Truth, knowledge and belief Truth and relativity • True for me, true for you • Truth, value and morality • Belief, justification and truth • Justification without arguments • Knowledge • Justification failure • Knowledge and rational persuasiveness • Philosophical directions

2005 ◽  
pp. 273-300
Author(s):  
Ellen Winner

This book is an examination of what psychologists have discovered about how art works—what it does to us, how we experience art, how we react to it emotionally, how we judge it, and what we learn from it. The questions investigate include the following: What makes us call something art? Do we experience “real” emotions from the arts? Do aesthetic judgments have any objective truth value? Does learning to play music raise a child’s IQ? Is modern art something my kid could do? Is achieving greatness in an art form just a matter of hard work? Philosophers have grappled with these questions for centuries, and laypeople have often puzzled about them too and offered their own views. But now psychologists have begun to explore these questions empirically, and have made many fascinating discoveries using the methods of social science (interviews, experimentation, data collection, statistical analysis).


Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

This chapter considers whether internal categoricity can be used to leverage any claims about mathematical truth. We begin by noting that internal categoricity allows us to introduce a truth-operator which gives an object-language expression to the supervaluationist semantics. In this way, the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude towards model theory itself. We then use this to illuminate the cryptic conclusions of Putnam's justly-famous paper ‘Models and Reality’. We close this chapter by presenting Tarski’s famous result that truth for lower-order languages can be defined in higher-order languages.


Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 6 include the nature of perceptual justification, intentionality, modal knowledge, credences, epistemic supererogation, epistemic and rational norms, expressivism, skepticism, and pragmatic encroachment. The various writers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey

Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.


1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-417
Author(s):  
Hugues Leblanc
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenai Hu ◽  
Maria Vender ◽  
Gaetano Fiorin ◽  
Denis Delfitto

Recent experimental results suggest that negation is particularly challenging for children with reading difficulties. This study looks at how young poor readers, speakers of Mandarin Chinese, comprehend affirmative and negative sentences as compared with a group of age-matched typical readers. Forty-four Chinese children were tested with a truth value judgment task. The results reveal that negative sentences were harder to process than affirmative ones, irrespective of the distinction between poor and typical readers. Moreover, poor readers performed worse than typical readers in comprehending sentences, regardless of whether they were affirmative or negative sentences. We interpret the results as (a) confirming the two-step simulation hypothesis, based on the result that the difficulty in processing negation has a general validity (persisting in pragmatically felicitous contexts), and (b) disconfirming that negation, as far as behavioral data are concerned, can be used as a reliable linguistic predictor of reading difficulties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-529
Author(s):  
WEI YAO

This paper studies the fuzzy Scott topology on dcpos with a *-continuous semigroup (L, *) as the truth value table. It is shown that the fuzzy Scott topological space on a continuous dcpo is an ιL-sober space. The fuzzy Scott topology is completely distributive iff L is completely distributive and the underlying dcpo is continuous. For (L, *) being an integral quantale, semantics of L-possibility of computations is studied by means of a duality.


Studia Logica ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy T. Cook
Keyword(s):  

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