) Seller is bound to hand the goods over to the first carrier at a particular place, but hands them over prior to the place agreed. d) Goods are handed over to the first carrier but have not yet been identified. Q 67-9 In which of the above situations is the burden of the risk split during transport? Q 67-10 Under the CISG, when does the risk pass in the following situations: a) Seller hands goods over to freight forwarder who will undertake the transport itself. b) Same situation, but a third party will transport the goods. c) Same situation, but the freight forwarder has the right to transport in its own name. Q 67-11 Compare Art. 67 CISG with domestic sales laws. a) Compare Art. 67(1) CISG with § 2-509 UCC. Do you see any similarities? b) What is the corresponding rule in the BGB? c) Why is the BGB clearer than the CISG with regard to the passing of risk in the case of handing the goods over to a freight forwarder? Q 67-12 It has been stated that, under the CISG, although from a dogmatic view, the time of delivery and the time of passing of risk have been distinguished, in practice they will often coincide. Under French and Swiss law, the passing of risk has been settled differently. a) To what extent do Swiss and French law provide for a similar rule on the passing of risk? b) Which point in time is decisive as to whether the risk has passed to the buyer? c) Which rules are more suited for modern international trade, the French and Swiss ones or those found in Art. 67 CISG and the other sales laws? Discuss. d) Under Swiss law, title to the goods will not pass until handing over the goods to the buyer. How does the CC settle the passing of title to goods? Cf. Art. 1138(1) CC. e) In light of what has been said sub c), do you see a rationale in French law for how it handles the passing of risk? f) Which difficulty persists in Swiss law with regard to risk allocation between the buyer and the seller? Q 67-13 As a rule, the burden of proof as to where loss or damage to the goods occurred is borne by the party that wants to draw a benefit from that fact.

2007 ◽  
pp. 519-519
Author(s):  
A. Haddadi ◽  
F. Ravaz

Under criminal law, euthanasia can have two distinct qualifications: that of homicide in the event that the act of directly killing another person is characterized, or that of assisting a third party in the suicide. These two qualifications are applicable on the condition that the agent — the author of the act of causing death — is not the one who went through it. In fact, selfeuthanasia is nothing more than suicide.In addition to euthanasia imposed to a third party (such as in the case of Malevre, nurse from Mantes-la-Jolie, tried in 2003), the euthanasia requested and subscribed constitutes a complex legal question. Answering this question first involves specifying the position of contemporary criminal law in the face of suicide.In the event that suicide is only decriminalized, in fact, the author of the act — regardless of the outcome of his actions, who is himself the victim, cannot be prosecuted. Nor ultimately receive any condemnation.However, this lack of prosecution and conviction is by no means an endorsement of the act — suicide — by the law.Moreover, in the event that suicide is a right, it would then be necessary to agree that any candidate for this act can request assistance in the accomplishment of his death. Given these two opposing approaches, imposed on us the question of whether there is a right to die.Although the euthanasia imposed is unequivocally under ordinary criminal law, the euthanasia requested and granted is not based on any rights. To date, there is no right to approve a death request, but on the other hand, it does allow it to be respected and to some extent promotes its approach with dignity. This work will focus on two central points which are the possibility that euthanasia is a homicide under common law (I) and the attitude of French law concerning the right to death (II).


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Dija Hedistira ◽  
' Pujiyono

<p>Abstract<br />This article aims to analyze the ownership and mastery of a fiduciary collateral object, in cases that often occur today, many disputes between creditors and debtors in fiduciary collateral agreements are caused because creditors assume that with executive rights as fiduciary recipients, the fiduciary collateral object legally owned by creditors and creditors the right to take and sell fiduciary collateral objects when the debtor defaults unilaterally, as well as the debtor who considers that the fiduciary collateral object is owned by him because the object is registered on his name, so that the debtor can use the object free as  giving to a third party or selling the object of fiduciary guarantee unilaterally. the author uses a normative <br />juridical approach, and deductive analysis method based on the Civil Code and fiduciary law applicable in Indonesia, Law No. 42 of 1999 concerning Fiduciary Guarantees. The conclusion of the discussion is the ownership of the object of the Fiduciary Guarantee is owned by the debtor in accordance with the Law, mastery of the object of collateral controlled by the debtor for economic benefits, the procedure of execution The object of Fiduciary Guarantee is carried out in accordance with the Fiduciary Guarantee Act, an alternative mediation in resolving the dispute. There needs to be clarity in the use of language in making a law, so as not to conflict with each other between Article one and the other Articles.<br />Keywords: Ownership; Mastery; Object of Fiduciary Guarantee; Debtor; Creditors.</p><p>Abstrak<br />Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis tentang kepemilikan dan penguasaan suatu objek jaminan fidusia, dalam kasus yang saat ini sering terjadi, banyak sengketa antara kreditur dan debitur dalam perjanjian jaminan fidusia disebabkan karena kreditur beranggapan bahwa dengan adanya hak eksekutorial sebagai penerima fidusia, maka objek jaminan fidusia tersebut secara sah dimiliki oleh kreditur dan kreditur berhak mengambil dan menjual objek jaminan fidusia saat debitur cidera janji<br />(wanprestasi) secara sepihak, begitupun dengan debitur yang menganggap bahwa objek jaminan fidusia tersebut dimiliki olehnya karena objek tersebut terdaftar atas namannya, sehingga debitur dapat mempergunakan objek tersebut secara bebas seperti menyerahkan kepada pihak ketiga atau menjual objek jaminan fidusia tersebut secara sepihak. penulis menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif, dan metode analisis deduktif yang didasarkan pada Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata<br />dan hukum jaminan fidusia yang berlaku di Indonesia, Undang-Undang No. 42 Tahun 1999 tentang Jaminan Fidusia. Kesimpulan pembahasan adalah Kepemilikan Objek Jaminan Fidusia dimiliki oleh debitur sesuai Undang-undang, penguasaan objek jaminan dikuasai debitur untuk manfaat ekonomis, prosedur eksekusi Objek Jaminan Fidusia dilakukan sesuai dengan Undang-Undang Jaminan Fidusia, alternatif secara mediasi dalam menyelesaikan sengketa yang terjadi. Perlu ada kejelasan dalam<br />penggunaan bahasa pada pembuatan suatu Undang-Undang, agar tidak saling bertentangan antar Pasal satu dengan Pasal yang lainnya. <br />Kata Kunci: Kepemilikan; Penguasaan; Objek Jaminan Fidusia; Debitur; Kreditur.</p>


