International relations, philosophy of

Author(s):  
Charles R. Beitz

The philosophy of international relations – or more precisely its political philosophy – embraces problems about morality in diplomacy and war, the justice of international practices and institutions bearing on economic welfare and the global environment, human rights, and the relationship between sectional loyalties such as patriotism and global moral commitments. Not everyone believes that such a subject can exist, or rather, that it can have significant ethical content. According to political realism – a widely-held view among Anglo-American students of international relations – moral considerations have no place in decisions about foreign affairs and international behaviour. The most extreme varieties of realism deny that moral judgment can have meaning or force in international affairs; more moderate versions acknowledge the meaningfulness of such judgments but hold either that leaders have no responsibility to attend to the morality of their actions in foreign affairs (because their overriding responsibility is to advance the interests of their constituents), or that the direct pursuit of moral goals in international relations is likely to be self-defeating. Leaving aside the more sceptical kinds of political realism, the most influential orientations to substantive international morality can be arrayed on a continuum. Distinctions are made on the basis of the degree of privilege, if any, extended to the citizens of a state to act on their own behalf at the potential expense of the liberty and wellbeing of persons elsewhere. ‘The morality of states’, at one extreme, holds that states have rights of autonomy analogous to those of individuals within domestic society, which secure them against external interference in their internal affairs and guarantee their ownership and control of the natural and human resources within their borders. At the other end of the continuum, one finds cosmopolitan views which deny that states enjoy any special privilege; these views hold that individuals rather than states are the ultimate subjects of morality, and that value judgments concerning international conduct should take equally seriously the wellbeing of each person potentially affected by a decision, whether compatriot or foreigner. Cosmopolitan views may acknowledge that states (and similar entities) have morally significant features, but analysis of the significance of these features must connect them with considerations of individual wellbeing. Intermediate views are possible; for example, a conception of the privileged character of the state can be combined with a conception of the international realm as weakly normative (that is, governed by principles which demand that states adhere to minimum conditions of peaceful coexistence). The theoretical difference between the morality of states and a fully cosmopolitan morality is reflected in practical differences about the justifiability of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the basis and content of human rights, and the extent, if any, of our obligations as individuals and as citizens of states to help redress the welfare effects of international inequalities.

2007 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 318-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriana Sinclair ◽  
Michael Byers

The term ‘sovereignty’ figures prominently in international affairs and academic analysis. But does ‘sovereignty’ mean the same thing in different countries and political cultures? In this article, we examine conceptions of sovereignty as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international law and those international relations scholars who deal with international law, in order to obtain a clearer picture of what ‘sovereignty’ means in American academic discourse. At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) a statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or undemocratic character; (2) a popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. On closer examination, what seem to be two conceptions are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty which elevates the United States above other countries and protects it against outside influences while concurrently maximising its ability to intervene overseas.


2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLUF LANGHELLE ◽  
HILMAR ROMMETVEDT

According to traditional constitutional theory, foreign affairs is the prerogative of the executive. However, globalisation and the dual process of internationalisation of domestic affairs and domestification of international affairs imply that the days when foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the executive are over. The article explores the effects of globalisation on the role of Parliament in international relations in general, and WTO negotiations specifically, using the Norwegian Parliament as an illustration. Three findings are presented. First, at the international level attempts are made to develop a ‘parliamentary dimension of the WTO’. Second, at the national level the Norwegian Parliament has become more actively engaged in international relations. And, third, the Norwegian Parliament plays an important role in the processes of defining national interests and determining national negotiation positions in the WTO, especially with regard to possible trade-offs between the offensive interests of fisheries and the defensive interests of agriculture.


