Evolutionary Game Analysis on Management of R&D Staff

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
Zheng Kui Zhu ◽  
Hai Shu Lu
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Game Analysis

At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the R&D staff, between the R&D staff and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes an evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the R&D staff under the assumptions that the enterprises and the R&D staff all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the R&D staff and the enterprises, among the R&D staff, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the R&D staff and the enterprises.

scholarly journals Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Han ◽  
Guohong Chen ◽  
Elena Poh
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Development ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Network Externality ◽  
Industrial Agglomeration ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Informal Contracts ◽  
Credit Network

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three Players on Behavioural Strategy of P2P Lending Participants: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Ge You ◽  
Hao Guo ◽  
Abd Alwahed Dagestani ◽  
Shuai Deng
Keyword(s):  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Sustainable Operations ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Sustainable Operation ◽  
Behavioural Strategy ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Behavioural Strategies

In China, most of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms do not possess operational sustainability due to excessive defaults. To address this problem, the conflict of interests among P2P lending participants is discussed using a stakeholder approach. An evolutionary game model (EGM) of three players is developed to analyse the interactions among regulatory authorities, P2P lending platforms, and borrowers. Then, the asymptotic of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the EGM are analysed. Results indicate that either the P2P lending platforms or borrowers will choose “noncompliant operation” or “default” strategies from a short-term perspective, and the strict supervision of the P2P lending platform in the short term is necessary for the sustainable operation of the platform. When supervision is intensified in the early stage and regulatory pressure becomes a normal state, P2P lending platforms and borrowers will actively select “compliant operation” and “repayment” strategies even if there is a lack of regulation in the future. Meanwhile, the behavioural strategies of P2P lending participants can be changed to conform to the sustainability of P2P lending by reducing the costs of strict supervision and increasing the damage caused by general supervision, reward and punishment coefficient for P2P lending platforms, repayment incentives of borrowers, and defaulting opportunity costs. Finally, suggestions for regulating the behaviours of P2P lending participants and promoting sustainability of P2P lending industry are discussed.

scholarly journals How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (No. 2 Oct 2019) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Shao Jie
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Consumption Pattern ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
China And Japan

The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper will analyze the costs and benefits of three parties (i.e. government, insurance companies and consumers) and their strategies regarding information disclosure of insurance products on the internet. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision not regulation that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information. The different current situations in China and Japan are discussed in light of the model, and some measures are suggested to promote the development of internet insurance markets in both countries.

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