Do Informal Contracts Matter for Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Social Capital

We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation.

Contract

This chapter traces the development of the action of assumpsit, a species of trespass on the case used to enforce informal contracts. The earliest examples were of ‘misfeasance’ causing physical damage; they belong as much to the history of tort as of contract. There were intellectual obstacles to extending the trespassory remedy to mere ‘nonfeasance’, but they were overcome by drawing (inter alia) on the concepts of deceit, reliance, and (in Doige’s Case) on the mutual force of bargains. The competing principles were brought together in the Tudor doctrine of consideration, which also accommodated the binding force of mutual executory promises. The use of assumpsit to recover debts, and thereby avoid wager of law, caused a prolonged controversy between the King’s Bench and Common Pleas, which was ended by Slade’s Case (1602). The action was soon afterwards held to lie against executors.

Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects’ partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners’ relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. While socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement, distant pairs do not. Individuals with more central partners behave more cooperatively without enforcement. Capacity for cooperation in the absence of contract enforcement therefore depends on the subjects’ network position. (JEL C93, D86, K12, O15, O17, Z13)

The relationship between information sharing, informal contracts and trust on performance of supply chain management in the SMEs of batik

Purpose The purpose of this study is twofold: to examine the effect of information sharing and contract on increasing the trust level in the relationship between the batik small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and supplier and to examine the trust on performance of a supply chain related to the procurement of raw cotton fabric (mori). Design/methodology/approach This research used primary data collected through interviews and closed questionnaires using a five-point Likert scale. The sample included 65 people, including batik SME-owners in Pekalongan, a Central Java city. This research was conducted using partial least square (PLS) through SmartPLS 3.0 software to analyze the hypothesis. Findings The results of hypothesis testing indicate that trust between owners of SME and their suppliers has a significant positive effect on the performance of supply chain management (SCM). Strong trust between batik SME- owners with their suppliers will be beneficial for both parties. Among other things, trust can reduce unnecessary cost and activity, reduce the waiting time for the arrival of raw material, reduce the number of inventories and increase profit and customer satisfaction. This result has also show that information sharing and informal contract have a significant positive effect on trust between batik SME-owners and their mori suppliers. In this case, information sharing has a higher effect on trust compared to informal contract. Broader information was distributed to the batik SME-owners and their suppliers, resulting in stronger trust between them. Research limitations/implications The limitations of this study include the relatively small sample size and data collection method used to determine the effect of trust, the number of the antecedent variables of trust and the type of scale used to measure the performance of the supply chain. Suggestions for future research may include expanding the scope of the data collection to other regions in Indonesia; adopting a dyadic approach and longitudinal research in providing evidence on the effect of trust as a component of an interactive activity along the supply chain; adding other variables that contribute towards increasing the trust between SMEs and their suppliers (such as commitment); and enhancing the performance measurement of SCM by using a direct measure of financial and non-financial performance instead of recording the perception of the batik SME-owners. Practical implications As the scale of their business increases, it is better if the batik SMEs can enhance information sharing and informal contract with suppliers to promote the development of trust. In this case, to ensure that batik SMEs will have better information sharing from their supplier, it is better if the batik SME-owners using the criteria of supplier willingness to share detailed information when they select the new supplier. Then, to increase the role of contract on trust, it is better if owner of batik SME learn to understand the written contract processes and procedures as their business scale increases. Social implications The research confirms that information sharing, informal contract and trust between batik SMEs and their suppliers can have a positive effect on the performance of the supply chain. It may encourage more SMEs and suppliers in the batik industry to build better information sharing, informal contract and trust as a bottom line for the economic and non-economic growth of their business. Originality/value The conceptual model used in this study is original, built from past research about the relationship between information sharing, informal contract and trust on the performance of the supply chain. Besides, the selection of the sample is also original, which in this case is on the batik SMEs which have informal contracts. This case has still been rarely studied, and the research is therefore highly valuable.

Why the Uncertain Term Occurs in the Farmland Lease Market: Evidence from Rural China

Urbanization and aging of the agricultural population lead to the insufficient supply of agricultural labor and land being idle in rural China, calling for the farmland lease market to maintain sustainable and efficient use of farmland. However, rural households tend to agree on an uncertain term for farmland leasing in/out, which leads to low efficiency and land loss in agriculture. Therefore, using the survey data collected from 2704 rural households and a logistic regression model, we examine the effects of risk faced by the rural households on the likelihood of the uncertain term for farmland leasing. Results reveal that a large share of labor with low education and high income increase the likelihood of an uncertain term for farmland leasing out activities, while a high disaster frequency, a high education of household and a high share of agricultural income increase the probability of an uncertain term for farmland leasing in activities. Additionally, leasing farmland to/from relatives or neighbors, informal contracts, low rent and the lack of pension insurance also increase the likelihood of the uncertain term for farmland leasing out/in activities. Findings suggest that more attention should be paid to education, agricultural insurance and social security system in rural areas.

Formality and informality in an Indian urban waste economy

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute original evidence about the conditions for formal and informal contracts for commodities and labour in the waste economy of a South Indian town. Design/methodology/approach Field research was exploratory, based on snowball sampling and urban traversing. The analysis follows capital and labour in the sub-circuits of capital generating waste in production, distribution, consumption, the production of labour and the reproduction of society. Findings Regardless of legal regulation, which is selectively enforced, formal contracts are limited to active inspection regimes; direct transactions with or within the state; and long-distance transactions. Formal labour contracts are least incomplete for state employment, and for relatively scarce skilled labour in the private sector. Research limitations/implications The research design does not permit quantified generalisations. Practical implications Waste management technology evaluations neglect the social costs of displacing a large informal labour force. Social implications While slowly dissolving occupational barriers of untouchability, the waste economy is a low-status labour absorber of last resort, exit from which is extremely difficult. Originality/value The first systematic exploration of formal and informal contracts in an Indian small-town waste economy.

Plural forms of governance in the beef industry: a case study in Brazil

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to describe the forms of coordinating transactions used by a large beef slaughterhouse and processing companies and their suppliers of beef cattle, and to identify the reasons for the adoption of plural forms of governance for their transactions with cattle suppliers. Design/methodology/approach – A case study format was selected for this investigation. The focal company selected offers a large number of products derived from beef for different commercialisation channels in the domestic and foreign market. A non-probability sample of 30 suppliers (cattle farmers) of the focal company provided data on finished steers sold in 2010, according to the three types of governance used in the transactions (spot market, forward contracts and long-term contracts). Findings – The simultaneous use of more than one type of governance structure to coordinate similar transactions has been termed plural forms of governance in the literature. In Brazil, new forms of governance, such as formal and informal contracts, have been adopted for transactions between beef processing companies and cattle farmers, in addition to the use of spot market and vertical integration. It has been shown that the adoption of plural forms reduces the risk of complex transactions; and is a strategy to deal with unpredictable institutional environments and high heterogeneity of both suppliers and distribution channels. Research limitations/implications – The research provides empirical evidence of plural forms of governance, as well as the reasons for the adoption of this strategy by firms, which contributes to the ongoing theoretical discussion on this subject. Practical implications – The paper has implications for company supply chain management. Originality/value – This paper presents theoretical review on plural forms of governance, new empirical evidence and determinant factors for their adoption.