scholarly journals How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (No. 2 Oct 2019) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Shao Jie
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Consumption Pattern ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
China And Japan

The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper will analyze the costs and benefits of three parties (i.e. government, insurance companies and consumers) and their strategies regarding information disclosure of insurance products on the internet. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision not regulation that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information. The different current situations in China and Japan are discussed in light of the model, and some measures are suggested to promote the development of internet insurance markets in both countries.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Management of R&D Staff

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
Zheng Kui Zhu ◽  
Hai Shu Lu
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Game Analysis

At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the R&D staff, between the R&D staff and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes an evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the R&D staff under the assumptions that the enterprises and the R&D staff all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the R&D staff and the enterprises, among the R&D staff, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the R&D staff and the enterprises.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4032-4036
Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Fraud ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Audit Independence

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Stability analysis of green innovation in construction enterprises based on evolutionary game

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02020
Author(s):  
PeiPei Hu
Keyword(s):  
New Products ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Clean Energy ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Stability Results

In order to conform to the trend of ecological economic development, the development of clean, energy saving, environmental protection of green new products has become the primary task of construction enterprises. Based on this, by establishing the game model between suppliers and manufacturers in the construction supply chain, this paper considers the influence of different parameters such as innovation cost, innovation compensation and innovation revenue increment on the choice of green innovation strategy of both enterprises. By solving the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary stability results show that suppliers and manufacturers choose different decision-making methods according to the revenue, input-output results and the amount of green innovation subsidies given to each other.

scholarly journals The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Hong Li ◽  
Xian Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Anhui Province ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Grain Production ◽  
Fluctuation Range ◽  
Government Contractors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The purpose of the paper is to study how the interests of farmland transfer be distributed among the government, contractors, and farmland transferees. The process of the paper is to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies of the government, contractors, and farmland transferees by building a three-party evolutionary game model; in order to identify the equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game, an example of interest distribution in a village in Anhui Province is used to analyze and simulate the three-party evolutionary game. The conclusions of the paper are as follows: the combination of a one-party subsidy, transferring farmland, and grain production is the ideal equilibrium result in the three-party game; farmland transfer rent is the a crucial factor of interest balance among the three parties; only if the farmland transfer rental price is larger than the sum of the contractor’s self-farming incomes and subsidies and lower than the grain income of the transferee can the three parties realize the equilibrium of interest distribution. The suggestions of the paper are that the government should carry out the system of “retirement allowance” and transform “subsidy” to “allowance” to protect the interests of contractors, and the government should promote farmland transfer and encourage grain production by controlling the fluctuation range of farmland transfer rent.

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