COMPANY DIRECTORS DISQUALIFICATION ACT 1986

2012 ◽  
pp. 42-52
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (6/7) ◽  
pp. 582-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar ◽  
Hafiz Majdi Abdul Rashid

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to ascertain the control role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), as prescribed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG).The MCCG (2000) requires substantive involvement of INEDs on the audit, nomination and remuneration board sub-committees. The study also examines the effectiveness of INEDs in discharging their monitoring roles in these sub-committees. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research design consisting of a series of interviews with board members of Malaysian-owned PLCs on the board of Bursa Malaysia was used. Findings – Interviews with 27 company directors reveal that, due to their independence, INEDs are crucial in safeguarding the interests of smaller investors if situations arise in which shareholders’ interests may be threatened. The interviews also disclose that the audit committee possesses the most authority among the sub-committees, as it derives its power not only from the Listing Requirements but also from statute, as well as being involved in areas of the company not traditionally associated with the committee. The study also reveals the differences in opinion between executive directors and INEDs with regard to the extent of INEDs’ effectiveness. Research limitations/implications – This research utilises interviews. Generalisation may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. In addition, the sample is not random, as access to many directors is dependent on recommendations. In addition, the respondents have been consciously selected to cover various board positions, including independent and non-independent directors. Practical implications – The findings from this research suggest that INEDs are able to discharge their responsibilities in overseeing the conduct of executives and protecting the interests of investors. In addition, the interviews disclose that the effectiveness of INEDs depends on how non-executive directors view INEDs being on the board. Rather than focusing solely on their control role, INEDS are expected to have a more proactive and progressive role in ensuring sustainable growth and the expansion of the business entity. Originality/value – There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating the effectiveness of INEDs in the control role of the board in developing countries. Prior studies were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.


2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-115
Author(s):  
Joanna Gray

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to report on the company directors' disqualification proceedings following the failure of FSA‐regulated firm.Design/methodology/approachThe paper outlines the facts surrounding the decision and comments on the ruling.FindingsIt was found that this whole question of overlapping laws in highly complex and regulated business sectors is a real one and is set to become a growing problem for courts to manage and boards to predict.Originality/valueThe paper highlights the real, practical problems that can arise when different legal regimes criss‐cross the same factual domain.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Gary Gagarin Akbar

ABSTRAK Direksi mempunyai peran yang sangat vital bagi perseroan. Direksi ibarat nyawa bagi perseroan, tidak mungkin suatu perseroan tanpa adanya direksi. Direksi bertugas sebagai perwakilan perseroan dalam menjalankan perseroan. Dalam prakteknya, direksi sering kali dirugikan akibat keputusan bisnis yang diambilnya. Hal ini diakibatkan oleh belum adanya harmonisasi undang-undang mengenai definisi keuangan negara sehingga memungkinkan direksi dikenakan tindak pidana korupsi jika direksi dalam mengambil keputusan bisnis menimbulkan kerugian bagi perseroan. Jika direksi dalam mengambil suatu keputusan tidak mendapatkan perlindungan hukum maka direksi menjadi takut untuk mengadakan transaksi bisnis. Karena itu dalam hal ini sangat dibutuhkan doktrin Business Judgement Rule sebagai perlindungan hukum bagi direksi dalam melakukan transaksi bisnis agar mereka bisa menjalankan tugasnya dengan maksimal. Selain itu, jika direksi membuat keputusan bisnis yang menimbulkan kerugian untuk perseroan dikarenakan ultra vires atau melampaui kewenangan yang telah ditentukan dalam anggaran dasar atau peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku, maka direksi tersebut tidak bisa dilindungi oleh doktrin Business Judgement Rule. Dalam hal direksi melakukan tindakan ultra vires, maka direksi tersebut dapat dikenakan Pasal 97 ayat (3) UUPT, pasal ini menyatakan bahwa setiap anggota direksi bertanggung jawab penuh sampai pada harta pribadi apabila direksi tersebut melakukan kesalahan atau kelalaian yang mengakibatkan perseroan mengalami kerugian, kemudian direksi BUMN juga dapat dikenakan Pasal 1365 mengenai perbuatan melawan hukum yang mengakibatkan kerugian pada orang lain, maka harus membayar ganti rugi kepada pihak yang dirugikan. Kata Kunci: Direksi, BUMN, Business Judgement Rule ABSTRACT Directors have a very important role for company. Directors like soul of the company, impossible a company without directors. Directors served as representative of the company in running the company. In practice, directors are often adversely affected business decision taken. This is caused by the absence of harmonization of legislation on the definition of state finances so as to enable the directors subject to corruption if the directors in making business decisions result in losses for the company. If the directors in taking a decision not to get legal protection, the directors be afraid to conduct business transactions. Therefore in this case is necessary doctrine of Business Judgment Rule as legal protection for directors in the transaction of business so that they can carry out their duties to the fullest. In addition, if directors make business decisions causing losses to the company due to the ultra vires or beyond the authority specified in the statutes or regulations applicable law, the directors can not be protected by the doctrine of the Business Judgment Rule. In the event that the directors act ultra vires, the directors may be subject to Article 97 paragraph (3) of legislation limited liability company, this article states that each member of the board of directors fully responsible to the personal property if the directors of wrongdoing or negligence which resulted in the company at a disadvantage, then the board of directors SOE also be subject to Article 1365 of the unlawful act that caused financial losses to others, it must pay compensation to the injured party. Keywords : Directors, State Owned Enterprises, Business Judgement Rule (BJR)


