Moral Expressions in 280 Characters or Less: An Analysis of Politician Tweets Following the 2016 Brexit Referendum Vote

Ideas about morality are deeply entrenched into political opinions. This article examines the online communication of British parliamentarians from May 2017-December 2019, following the 2016 referendum that resulted in Britain's exit (Brexit) from the European Union. It aims to uncover how British parliamentarians use moral foundations to discuss the Brexit withdrawal agreement on Twitter, using Moral Foundations Theory as a classification basis for their tweets. It is found that the majority of Brexit related tweets contain elements of moral reasoning, especially relating to the foundations of Authority and Loyalty. There are common underlying foundations between parties, but parties express opposing viewpoints within a single foundation. The study provides useful insights into Twitter’s use as an arena for moral argumentation, as well as uncovers the politician’s uses of moral arguments during Brexit agreement negotiations on Twitter. It contributes to the limited body of work focusing on the moral arguments made by politicians through Twitter.

On formal ethics versus inclusive moral deliberation

In this article, I will advocate caution against a formalization of ethics by showing that it may produce and perpetuate unjustified power imbalances, disadvantaging those without a proper command of the formalisms, and those not in a position to decide on the formalisms’ use. My focus rests mostly on ethics formalized for the purpose of implementing ethical evaluations in computer science–artificial intelligence, in particular—but partly also extends to the project of applying mathematical rigor to moral argumentation with no direct intention to automate moral deliberation. Formal ethics of the latter kind can, however, also be seen as a facilitator of automated ethical evaluation. I will argue that either form of formal ethics presents an obstacle to inclusive and fair processes for arriving at a society-wide moral consensus. This impediment to inclusive moral deliberation may prevent a significant portion of society from acquiring a deeper understanding of moral issues. However, I will defend the view that such understanding supports genuine and sustained moral progress. From this, it follows that formal ethics is not per se supportive of moral progress. I will illustrate these arguments by practical examples of manifest asymmetric relationships of power primarily from the domain of autonomous vehicles as well as on more visionary concepts, such as artificial moral advisors. As a result, I will show that in these particular proposed use-cases of formal ethics, machine ethics risks to run contrary to their proponents’ proclaimed promises of increasing the rigor of moral deliberation and even improving human morality on the whole. Instead, I will propose that inclusive discourse about automating ethical evaluations, e.g., in autonomous vehicles, should be conducted with unrelenting transparency about the limitations of implementations of ethics. As an outlook, I will briefly discuss uses formal ethics that are more likely to avoid discrepancies between the ideal of inclusion and the challenge from power asymmetries.Please check and confirm that the authors and their respective affiliations have been correctly identified and amend if necessary.I confirm.Author names: Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). I confirm. Kindly check and confirm the country name for the affiliation [1] is correct.I confirm.

Three Risks That Caution Against a Premature Implementation of Artificial Moral Agents for Practical and Economical Use

In the present article, I will advocate caution against developing artificial moral agents (AMAs) based on the notion that the utilization of preliminary forms of AMAs will potentially negatively feed back on the human social system and on human moral thought itself and its value—e.g., by reinforcing social inequalities, diminishing the breadth of employed ethical arguments and the value of character. While scientific investigations into AMAs pose no direct significant threat, I will argue against their premature utilization for practical and economical use. I will base my arguments on two thought experiments. The first thought experiment deals with the potential to generate a replica of an individual’s moral stances with the purpose to increase, what I term, ’moral efficiency’. Hence, as a first risk, an unregulated utilization of premature AMAs in a neoliberal capitalist system is likely to disadvantage those who cannot afford ’moral replicas’ and further reinforce social inequalities. The second thought experiment deals with the idea of a ’moral calculator’. As a second risk, I will argue that, even as a device equally accessible to all and aimed at augmenting human moral deliberation, ’moral calculators’ as preliminary forms of AMAs are likely to diminish the breadth and depth of concepts employed in moral arguments. Again, I base this claim on the idea that the current most dominant economic system rewards increases in productivity. However, increases in efficiency will mostly stem from relying on the outputs of ’moral calculators’ without further scrutiny. Premature AMAs will cover only a limited scope of moral argumentation and, hence, over-reliance on them will narrow human moral thought. In addition and as the third risk, I will argue that an increased disregard of the interior of a moral agent may ensue—a trend that can already be observed in the literature.

