Tourism Supply Chain Coordination through Revenue Sharing Contract
2014 ◽
Vol 644-650
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pp. 6093-6096
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Keyword(s):
In this paper we develop revenue sharing contracts in a scenic spot –travel agency tourism supply chain. We use the Stackelberg game model to formulate the leader–follower relationship. By backward induction, we obtain equilibrium under the non-cooperative revenue sharing contract and the cooperative revenue sharing contract. Results show that the non-cooperative revenue sharing contract doesn’t meet the travel agency’s participation constraint while the cooperative revenue sharing contract can achieve coordination and Pareto improvement. Finally the Nash bargaining game suggests that scenic spot obtains a larger share of the profit growth due to its higher bargaining power.
2018 ◽
Vol 2018
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pp. 1-13
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2018 ◽
Vol 197
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pp. 607-615
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 697
◽
pp. 482-487
Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 2
(2)
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pp. 144
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Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 205
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pp. 1-14
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Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 117
(9)
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pp. 1842-1865
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Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 2014
◽
pp. 1-11
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