Dewey on Disability and Epistemic Virtue

2021 ◽  
pp. 124-137
Author(s):  
Sarah H. Woolwine
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Virtue

Love and Friendship

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar ◽  
E. M. Dadlez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Joint Activities

Emma is a novel about the centrality of love and friendship to its heroine’s happiness. Emma’s friendship with Mr. Knightley illustrates Aristotle’s conception of the highest kind of friendship: a friendship of virtuous people who share their lives through conversation and joint activities. Critics who disagree with this claim misunderstand either Emma’s character or Aristotle’s conception of virtue. Some critics reject the Aristotelian-Austenian conception of a good friendship on the grounds that a good friendship is often in conflict with moral and epistemic virtue. Good friends are, and ought to be, epistemically biased, and willing to do immoral things for their friends’ sake. But while there may be moral dilemmas in which whatever one does is wrong, it is only in the friendships of bad or “morally casual” people that there is frequent conflict between friendship and moral and epistemic virtue. Such conflict is not inherent in the nature of friendship.

Extending Epistemic Virtue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Battaly
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism

What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off? This chapter suggests that VR and EC are not obviously incompatible, and that each might fruitfully contribute to the other. Although there has been an explosion of recent work at the intersection of virtue epistemology and EC, this work has focused almost exclusively on the reliabilist side of virtue epistemology. Little has been said about the intersection of VR and EC. This chapter takes initial steps toward filling that gap.

THE DYNAMICS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL DECOLONISATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS EPISTEMIC FREEDOM

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Academic Freedom ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Global South ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Knowledge Domain ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Conceptual Study

The problem of the 21st century in the knowledge domain is best rendered as the ‘epistemic line’. It cascades directly from William E B Dubois’s ‘colour line’ which haunted the 20th century and provoked epic struggles for political decolonisation. The connection between the ‘colour line’ and the ‘epistemic line’ is in the racist denial of the humanity of those who became targets of enslavement and colonisation. The denial of humanity automatically disqualified one from epistemic virtue. This conceptual study, therefore explores in an overview format, how Africa in particular and the rest of the Global South in general became victims of genocides, epistemicides, linguicides, and culturecides. It delves deeper into the perennial problems of ontological exiling of the colonised from their languages, cultures, names, and even from themselves while at the same time highlighting how the colonised refused to succumb to the ‘silences’ and fought for epistemic freedom. The article introduces such useful analytical concepts as ‘epistemic freedom’ as opposed to ‘academic freedom’; ‘provincialisation’; ‘deprovincialisation’; ‘epistemological decolonisation’; ‘intellectual extroversion’; and ‘epistemic dependence’. It ends with an outline of five-ways-forward in the African struggles for epistemic freedom predicated on (i) return to the base/locus of enunciation; (ii) shifting the geo-and bio-of knowledge/moving the centre; (iii) decolonising the normative foundation of critical theory; (iv) rethinking thinking itself; and finally (v) learning to unlearn in order to relearn.

scholarly journals Critical Thinking in Moral Argumentation Contexts: A Virtue Ethical Approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 242
Author(s):  
Michelle Ciurria
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Natural Light ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Ethical Approach ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Moral Argumentation ◽  
Light Theory

In traditional analytic philosophy, critical thinking is defined along Cartesian lines as rational and linear reasoning preclusive of intuitions, emotions and lived experience. According to Michael Gilbert, this view – which he calls the Natural Light Theory (NLT) – fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminist forms of argumentation and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I argue that while Gilbert’s criticism is correct for argumentation in general, NLT fails in a distinctive and particularly problematic manner in moral argumentation contexts. This is because NLT calls for disputants to adopt an impartial attitude, which overlooks the fact that moral disputants qua moral agents are necessarily partial to their own values and interests. Adopting the impartial perspective would therefore alienate them from their values and interests, causing a kind of “moral schizophrenia.” Finally, I urge a re-valuation of epistemic virtue in argumentation.

Good Learning and Epistemic Transformation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Kunimasa Sato
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Good Learning ◽  
Socially Situated ◽  
The Ideal

Abstract This study explores a liberatory epistemic virtue that is suitable for good learning as a form of liberating socially situated epistemic agents toward ideal virtuousness. First, I demonstrate that the weak neutralization of epistemically bad stereotypes is an end of good learning. Second, I argue that weak neutralization represents a liberatory epistemic virtue, the value of which derives from liberating us as socially situated learners from epistemic blindness to epistemic freedom. Third, I explicate two distinct forms of epistemic transformation: constitutive and causal epistemic transformation. I argue that compared with the ideal conception of epistemic virtue, constitutive epistemic transformation that involves good learning has a transcendent value in light of agents constantly renewing their default epistemic status toward ideal virtuousness.

Gift-giving as an Epistemic Virtue

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 158-174
Author(s):  
Olga V. Popova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Knowledge Exchange ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Gift Giving ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Growth Of Knowledge

The article presents a study of gift-giving practices in the context of the development of modern biomedicine and shows their relationship to the realization of epistemic virtues. In biomedicine, the gain and production of knowledge (the gift of knowledge) is often grounded in bodily gift (sacrifice) and donor practices. The latter are associated with a number of mishaps in the history of biomedicine, reflecting the violation of moral norms in the process of obtaining scientific data and demonstrating the need for a clear differentiation of intellectual and moral virtues. An important factor in the formation of the epistemic norms of modern biomedicine has been the transformation of the values of scientific knowledge from practices of coercion to giving. As a result, the involuntary sacrifice of biomaterials to science was replaced by voluntary practices of somatic giving and informational exchange that determine the process of mutual recognition in science. It is shown that gift-giving in science is closely associated with intellectual virtues, with intellectual generosity characterizing the idea of openness in science and scientists’ intention for production and constant growth of knowledge, and can also be related to the idea of altruistic service to science, involving the exchange of received scientific data and access to free information in the network space. A number of examples of the modern digital gift ethos and the implementation of the principles of openness of knowledge and knowledge exchange in the context of the creation of biomedical expert digital platforms, the formation of social scientific networks – platforms with open access to scientific information, the development of the phenomenon of “garage” science and other “zones of exchange” experience are considered.

Epistemic Virtue of Wisdom and Evidentialism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-208
Author(s):  
Kirill V. Karpov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Case

My primary concern in this article is the connection between virtue epistemology and evidentialism. This possible connection is analyzed upon, firstly, the example of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, and, secondly, the historical case – Thomas Aquinas’ approach to virtue of wisdom as an intellectual disposition (habitus). I argue that it is possible to offer such an interpretation of ‘intellectual virtue’ that aligns with the peripatetic tradition broadly understood (to which the epistemology of virtues ascends), and on the basis of which an evidentialist theory of justification is offered. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the main interpretations of virtue epistemology and evidentialism in the light of externalism/internalism debate. In the second part I discuss Aquinas’ understanding of intellectual virtue as a disposition (habitus). The main concern here are virtues of theoretical habitus – wisdom and (scientific) knowledge. I show that habitus in this case is understood in two ways: as an ability, inherent to human beings, and as objective knowledge. Thus, there are two understandings of wisdom – as a virtue and knowledge (scientia). Finally, in the concluding parts of the paper, I outline possible ways of solving presented in the first part challenges to evidentialism and internalism.

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