Modeling of Dynamic Game-Based Route Guidance System

2011 ◽  
Vol 130-134 ◽  
pp. 1867-1871
Author(s):  
Yun Wei ◽  
Qing Shao ◽  
Yin Han
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Flow System ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
User Equilibrium ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Guidance System ◽  
Route Guidance ◽  
System Optimum ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Guidance Information

Route guidance process is the dynamic game-based process of traffic authority and users, users’ behavior is affected by the guidance information and it also affect guidance effect. On the basis of analysis of user equilibrium and system optimum, a game theory model between traffic authority and users is presented, and system optimum and user optimum guidance strategy are given. Simulation results show that: user optimum guidance strategy will bring oscillation of traffic flow, system optimum guidance strategy is optimal but difficult to achieve, and coordination of system optimum and user optimum is close to system optimum strategy.

Forced-node route guidance system: incorporating both user equilibrium and system optimal benefits

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 1851-1859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Rahimi-Farahani ◽  
Amir Abbas Rassafi ◽  
Babak Mirbaha
Keyword(s):  
User Equilibrium ◽  
Guidance System ◽  
Route Guidance ◽  
System Optimal

scholarly journals Spatial Competition with Entry Deterrence considering Horizontal Product Differentiations

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Ai-nong Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Transportation Cost ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Entry Deterrence ◽  
Setup Cost ◽  
Middle Point ◽  
Potential Entrant ◽  
Linear City

Spatial competition plays important roles in economics, which attracts extensive research. This paper addresses spatial competitions along with horizontal product differentiations and entry deterrence. By the dynamic game theory model about one firm and a potential entrant with different cost in a linear city, this paper finds that both the higher fixed setup cost and the higher transportation cost deter entrants. To efficiently deter the entrants, the establisher is inclined to locating at the middle point of the linear city.

scholarly journals Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Y. Krylatov ◽  
Victor V. Zakharov ◽  
Igor G. Malygin
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Assignment Problem ◽  
Traffic Assignment ◽  
User Equilibrium ◽  
Urban Traffic ◽  
Route Guidance ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
System Optimum ◽  
Traffic Assignment Problem ◽  
Route Choices

Abstract Recently in-vehicle route guidance and information systems are rapidly developing. Such systems are expected to reduce congestion in an urban traffic area. This social benefit is believed to be reached by imposing the route choices on the network users that lead to the system optimum traffic assignment. However, guidance service could be offered by different competitive business companies. Then route choices of different mutually independent groups of users may reject traffic assignment from the system optimum state. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is shown to be very efficient to formalize competitive traffic assignment problem with various groups of users in the form of non-cooperative network game with the Nash equilibrium search. The relationships between the Wardrop’s system optimum associated with the traffic assignment problem and the Nash equilibrium associated with the competitive traffic assignment problem are investigated. Moreover, some related aspects of the Nash equilibrium and the Wardrop’s user equilibrium assignments are also discussed.

A game-theoretic strategic mechanism to control brand counterfeiting

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Amirhossein Akhavan Mofrad ◽  
Rashid Saeed
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Dynamic Game Theory

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue. Design/methodology/approach This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information. Findings The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision. Practical implications Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues. Originality/value This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.

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