A Liberal Concept of Caregiving as Burden and Excellence

2019 ◽  
pp. 117-137
Author(s):  
Asha Bhandary
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
Arnošt Novák

Direct actions constitute an important repertoire of action for environmental movements in Western countries. This article differentiates two ideal types of this repertoire of action: the anarchist concept, which understands direct action in terms of values and as a preferred way of doing things; and the liberal concept, which uses direct action in an instrumental way. Based on my empirical research in post-socialist Czech Republic, the article focuses on debates over environmentalism and, to be more precise, on uses of direct actions by environmental organizations. It explains why the liberal concept was very limited and why direct action as a preferred way of doing things has not become a part of the repertoire of collective action. The article argues that the movement was politically moderate due to a combination of reasons: the very specific historical experience of the Czech environmental movement, which inclines it to use dialogue rather than confrontations with power; the fear of political hostility and marginalization by the state; and the internal dynamics of the environmental milieu.


Author(s):  
Lucjan Wroński ◽  

In his paper, the author analyses some premises of liberal concept of equality and its philosophical origins. He attempted to show affinities and differences between liberal and conservative approaches to legal equality. He argues that economic inequality is compatible with political and legal liberties within conservative political philosophy. Victorian lawyer James Fitzjames Stephen proved that fraternity is an ambiguous ideal conceived from utilitarian perspective mainly because that it would be political naïvete to expect love from our citizens instead of justice and respect.


2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188
Author(s):  
Courtney Doucette

Abstract This article examines letters on glasnost sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1987 and compiled by the Central Committee’s Letter Department in a booklet for the Politburo in 1988. Contextualized by other sources from the archive of this Letter Department and others, these sources begin to illuminate how the Central Committee’s Letter Department functioned and how it evolved during Perestroika. These letters also allow us to begin to incorporate more ordinary citizens’ conceptions of glasnost into the history of this concept. These sources show at least four definitions of glasnost that circulated in the first years of reform. None of these definitions coincided with the liberal concept of “freedom of speech”. The conversation about glasnost in these letters challenges the common liberal teleology of studies of Perestroika, highlighting the distinctly Soviet nature of those who wrote letters and the concepts they wrote about.


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 382-408
Author(s):  
Reza Hajatpour

AbstractThis article discusses the book "Religious Government and Human Rights" (Hukūmat-i dīn-i wa huqūq-i insān) by the Shiite Grand Ayatullāh Husayn 'Alī Muntazirī (1922-2009). In this work, he explicitly tackles central issues of religious government and discusses its incongruity with human rights. He advocates the recognition of human rights along general lines, and positions himself firmly against absolutist Islamic rule, thereby undermining the concept of religious authority currently prevalent in the Islamic Republic. Muntazirī justifies these moves by applying the traditional method of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), calls for re-arranging the system of how sections of the law are structured and even for the possibility of adding entirely new articles. Iğtihād for him is the renewal of jurisprudence in accordance with the Zeitgeist, with changing social conditions and with scientific discoveries. Jurisprudence, in contrast to revelation, is the work of man and can therefore be questioned and adapted in the light of the principles of reason ('aql). Muntazirī calls for a fresh review of jurisprudence based on the liberal human rights of our time. He also stresses the permanent and universal character of these natural and fundamental rights, which apply in all situations and under all conditions despite cultural and religious differences. For Muntazirī, these fundamental rights are deduced from the very essence of man's existence (insāniyat-i insān), which constitutes their only legitimate source. The roots for Muntazirī's oppositional and critical stance towards the Islamic Republic and its despotic system of rule lie first and foremost in his negative personal experiences with the system. Gradually, these gave way to a critical and more liberal concept of religion and political authority in his thought.


1966 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-325
Author(s):  
George P. Klubertanz ◽  
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
April Carter

This article argues that liberalism's failure to address systematically the question of citizens' obligation to military service is indicative of its wider failure to develop a satisfactory concept of citizenship. Whilst liberalism's individualist bias, implicit class assumptions and hope of transcending war have all contributed to neglect of citizen duty to bear arms, the most interesting reason, in relation to contemporary republican critiques, is liberalism's inadequate view of citizenship. This article examines the different approaches of the classical English liberals Locke, Bentham and J. S. Mill to international relations, forms of national defence and the role (if any) of citizens, and considers very briefly the views of some contemporary liberal theorists on military service and justified resistance to the draft. Finally, it comments on the implicit reliance of liberal polities on non-liberal models of citizenship, and the need for a coherent liberal concept of citizenship which includes an examination of responsibility for defence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Aleksei V. Loginov

A number of widely discussed court decisions on cases of insults against religious feelings in Russia, such as the relatively recent “Pokemon Go” case of blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky or the lawsuit filed against an Orthodox priest by Nikolai Ryabchevsky in Yekaterinburg for comparing Lenin with Hitler, make pertinent the question of why toleration becomes so difficult in matters concerning religion. In this paper, I revise the classical liberal concept of toleration (David Heyd, Peter Nicholson, and John Horton), arguing that it is challenged by contemporary philosophers, who see no room for applying this concept in the “domain of identities”. The most prominent case of “primordial” identity, that is, the notion of identity as a given, is the claim of devoted believers for recognition. Should we replace the principle of toleration by the principle of recognition since the latter better corresponds to identity claims? To address this question, in the first part of the article I describe the mechanism of tolerant attitude (Nicholson, Heyd) and in the second part, I analyze the debates about the possibility or impossibility of inner religious toleration (Avishai Margalit, Cary Nederman, and Maxim Khomyakov) and further compare toleration and recognition as normative principles. In the light of the debates I took part in the conference hosted by the University of Southern Denmark in October 2019 as part of the project “Religious Majority/Minority in Public Space in Russia and Northern Europe: Historical-Cultural Analysis”, I come to the conclusion that the principle of toleration is preferable to the principle of recognition because the “second-order” arguments for toleration in a secular state will be universally acceptable (pragmatic argument) and, therefore, the principle of toleration is more logical (analytical argument). Following Peter John’s thesis about minimal recognition embedded in toleration, it may also be concluded that we need a normatively charged idea of citizenship, which could provide us with universal “second-order” foundation.


Author(s):  
Abraham Kovacs

Abstract The aim of this paper is to scrutinise the two aspects of the debate which took place between Hungarian liberal theology and neo-orthodoxy from 1860s onwards. First, it discusses the liberal concept of what the essence of Christian religion was and its orthodox critique which led to the Declaration of Faith in Debrecen (1875). Secondly, it investigates the arguments on what basis liberal theologians rejected confessions. The paper argues that both trends interpreted very differently the Reformed principle ‘ecclesia semper reformari debet with ecclesia semper transformari debet’ and throws light on how it is best to understand their way of thinking.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document