberal universalism. By examining the contraposition between universalism and communitarism, in this paper I intend to give a theoretical solution to such a contrast. In order to outline a perspective able to overcome conflicts in a pacified society, I consider the resources of the recognition of the rights to capabilities, public debate and practical wisdom.


Author(s):  
Karol Berger

The music-dramatic core of the book is framed by sections designed to place Wagner’s late works within the context of the political and ethical ideas of his time. The Prologue offers a genealogy of the principal worldviews available to Wagner and his contemporaries and shows how they related to one another. The options I describe are of diverse age, some with roots going as far back as the antiquity (the Judeo-Christian religious outlook), some characteristic of the modern age (the Enlightenment), some arising even more recently in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the main currents of the Counter-Enlightenment that proceed under the banners of History, Nation, and Will). Deposited at different times, they all actively shaped the landscape in which Wagner found himself and left traces on his music dramas.



1999 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel I. O'Neill

This article critically analyzes the work of Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer, three of the most important contemporary political philosophers writing on issues of multiculturalism. It uses the Rushdie affair, and each theorist's interpretation of it, as the basis for an immanent critique of “multicultural liberalism,” a theory defined by the dual commitment to cultural rights for minority groups and certain core liberal principles, defended in different ways by Kymlicka, Taylor, and Walzer. It is principally concerned with Kymlicka, whose work is one of the most influential attempts to respond to communitarian criticisms that “atomistic” liberalism is inhospitable to community and culture. The article argues that Kymlicka's defense of “multicultural citizenship” is deeply problematic from the perspective of the Rushdie affair. It then considers Taylor and Walzer similarly, as representatives of the communitarian strain of multicultural liberal argument, and likewise finds their positions unconvincing. The article concludes with the suggestion that the Rushdie affair points to a potentially unresolvable tension at the heart of all three attempts to defend multicultural liberalism.



NASPA Journal ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanessa D. Johnson

This study suggests that residence hall students at a predominantly White university perceive the racial climate of residence halls differently depending on their cultural group. White, African American, Latino, Native American, biracial, and international college students were included in this study. In each instance where there were significant differences in students' responses regarding racial climate, the statistical significance was between White and one or more of the cultural minority groups. There were no significant differences found in the responses of any of the ethnic minority groups.



2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
FELIX DRIVER

What is Enlightenment? Few questions in the history of ideas can have given rise to more controversy, sustained over more than two centuries and extending into the furthest reaches of contemporary thought. In comparison, the ‘where’ of Enlightenment – the sites from which philosophes garnered their evidence, the settings in which their ideas took shape, the networks through which they were disseminated, the contexts in which they were interpreted – has received much less attention. It is not that these geographies have been altogether neglected. Distinctions between different ‘national’ Enlightenments (French, Scottish, English, and so on) are familiar, perhaps all too familiar, to historians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. At a smaller scale, it is difficult to imagine historical accounts of the Enlightenment world without some sort of tour of those paradigmatic sites – the coffee house, the botanic garden, the lecture theatre. There is a geography here, of sorts: but in truth it is often simply a stage for action, a passive background (sometimes ‘national’, sometimes ‘local’) to the real business of social and intellectual change. In recent years, however, intellectual historians in general, and historians of science in particular, have begun to pay more attention to these and many other sites, not simply as inert contexts but as vital components of the making and communication of new knowledge. Thus is a genuine geography of knowledge in the making.



2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-278
Author(s):  
TRISTAN J. ROGERS

AbstractWhat is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional virtue? The latter has been exhaustively explored by political philosophers, whereas the former remains underexplored in the literature on virtue ethics. This article defends the view that individual justice is logically prior to institutional justice, and argues that this view requires a conception of individual justice I call ‘justice as lawfulness’. The resulting view consists of three claims. First, just institutions are composed of the relations between just persons. Second, the just person has a disposition to act in accordance with the legal and social norms (collectively, thenomoi) of the existing political tradition. Third, departures from thenomoirequire that the just person act with practical wisdom to reform thenomoiaccording to an implicit standard of justice in the political tradition.





1969 ◽  
pp. 465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Asch

In this article, the author examines the need for constitutional recognition and protection of the political collective rights of minority groups in Canada, particularly those of Aboriginal nations. The author asserts that Canada's present constitutional approach to minority collective rights is one of "indirect consociation," an approach which embraces the ideology of "universalism" and does not expressly recognize or protect minority ethnonational communities. This is ineffective as it generates political instability. He examines both Canadian constitutional thinking as well as the thoughts of Aboriginal nations on the right to self-government and discusses the conflicting theories behind each position. Finally, the author suggests that the solution to resolving this conflict between minority and majority political rights is for Canada to adopt a "direct consociation" approach. This approach would recognize expressly and protect the political rights of Aboriginal nations and other minorities, based on the concept of equality, as opposed to continuing colonialist or assimilationist approaches which only serve to heighten inequality and political tension.



2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
O. A. Vinogradova ◽  
A. V. Ugleva (Yastrebtseva)

Starting from the Age of Enlightenment, a person’s ability of self-improvement, or perfectibility, is usually seen as a fundamental human feature. However, this term, introduced into the philosophical vocabulary by J.-J. Rousseau, gradually acquired additional meaning – largely due to the works of N. de Condorcet, T. Malthus and C. Darwin. Owing to perfectibility, human beings are not only able to work on themselves: by improving their abilities, they are also able to change their environment (both social and natural) and create favorable conditions for their existence. It is no coincidence that perfectibility became the key concept of the idea of social progress proposed by French thinkers in the Age of Enlightenment, despite the fact that later it was criticized, above all, by English authors, who justified its organic and biological nature and gave a different evolutionary interpretation to this concept, without excluding perfectibility from the philosophical vocabulary. In this article, we address the opposition and mutual counterarguments of these two positions. Beyond that, we draw a parallel with some of the ideas of S. Kapitsa, who proved to be not only a critic of Malthusianism but also a direct disciple of Condorcet. In the modern age, the ideas of human self-improvement caused the development of transhumanist movement. Condorcet is more relevant than ever, and today his theory of the progress of the human mind, which influenced the genesis of modern historical science, needs a re-thinking in the newest perspective of improving the mental and physical human nature with the help of modern technologies.



Author(s):  
Ana Rita Ferreira ◽  
Daniel Carolo ◽  
Mariana Trigo Pereira ◽  
Pedro Adão e Silva

This article discusses the ways in which the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic has embodied to the political choices made during the process of creating and defining a democratic welfare state and how the various constitutional principles are reflected in the architecture of the system and have gradually changed over the years. The authors argue that when Portugal transitioned to democracy, unlike other areas of the country’s social policies the social security system retained some of its earlier organising principles. Having said this, this resilience on the part of the Portuguese system’s Bismarckian template has not prevented social protection from expanding here in accordance with universal principles, and has given successive governments manoeuvring room in which to define programmatically distinct policies and implement differentiated reformist strategies. The paper concludes by arguing that while the Constitution has not placed an insurmountable limit on governments’ political action, it has served as a point of veto, namely by means of the way in which the Constitutional Court has defended the right to social protection, be it in the form of social insurance, be it in the imposition of certain social minima.



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