Political Realism and International Morality

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Kipnis ◽  
Diana T Meyers
Author(s):  
Charles R. Beitz

The philosophy of international relations – or more precisely its political philosophy – embraces problems about morality in diplomacy and war, the justice of international practices and institutions bearing on economic welfare and the global environment, human rights, and the relationship between sectional loyalties such as patriotism and global moral commitments. Not everyone believes that such a subject can exist, or rather, that it can have significant ethical content. According to political realism – a widely-held view among Anglo-American students of international relations – moral considerations have no place in decisions about foreign affairs and international behaviour. The most extreme varieties of realism deny that moral judgment can have meaning or force in international affairs; more moderate versions acknowledge the meaningfulness of such judgments but hold either that leaders have no responsibility to attend to the morality of their actions in foreign affairs (because their overriding responsibility is to advance the interests of their constituents), or that the direct pursuit of moral goals in international relations is likely to be self-defeating. Leaving aside the more sceptical kinds of political realism, the most influential orientations to substantive international morality can be arrayed on a continuum. Distinctions are made on the basis of the degree of privilege, if any, extended to the citizens of a state to act on their own behalf at the potential expense of the liberty and wellbeing of persons elsewhere. ‘The morality of states’, at one extreme, holds that states have rights of autonomy analogous to those of individuals within domestic society, which secure them against external interference in their internal affairs and guarantee their ownership and control of the natural and human resources within their borders. At the other end of the continuum, one finds cosmopolitan views which deny that states enjoy any special privilege; these views hold that individuals rather than states are the ultimate subjects of morality, and that value judgments concerning international conduct should take equally seriously the wellbeing of each person potentially affected by a decision, whether compatriot or foreigner. Cosmopolitan views may acknowledge that states (and similar entities) have morally significant features, but analysis of the significance of these features must connect them with considerations of individual wellbeing. Intermediate views are possible; for example, a conception of the privileged character of the state can be combined with a conception of the international realm as weakly normative (that is, governed by principles which demand that states adhere to minimum conditions of peaceful coexistence). The theoretical difference between the morality of states and a fully cosmopolitan morality is reflected in practical differences about the justifiability of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the basis and content of human rights, and the extent, if any, of our obligations as individuals and as citizens of states to help redress the welfare effects of international inequalities.


The Monist ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-606
Author(s):  
Cheryl Noble ◽  

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 179-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Joseph Smith

The three books reviewed in this essay, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View (Mary Maxwell), Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Joel H. Rosenthal), and Securing Europe (Richard H. Ullman), in some sense represent a reaction to Reagan's ideological policies. Maxwell's book appeals to the sociobiological nature of international morality. Rosenthal's book invites the reader to consider the valid view of the realist model as a venue toward integration of morals with decision making in international relations. Ullman's main premise is that the disintegration of the Soviet empire and reunification of Germany gave a strong impetus for the European states to seek a common ground in all areas through cooperation, particularly on security issues.


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-252
Author(s):  
Frédéric Rimoux

The international thought of the early utilitarian thinkers Jeremy Bentham and James Mill remains little known and largely misunderstood. Most commentators give them a superficial appreciation or criticize their supposed naivety, in both cases mostly assuming that Mill borrowed his thoughts from Bentham's writings alone. This questionable reception overlooks some essential aspects of Bentham's and Mill's extensive reflections on war and peace, in particular their constant effort to overcome the tension between individual freedom and collective security. In reality, the fertile dialogue between the two thinkers gradually crystallized into an independent utilitarian peace theory centered on law and public opinion as instruments of an ambitious reform of international relations according to the principle of utility. They managed to elaborate a fragile synthesis between liberal principles and considerations of political realism, which grants their utilitarian peace theory a singular place in the historical efforts to systematically define the conditions of world peace.


Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

The trial might well have taken place were it not for a variety of unforeseen circumstances. For example, the Dutch might have agreed to the Kaiser’s surrender and the Kaiser might even have agreed to the trial. Other options would have been a trial in absentia or a trial in the Netherlands itself. Had a trial been held, the enigmatic charge of an ‘offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’ would have required interpretation. Many considered that it would have covered not only violations of the laws of war within the conflict, but also the launching of the aggressive war. This would have necessitated proof that Germany was actually responsible for starting the war, and a possible inquiry into the conduct of the European Powers over several years prior to 1914, something for which the British and the French had little enthusiasm.


Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

Today’s elaborate system of international criminal justice originates in proposals at the end of the First World War to try Kaiser Wilhelm II before an international criminal tribunal. In the weeks following 11 November 1918, the British, French, and Italian Governments agreed on a trial. Lloyd George campaigned for re-election on the slogan ‘Hang the Kaiser’. The Kaiser had fled to the Netherlands, possibly after receiving signals from the Dutch Queen that he would be welcome. Renegade US soldiers led by a former Senator failed in a bizarre attempt to take him prisoner and bring him to Paris. During the Peace Conference, the Commission on Responsibilities brought international lawyers together for the first time to debate international criminal justice. They recommended trial of the Kaiser by an international tribunal for war crimes, but not for starting the war or violating Belgian neutrality. The Americans were opposed to any prosecution. However, President Wilson changed his mind and agreed to trial for a ‘supreme offence against international morality’. This became a clause in the Treaty of Versailles, one of the few that the Germans tried to resist. Although the Allies threatened a range of measures if the former Emperor was not surrendered, the Dutch refused and the demands were dropped in March 1920. The Kaiser lived out his life in a castle near Utrecht, dying of natural causes in June 1941. Hitler sent a wreath to the funeral.


1915 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Arthur Ponsonby

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document