This is a new edition of the established authority on the law relating to directors of companies incorporated under the UK Companies Acts. The new edition features all important developments in the law including the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 which improves transparency (including requiring directors to be natural persons unless exceptions apply), simplifies company filing requirements, clarifies the application of general duties to shadow directors, modernises directors’ disqualification and reforms insolvency law to facilitate proceedings where there has been wrongdoing. There has been a wealth of new case law relevant to directors’ duties before the English courts, all of which are analysed and explained, including the Supreme Court decisions in Prest v Petrodel Resources, Jetivia v Bilta (UK), FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners and Eclairs Group v JKX Oil & Gas, the Court of Appeal decisions in Smithton Ltd v Naggar and Newcastle International Airport v Eversheds as well as the important High Court decisions in Universal Project Management Services v Fort Gilkicker, Madoff Securities International v Raven and the wrongful trading case, Re Ralls Builders. Non-UK cases are also analysed including Weavering Macro Fixed Income Fund Ltd v Peterson in the Cayman Islands’ Court of Appeal and the 2016 decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Chen v Jason. In keeping with developments in case law and legislation the book now includes expanded coverage of multiple derivatives claims, directors’ exposure to third party claims and a new chapter on civil remedies for market abuse. The third edition is a complete reference work on the law relating to company directors and is the first port of call for all serious corporate lawyers and scholars on this subject.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-194
Author(s):  
Eva Micheler

This chapter describes the role of the directors. The duties of the directors are owed to the company and while the shareholders are the primary indirect beneficiaries of those duties, the law integrates the interests of creditors and also of wider society. The law is primarily focused on ensuring compliance with the Companies Act and the constitution rather than with the enhancement of economic interests. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 serves as a mechanism through which the public interest is integrated into company law, while the UK Corporate Governance Code adds a further procedural dimension to the operation of the board of directors. The chapter then looks at how the idea of designing remuneration in a way that guides the directors to act either for the benefit of the shareholder or for the benefit of the company is flawed and has served as a motor justifying increasing rewards without bringing about commensurate increases in performance. It also analyses the duties of the directors to keep accounting records and to produce financial reports.


Author(s):  
Imogen Moore

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter examines the law on minority shareholder remedies, which provide some limited protection or avenues of redress for a shareholder with grievances concerning the actions of the company, directors, or majority shareholders. The chapter explores, in particular: the rule in Foss v Harbottle; derivative claims; personal claims and the issue of reflective loss; the ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy in Companies Act 2006, s. 994; and petitions to wind up the company on the ‘just and equitable’ ground under Insolvency Act 1986, s. 122(1)(g).


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