The Second-Degree Price Discrimination of m Firms with n Demand Intervals Pricing Based on Cournot Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 971-973 ◽  
pp. 2432-2441
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Distribution Law ◽  
General Sense ◽  
Common Ratio ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
N Demand ◽  
Second Degree

Under the condition of linear demand function, the distribution law of equilibrium segment points of firms enforcing second-degree price discrimination to maximize respective revenues is analyzed in the case of m firms with n intervals pricing by using complete information static game theory. This is a promotion for two firms pricing with n segment intervals and m firms pricing with two segment intervals. The results show that: when m firms divide demand to enforce second-degree price discrimination, the necessary condition of revenue maximization is to divide demand into some intervals and let the length of each interval become geometric series, whose common ratio is 1 / m. The unified formula of equilibrium production, equilibrium price and market equilibrium total revenue of all four kinds of markets under the condition of second-degree price discrimination are presented in the most general sense, further more, the nature of which are analyzed in detail.

Analysis on Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly Market Based on Static Game Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 912-914 ◽  
pp. 1865-1873
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Total Revenue ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
The Relationship

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.

scholarly journals Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Böhme
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Discrimination Problem ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
High Demand ◽  
The One ◽  
Two Sided Markets ◽  
Second Degree

AbstractThe paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a framework with two distinct types of agents on either side of the market, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly lower than the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, we find that it is possible in the monopoly optimum that the contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is contract-specific.

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Michel Mougeot ◽  
Sonia Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Marginal Benefit ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Public Acceptability ◽  
Distortionary Taxes ◽  
High Willingness ◽  
Second Degree

AbstractIn this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a seconddegree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second-degree price discrimination and from a third-degree price discrimination and high willingness-to-pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.

scholarly journals PERSPEKTIF ILMU EKONOMI DAN UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 5 TAHUN 1999 TENTANG LARANGAN PRAKTIK MONOPOLI DAN PERSAINGAN USAHA TIDAK SEHAT TERHADAP DISKRIMINASI HARGA

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irwan Sugiarto
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Peak Load ◽  
Cost Price ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Price Determination ◽  
Intertemporal Price Discrimination ◽  
Price Strategies ◽  
Second Degree

Unfair business competition can cause and trigger monopoly practice where markets arecontrolled and dominated by business doers. Besides, another impact of monopoly practiceis that; the business doers tend to sell expensive products without good quality. Monopolybusiness doers often apply price strategy where the entrepeneurs at normal competitivemarkets are not possible to do that. One of price strategies is price discrimination. Pricediscrimination refers to different price determination at a product at different time to everydifferent customer, or different market, but it is not based on different cost. Price discriminationcan be distinguished into three kinds, namely first degree price discrimination, second degreeprice discrimination, and third degree price discrimination. In addition to that, there is avariant in second degree price discrimination and third degree price discrimination, namelytwo part tariff, intertemporal price discrimination, and also peak load pricing.In Act No. 5 year 1999, discrimination related to prices is regulated in two groups ofrules and articles, that is to say price discrimination which is aproved under agreement, anddiscrimination which is performed by unilateral agreement or without agreement.

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