Author(s):  
Krebs Thomas

This commentary focuses on Article 2.2.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning undisclosed agency. The doctrine of the undisclosed principal allows an intermediary to bring about direct contractual relations between the principal and a third party, even though the intermediary appears to be acting in its own name alone. The doctrine offers a way in which a party wishing to buy or sell in the market can do so without appearing itself in the transaction. This doctrine was excluded altogether from the PICC, as it was seen as ‘inappropriate in the context of international contracting’. This commentary discusses the practical consequences of (attempted) undisclosed agency, enterprise liability arising from undisclosed agency, and the burden of proof relating to undisclosed agency.


1993 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward M. Harris

When entering into a legal agreement, it is not unusual for one of the parties to ask the other to provide some security so as to ensure that the latter's obligations under the agreement will be fulfilled. There are two basic forms of security, personal and real. In personal security for a loan, the borrower arranges for a third party to come forward and to promise the lender that he will fulfil the borrower's obligations in the event that the borrower does not make interest payments or repay the principal. In real security, the borrower pledges some of his property, either movable or immovable, as security to the creditor. If the borrower defaults, the creditor has the right to seize the property pledged as security, and, if he wishes, to sell it for cash in lieu of repayment.


Author(s):  
Vogenauer Stefan

This commentary focuses on Article 5.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning a contract's exclusion and limitation clauses. According to Art 5.2.3, the conferment of rights in the beneficiary includes the right to invoke a clause in the contract which excludes or limits the liability of the beneficiary. There has to be express agreement of the parties to give the benefit of an exclusion or limitation clause to the beneficiary. This would be the case in the ordinary ‘Himalaya clause’, contained in bills of lading. The burden of proof is on the third party that invokes the clause excluding or limiting liability.


Author(s):  
Pichonnaz Pascal

This commentary analyses Article 8.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning set-off by notice. Under Art 8.3, the right of set-off is exercised by notice to the other party. This means that set-off can operate outside a courtroom and has a discharging effect on the obligation of the first party without the intervention of a judge or arbitrator. This commentary discusses the principle of set-off by notice, the form of notice of set-off, and time to give notice (‘anticipatory notice’). It also considers two other modes of set-off, set-off within insolvency proceedings and set-off by agreement, and concludes by explaining the burden of proof relating to set-off by notice.


Author(s):  
Pichonnaz Pascal
Keyword(s):  

This commentary analyses Article 8.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning the conditions of set-off. Set-off has five basic requirements: mutuality of obligations, which means that the parties should owe each other performances; obligations of the same kind; the need for the ‘first party’ to be entitled to perform its obligation; the right of the ‘other party’ to enforce obligations; and the ascertainment of the obligation of the ‘other party’. This commentary discusses set-off and jurisdiction (arbitration), mutuality of obligations, obligations of the same kind, right to perform and enforceability, the notions of ascertainment and of ‘the same contract’, and burden of proof relating to set-off.


Author(s):  
Huber Peter

This commentary analyses Article 7.3.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning notice of termination. Under Art 7.3.2, termination of the contract has to be made by notice to the other party and sets a time limit for giving notice in certain cases of breach. The provision serves two objectives: first, it aims to prevent the aggrieved party from speculating on market fluctuations by postponing its decision on whether or not to terminate and, secondly, it allows the non-performing party to avoid any losses due to uncertainty as to whether the aggrieved party will terminate the contract. This commentary also discusses time limits for the exercise of the right to terminate and the burden of proof concerning notice of termination.


Author(s):  
Huber Peter

This commentary focuses on Article 3.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning an error that occurs in the expression or transmission of a declaration. Art 3.2.3 serves two purposes. The first is to attribute errors in expression and transmission to the party from which the declaration emanated. This is of particular relevance for errors in transmission, as in this case a third party (the transmitter) may commit the mistake which will then, under Art 3.2.3, be attributed to the party making the declaration. The second purpose is to protect the mistaken party in those cases where, as a result of the application of the rules on contractual interpretation, the contract is concluded on terms that the mistaken party did not intend. This commentary discusses the general principles of the right to avoid the contract, specific fact patterns, and burden of proof, along with the liability of both parties for damages under Art 3.2.16.


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