Purpose
Heuristics are used in the judgment and decision-making process of bank employees; however, discussions and research on the type or range of judgmental heuristics are very difficult to find throughout the world. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze what types of heuristics are used in bank employees’ judgment and decision-making processes and the extent to which those types of heuristics prevent rational decision making due to the systematic biases they generate. In particular, this study aims to conduct empirical research based on various scenarios related to the banking industry.
Design/methodology/approach
To examine the heuristics in decision-making circumstances and the level of subsequent biases, the present study narrowed the scope of research to the three main types of heuristics introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), namely, representativeness heuristics, availability heuristics and anchoring and adjustment heuristics. To analyze the bank employees’ decision making, this study specifically investigated the level of decision-making heuristics and the level of bias by focusing on these three types of heuristics. This study targeted bank employees who either sell financial products or are engaged in customer service work at a real/physical bank.
Findings
For representativeness heuristics, this study found bank employees’ judgment of probability was influenced by biases, such as insensitivity to prior probability, insensitivity to sample size, misconception of chance and insensitivity to predictability. Regarding availability heuristics, it found that bank employees judge the probability of events based on the ease of recalling an event instead of the actual frequency of the event, and so they fall prey to systematic biases. Finally, regarding anchoring and adjustment heuristics, this study found that employees fall prey to judgment biases as they judge the probability of conjunctive events and disjunctive events based on anchoring and insufficient adjustment.
Originality/value
Although people who are well-trained in statistics can avoid rudimentary errors, they fall prey to biased judgment at a similar level to those who are not properly trained in statistics when it comes to more complicated and ambiguous issues. It clearly indicates that it is risky to determine that financial experts would be more rational than the general public in making various judgments required in the policy-making process. To conclude, it is imperative to recognize the existence of heuristics-based systematic biases in the judgment and decision-making process and, furthermore, to reinforce the education and training system to improve bank employees’ rational choice and judgment ability.
Critical Thinking and Debiasing: Experimentation in an Academic Writing Course
