Qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. Lucrezio e lo scetticismo nel libro IV del De rerum natura

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura (469–521), Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (X 31–32) and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself.

The transformative power of accepting God's love

This article develops an account of some of the central features involved on the human side in adopting a richly accepting orientation towards God's love. It then builds a conceptual and empirical argument for the conclusion that accepting God's love can enhance a person's mental health and can indirectly enable a person to cultivate or maintain moral virtues – whether or not God exists. Importantly, the article contends that these transformative benefits are available to both believers and agnostics, and an original secondary data analysis is offered to support this conclusion in the case of agnostics. The article explains how this transformative value of accepting God's love may serve as the basis for a novel pragmatic argument for theistic religious commitment.

Defining Stereotypes and Stereotyping

How Stereotypes Deceives Us aims to illuminate the conditions under which stereotypes and stereotyping lead to misperceptions and misjudgements, but what exactly are stereotypes and what is stereotyping? This chapter defends the definitions of stereotypes and stereotyping that are adopted throughout this book. In particular, this chapter defends a non-normative conception of stereotyping, according to which stereotypes can be accurate or inaccurate, and stereotyping can be distorting or non-distorting. Existing arguments in favour of the non-normative account are critically evaluated before a pragmatic argument is presented and defended. It is argued that stereotypes should be defined as comparative social attitudes that make distinctions between social groups. Reasons are given for accepting that social attitudes other than beliefs, including implicit attitudes, should count as stereotypes.

A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason

Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views, which, by reference to their historical models, can be named as follows: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian, and Nietzschean. The subject matter of this chapter is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the core lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is presented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcendental-pragmatic argument, an argument that takes account of the maximization of individual utility, and an empirical premise addressing an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the chapter outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.

Religious Fictionalism and Pascal’s Wager

This chapter is a re-examination of Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument (Pascal’s Wager) in support of wagering for God, first introduced in Pensées, Part III, §233. It is, in part, a consideration of whether Pascal is best interpreted as advocating a version of fictionalism about the Christian religion. Although it is ultimately concluded that Pascal should not be interpreted this way, his views are remarkably close to the religious fictionalist’s, and, in a sense, his views may be thought of as a precursor to religious fictionalism. In addition, this chapter is also a consideration of how a contemporary fictionalist might adapt Pascal’s argument. Although the new “factionalist” wager suffers from many of the same problems as Pascal’s original wager, it is not vulnerable to them all. In particular, fictionalists can dodge a thorny problem first raised by Antony Duff in 1986.

Second-Order Arguments, or Do We Still Need Tolerance in the Public Sphere?

A number of widely discussed court decisions on cases of insults against religious feelings in Russia, such as the relatively recent “Pokemon Go” case of blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky or the lawsuit filed against an Orthodox priest by Nikolai Ryabchevsky in Yekaterinburg for comparing Lenin with Hitler, make pertinent the question of why toleration becomes so difficult in matters concerning religion. In this paper, I revise the classical liberal concept of toleration (David Heyd, Peter Nicholson, and John Horton), arguing that it is challenged by contemporary philosophers, who see no room for applying this concept in the “domain of identities”. The most prominent case of “primordial” identity, that is, the notion of identity as a given, is the claim of devoted believers for recognition. Should we replace the principle of toleration by the principle of recognition since the latter better corresponds to identity claims? To address this question, in the first part of the article I describe the mechanism of tolerant attitude (Nicholson, Heyd) and in the second part, I analyze the debates about the possibility or impossibility of inner religious toleration (Avishai Margalit, Cary Nederman, and Maxim Khomyakov) and further compare toleration and recognition as normative principles. In the light of the debates I took part in the conference hosted by the University of Southern Denmark in October 2019 as part of the project “Religious Majority/Minority in Public Space in Russia and Northern Europe: Historical-Cultural Analysis”, I come to the conclusion that the principle of toleration is preferable to the principle of recognition because the “second-order” arguments for toleration in a secular state will be universally acceptable (pragmatic argument) and, therefore, the principle of toleration is more logical (analytical argument). Following Peter John’s thesis about minimal recognition embedded in toleration, it may also be concluded that we need a normatively charged idea of citizenship, which could provide us with universal “second-order” foundation.

The Julius Caesar Problem

The Julius Caesar problem concerns cross-categorical identities such as “3 = Julius Caesar”. The problem and its significance to some Fregean projects are explained. The notions of sortal and category are introduced. A neo-Fregean argument to the effect that every object belongs to a unique category is criticized and an alternative, more pragmatic argument to the same effect is developed. The handling of such mixed identity statements often needs conceptual decisions, not just factual discoveries. The conceptual decisions of our ancestors are implicit in our inherited linguistic practices, which have by and large legislated against the overlap of categories, but exceptions to the rule are certainly possible and very likely even actual.

A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth

Even though pragmatic theories of truth are not widely held, they have advantages not found elsewhere. Here I focus on one such advantage: that a pragmatic theory of truth does not limit the range of truth-apt beliefs and thereby “block the way of inquiry.” Furthermore, I argue that this speaks for a particular formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth, one that shifts away from Peircean approaches and their emphasis on temporal independence, and toward a theory that instead emphasizes truth’s subject independence.

Are Feminism and Competition Compatible?

Contemporary feminist interest in the persistent underrepresentation of women in top professions suggests an implicit approval of the competition required to achieve these posts. Competition, however, seems to be in tension with feminist opposition to domination and oppression. This paper outlines the dimensions of this tension and examines three attempts to resolve the incompatibility. The first two try to separate the undesirable elements of competition from the positive by way of the competitiveness/competition and the challenge/scarcity distinctions. I argue that these distinctions fail to alleviate worries about competition, particularly in the context of the professions. Meanwhile, the third reconciliatory attempt offers a pragmatic argument for compatibilism based on the value of women's participation in the professions (and their associated competitions). Although this pragmatic argument has some merit, I argue that it significantly overestimates the amount of competition acceptable for feminist participation. The end result is that, within the context of the professions, competition remains fundamentally in tension with feminism.