Three-Level Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contract and Rebate-Penalty Contract

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 195-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Hua Pang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decision Making Capacity ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Reasonable Choice ◽  
Independent Decision

A supply chain is made up of independent entities having independent decision-making abilities, each intent on maximizing his benefits. The coordination of a three-level supply chain made up of one manufacturer, one distributor and one retailer is studied under the random demand. Firstly, the optimal order quantity is determined with the channel coordination of the supply chain; Secondly, the paper designs a combined contract (revenue-sharing contract & rebate-penalty contract, RS-RP contract) to coordinate the supply chain, namely, manufacturer offers distributor a revenue-sharing contract and distributor offers retailer a rebate-penalty contract. The paper validates that RS-RP contract can coordinate the three-level supply chain by choosing reasonable parameters. The reasonable choice of parameters can attain the win-win good among all business members, which will help to improve the decision-making capacity and competive ability of businesses involved in the supply chain, and the sizes of parameters in a reasonable range relate to the bargaining position of a business. Finally, the validity of the RS-RP contract is illustrated by a numerical example.

Study on RP-RS Combined Contract of Three-Level Supply Chain

2012 ◽  
Vol 629 ◽  
pp. 927-931 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Hua Pang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decision Making Capacity ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Reasonable Choice

The paper studied the coordination of a three-level supply chain made up of one manufacturer, one distributor and one retailer under the random demand. Firstly, the optimal order quantity is determined with the channel coordination of the supply chain; Secondly, the paper designs a combined contract (rebate-penalty contract & revenue-sharing contract, RP-RS) to coordinate the supply chain, namely, manufacturer offers distributor a rebate-penalty contract and distributor offers retailer a revenue-sharing contract. The paper validates that RP-RS contract can coordinate the three-level supply chain by choosing reasonable parameters. The reasonable choice of parameters can attain the win-win good among all business members, which will help to improve the decision-making capacity and competive ability of businesses involved in the supply chain, and the sizes of parameters in a reasonable range relate to the bargaining position of a business.

scholarly journals A Coordinating Strategy for Biofuel Supply Chain under Disturbance Using Revenue Sharing Contract Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Geng ◽  
Yong Zhang ◽  
Yixiang Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Alternative Energy ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Biofuel Supply Chain

Biofuel is considered to be an important alternative energy in the future transportation. Its development is supported by the rest of the world. However, biofuel industry development is still very slow. From the previous research it is known that the supply chain coordination and other problems need to be solved to promote the supply chain ability. This paper studies biodiesel supply chain coordination problem from the view of disturbance management. It gives a disturbed coordination strategy which contains the optimal order quantity and the contract parameters. This paper has then verified the disturbed coordination strategy through using the actual data of Jiangsu Yueda Kate New Energy Co. Ltd. The result shows that when the market demand and the recovery cost are simultaneously disturbed, the coordination can make the biodiesel supply chain robust and the new strategy under the revenue sharing contract is better than the original one.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

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