Evolutionary game analysis on government subsidy policy and bank loan strategy in China’s distributed photovoltaic market

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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Evolutionary game analysis of green agricultural product supply chain financing system: COVID-19 pandemic

International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications ◽

10.1080/13675567.2021.1879752 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Zhang Yu ◽

Syed Abdul Rehman Khan

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Agricultural Product ◽

Financing System ◽

Game Analysis ◽

Supply Chain Financing

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System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12041578 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 1578 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Hongxia Sun ◽

Yao Wan ◽

Huirong Lv

Keyword(s):

System Dynamics ◽

Motor Vehicle ◽

Replicator Dynamics ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Practical Significance ◽

Subsidy Policy ◽

New Energy ◽

New Energy Vehicle ◽

The Impact ◽

Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

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