Epistemic Virtue of Wisdom and Evidentialism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-208
Author(s):  
Kirill V. Karpov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Case

My primary concern in this article is the connection between virtue epistemology and evidentialism. This possible connection is analyzed upon, firstly, the example of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, and, secondly, the historical case – Thomas Aquinas’ approach to virtue of wisdom as an intellectual disposition (habitus). I argue that it is possible to offer such an interpretation of ‘intellectual virtue’ that aligns with the peripatetic tradition broadly understood (to which the epistemology of virtues ascends), and on the basis of which an evidentialist theory of justification is offered. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the main interpretations of virtue epistemology and evidentialism in the light of externalism/internalism debate. In the second part I discuss Aquinas’ understanding of intellectual virtue as a disposition (habitus). The main concern here are virtues of theoretical habitus – wisdom and (scientific) knowledge. I show that habitus in this case is understood in two ways: as an ability, inherent to human beings, and as objective knowledge. Thus, there are two understandings of wisdom – as a virtue and knowledge (scientia). Finally, in the concluding parts of the paper, I outline possible ways of solving presented in the first part challenges to evidentialism and internalism.

scholarly journals Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Deliberate Effort ◽  
Over Time

Leading virtue epistemologists defend the view that knowledge must proceed from intellectual virtue and they understand virtues either as refned character traits cultivated by the agent over time through deliberate effort, or as reliable cognitive abilities. Philosophical situationists argue that results from empirical psychology should make us doubt that we have either sort of epistemic virtue, thereby discrediting virtue epistemology’s empirical adequacy. I evaluate this situationist challenge and outline a successor to virtue epistemology: abilism . Abilism delivers all the main benefts of virtue epistemology and is as empirically adequate as any theory in philosophy or the social sciences could hope to be.

Spinoza and the Breakdown of Thomist Politics: Machiavellianism and Utopia

2020 ◽  
pp. 319-352
Author(s):  
Alexandre Matheron
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mediating Role

In this chapter, Matheron reconstructs the historical and philosophical context that led Spinoza, in Chapter I of the Political Treatise, to make the seemingly improbable association between St. Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, and More. By reconstructing the context of political philosophy in the 17th century, Matheron endeavours to show the emergence of the specific problematic—simply put, resolving the tension between theory and practice—to which Spinoza delivers a novel solution. For the Thomists, the solution to this problem is to introduce the mediating role of prudence, which bridges the speculative and the practical. The Machiavellians, or politicians, of which Spinoza speaks, ultimately represent the other side of this same problematic to the extent that they praise the cunning of actual political figures. And Hobbes too is ultimately guilty of falling into the same teleological, utopian illusion by arguing that the state arises from reason and the realization that the safety sovereignty provides is preferable to the state of nature. Spinoza’s innovation is to propose a speculative science of human praxis, not in its idealized form, but one which produces objective knowledge of the laws that determine human beings subject to passions to produce different kinds of self-regulating political regimes.

Secondary-Cause Autonomy and Divine Motivation

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Religious Motivation ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Theoretical View ◽  
Human Autonomy ◽  
The Voice

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.

Extending Epistemic Virtue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Battaly
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism

What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off? This chapter suggests that VR and EC are not obviously incompatible, and that each might fruitfully contribute to the other. Although there has been an explosion of recent work at the intersection of virtue epistemology and EC, this work has focused almost exclusively on the reliabilist side of virtue epistemology. Little has been said about the intersection of VR and EC. This chapter takes initial steps toward filling that gap.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

An Evaluation of Transhumanist Bill of Rights From Current and Future Perspective

2019 ◽  
pp. 346-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erdem Öngün
Keyword(s):  
Genetically Modified ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Future Perspective ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Human Beings

Science and technology are now radically changing human beings and how they help create various future forms of advanced sapient and sentient life in a transhumanist future and their related rights. In that process, the issue of transhumanist rights for such forms attract a great attention that is worth rethinking. Transhumanist Bill of Rights mainly covers “sentient entities” such as human beings, including genetically modified humans, digital intelligences, cyborgs, intellectually enhanced, previously non-sapient animals, any species of plant or animal enhanced to possess the capacity for intelligent thought, and other advanced sapient life forms. In that respect, the main concern of this chapter basically centers around the question to what extent transhumanist rights will be compatible and applicable enough to meet the needs of all sentient entities and forms on universal basis in a transhumanist world, which stands on the line between a dystopian and utopian future.

What Are Self-Cultivation Philosophies?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Practice ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Ideal State ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Part Structure ◽  
Life Philosophy

The chapter defines the concept of a self-cultivation philosophy. This proposes that human beings can and should move from a troubled state of existence to some ideal state of being via spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. Philosophy is defined as a reflective practice that seeks understanding of fundamental assumptions in our life. Philosophy may be a practical discipline or a theoretical one, and it may be based on whatever cognitive capacities human beings possess, including reason and awareness. This claim is defended by reference to virtue epistemology. Self-cultivation philosophy has a four-part structure: an account of human nature, an existential starting point, an ideal state of being, and a transformation program. The transformation program consists of exercises which have four functions: Cognition, Purification, Doctrine, and Habituation. Self-cultivation philosophies are often expressed in transformational texts intended to guide people in how to live their lives according to the philosophy

Predestination

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
John Calvin ◽  
Eternal Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Equal Condition ◽  
Divine Grace ◽  
The World ◽  
The Will ◽  
Determining Factor

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.

Virtue epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Early Form ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Theory Of Value

‘Virtue epistemology’ is the name of a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on good epistemic properties of persons rather than on properties of beliefs. The former or some interesting subset of the former are called intellectual virtues. Some of these theories propose that the traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analysed in terms of intellectual virtue, whereas others maintain that these traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and it is desirable to replace them with the notion of an intellectual virtue. In all these theories, epistemic evaluation rests on some virtuous quality of persons that enables them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way. Simple reliabilism may be treated either as a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it. Later versions add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable. Proponents of virtue epistemology claim a number of advantages. It is said to bypass disputes between foundationalists and coherentists on proper cognitive structure, to avoid sceptical worries, to avoid the impasse between internalism and externalism and to broaden the range of epistemological enquiry to include such neglected epistemic values as understanding and wisdom. Some theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is the way it permits us to redefine the central questions of epistemology. In addition, since virtue epistemology can be blended with virtue ethics, it holds out the promise of a unified theory of value.

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