1992 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 179-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Joseph Smith

The three books reviewed in this essay, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View (Mary Maxwell), Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Joel H. Rosenthal), and Securing Europe (Richard H. Ullman), in some sense represent a reaction to Reagan's ideological policies. Maxwell's book appeals to the sociobiological nature of international morality. Rosenthal's book invites the reader to consider the valid view of the realist model as a venue toward integration of morals with decision making in international relations. Ullman's main premise is that the disintegration of the Soviet empire and reunification of Germany gave a strong impetus for the European states to seek a common ground in all areas through cooperation, particularly on security issues.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Smith

AbstractE. H. Carr was one of Europe’s pre-eminent thinkers in the field of international affairs. Yet his contribution to International Relations theory is continually questioned. Realists depict Carr as a quintessential realist; revisionists draw from his wider corpus to qualify his contribution. Although not inaccurate, the revisionist literature is incomplete as it neglects a number of Carr’s diplomatic histories. Refocusing on these, especially the manner in which traces of Ranke’s ‘the primacy of foreign affairs’ tradition is evident, this article points to a more conservative and less critical Carr. Utilising an interpretivist framework, this shift in traditions of thought is explained by the dilemmas Carr faced. Although works of history rather than theory, the article contends that Carr’s diplomatic histories remain relevant, particularly with regard to the embedded criticism of realpolitik they contain. This realisation is made evident through a reading of Carr in parallel with the concept of tragedy.


The subject of our research will be international protection as it is a theoretical concept, far from the practical meaning that relates to the international conventions and declarations on the protection of human rights and the mechanisms associated with them. It must now evolve only after long periods of time, and with timid beginnings, in this study we must address the stages in the development of international protection. Since international protection-in the sense that this research deals with - concerns international affairs, it has been affected by the development of international relations and similar problems, so this study will also address those problems, which have hindered the development of international protection within the methodology of comparative analysis.


2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 995-1017 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADRIAN PABST

AbstractHow to theorise religion in International Relations (IR)? Does the concept of post-secularity advance the debate on religion beyond the ‘return of religion’ and the crisis of secular reason? This article argues that the post-secular remains trapped in the logic of secularism. First, a new account is provided of the ‘secularist bias’ that characterises mainstream IR theory: (a) defining religion in either essentialist or epiphenomenal terms; (b) positing a series of ‘antagonistic binary opposites’ such as the secularversusthe religious; and (c) de-sacralising and re-sacralising the public square. The article then analyses post-secularity, showing that it subordinates faith under secular reason and sacralises the ‘other’ by elevating difference into the sole transcendental term. Theorists of the post-secular such as Jürgen Habermas or William Connolly also equate secular modernity with metaphysical universalism, which they seek to replace with post-metaphysical pluralism. In contrast, the alternative that this article outlines is an international theory that develops the Christian realism of the English School in the direction of a metaphysical-political realism. Such a realism binds together reason with faith and envisions a ‘corporate’ association of peoples and nations beyond the secularist settlement of Westphalia that is centred on national states and transnational markets. By linking immanent values to transcendent principles, this approach can rethink religion in international affairs and help revive grand theory in IR.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Nardin

Kant’s primary concern in writing on international relations is how to achieve ‘justice’ ( Recht) between states. This means that instead of reading Kant as a theorist of peace or world government, as IR theorists have usually done, he is better read as a theorist international justice. His view of justice, which identifies it with a legal order that respects freedom as independence or nondomination, is broadly republican. But he equivocates on the possibility of justice at the international level, and this narrows what is usually seen as a wide gap between Kant’s thought and political realism. The paradox his uncertainty reveals is that it is wrong for states to remain in a lawless condition yet impossible for them to escape it so long as they remain independent. An international order cannot generate genuine law because there are no institutions to make, interpret, or enforce it. This means that states are entitled to determine their own foreign affairs. The gap between sovereignty and justice cannot be closed so long as these ideas are defined as they are within the state. The problem is not that a full, secure, and nonvoluntary system of justice that preserves the sovereignty of states is contingently unlikely. It is conceptually impossible. This conclusion poses a challenge to current theories of global justice.


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