Moral Assessment of War in Russian Marxist Thought in the 1910–1930s

This article precedes a large-scale study of the ethics of war in the USSR. The text deals with the problem of finding moral argumentation in the Russian Marxist tradition of under­standing of war in 1910–1930s. Lenin, developing the ideas of Marx and Clausewitz, formu­lated that war is continuation of politics, which in turn is an expression of the class struggle. This thesis was sometimes taken as evidence of a rejection of the ethical consideration of war. However, a closer study of the literature and comparative research of the Bolsheviks theorists’ attitudes to militarism and pacifism, can lead to the conclusion that the ethical view on war was not completely alien to the Soviet authors. The typology of war, peculiar to the Russian Marxism of the specified period, is given, and the main strategies of moral legit­imization of war are also designated. At the end of the article, the question of the complexity of studying the soviet ethics of war in the context of the homogenization of philosophical and military discourses in the USSR is considered. However, it is concluded that this institu­tional feature of Soviet science and philosophy manifested itself over time, that the reduc­tion in the possibility of free thought and discussion gradually increased. Accordingly, in the writings of the 1920s and 1930s, we can try to discover the original Soviet ethics of war and fix various points of view and positions on the issues of the moral limitation of war. The ar­ticle ends with the definition of the directions of further develop­ment of the subject. These tasks are: differentiation of the generalized views on the moral dimension of war presented in this article, clarification the dynamics and forms of the Soviet moral theory of war canon, and identification the differences between Lenin’s and Stalin’s approaches to understanding the war.

On the Empirical Measurement of Legitimacy

For decades, Tom Tyler had led the charge of making legitimacy and procedural justice core concepts and variables in the empirical study of compliance and cooperation in the social sciences. In this chapter, after laying out a conceptual map of the three types of legitimacy and the roles that procedures can play in legitimation, I show that much of Tyler’s work focuses on providing support for two assertions: that a belief in the legitimacy of local authorities leads people to comply, cooperate, and positively engage with them, and that fair procedures are a powerful way to make people develop these beliefs. I then argue that both of these claims are misleading. On the one hand, Tyler’s operationalization of legitimacy distorts it beyond common meaning. On the other hand, Tyler only measures and shows the effects of perceptions of procedural justice, and thus merely gives reason to focus on reforming institutions such that they appear just, rather than become just. The only way to avoid this unhappy Machiavellian outcome, I argue, is to once again bring in moral argumentation to discussions of institutional reform.

Grue-Sørensen imellem filosofi og pædagogik

The philosophical situation at Copenhagen University in the 1960’s was dominated by two positivists. Th elogical positivist Jørgen Jørgensen – who had written the history of the “movement” – and the legal positivistAlf Ross. There were also two “outsiders”: Peter Zinkernagel, who did more analytical philosophy of language in the British style, and K. Grue Sørensen who was working in the traditions of neo-Kantianism. In 1955 Grue-Sørensen was hired as the first professor in education – after a long controversy about the scientific status ofeducation as a discipline – but with a focus on the history of education. He had received a doctoral degree in philosophy in 1950 with a dissertation on refl exivity as a philosophical concept and a thesis about the reflexivity of consciousness. He was also an objectivist in ethics, and had been critical of the prevalent moral relativism and subjectivism found in recent philosophy. Jørgensen and Ross had done important work on moral argumentation with more technical work on the logic of imperatives and norms. Moral objectivism was not only wrong but in a way also “immoral” because it undermined their belief in democracy. Especially Jørgensen also thought that the idea of reflexivity was wrong when applied to consciousness. Neither statements nor consciousness could be reflexive – that is refer to themselves/itself. The reflexivity of consciousness is – according to Jørgensen – simply not an empirical psychological fact. Grue-Sørensen tried to establish the foundation of a theory of education based both on conceptions of consciousness and of the relation between scientific knowledge – facts – and moral values – in a neo-Kantian fashion. For him the interplay between ethics and knowledge was a central part of a theory of education – a belief due to which he never became a professor of philosophy – having tried many times. These debates in philosophy and in education were superseded in the 1970’s by the rise in influence of the German inspiration from Critical Theory and the demise of logical positivism.

Understanding Cultural Relativism: A critical Appraisal of the Theory

The aim of this review article is to reveal the cons and pros of ethical relativism, especially conventionalism. This article is written with the intention of showing some of the practical upshots of conventionalism without totally denying some of its virtues in a world where diversity of cultures and customs is apparent. The article inquires the question: Is ethical relativism tenable? The review article relies on reviewing secondary sources. What I am arguing in this article is that despite the attraction of ethical relativism as an intellectual weapon to fight against ethnocentrism and cultural intolerance, the view still goes against the idea of intercultural comparison, criticism and moral argumentation, so that it would have serious disastrous implication on practice, especially on the universal character of human rights and shutters all together any sort of moral progress and reform. The article concludes that we can set forth certain objective moral codes, discovered through rational intercultural dialogue and discussion which could be applied regardless of cultural specificities upon which cultural inter-comparison, discussion and moral argumentation is possible.