Science, Medicine and the U.S. Common Law Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Carl Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
The U.S

The New Private Law and Intellectual Property

2020 ◽  
pp. 408-426
Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Concepts And Categories ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Legal Concepts

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.

Remedies for equitable wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
Court Of Chancery

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.

Dispute Resolution in the Islamic Finance Industry

2020 ◽  
pp. 804-833
Author(s):  
Camille Paldi
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts

A unique and independent legal framework is important to effectively adjudicate Islamic finance disputes, Sukuk bankruptcies, and Takaful disputes. Currently, these disputes are being adjudicated in common law courts or ineffective arbitration centres where often the Islamic finance transaction is inadvertently converted into a conventional transaction due to the common law nature of the dispute adjudication. In this chapter, a framework is proposed for Islamic finance dispute resolution in the form of the Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbitration Centre (DWIFAC), DWIFAC Jurisprudence Office, the Sukuk Bankruptcy Tribunal (SBT) and the Takaful Tribunal (TT).

The Lost European Aspirations of U.S. Constitutional Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 595-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Abernathy
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Many ◽  
The U.S

Most European and American attorneys and judges think the U.S.A. has its legal roots in English common law, and that is probably true for the many areas of U.S. law that are still controlled by the traditional common-law process of simultaneously making and applying law. Yet, with respect to constitutional law – America's greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not England. The U.S. Constitution was inspired by French revolutionary ideas of rationalism in law; it was intended as an integrated document just like codes; and it has been interpreted by American judges to be not just a political document but binding law – law that is binding on all three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary. In fact that was the holding in Marbury v. Madison, the case decided exactly two hundred years ago.

The Law of Negligence as Reported in The Times, 1785–1820

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-419
Author(s):  
James Oldham
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Jury Trials ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
The Times ◽  
Post Trial ◽  
Century Development

Historically, the clear recognition by the courts that all adults in public intercourse owe a duty of reasonable care to avoid injuring others has been seen as an early nineteenth century development. Occasionally it is recognized that what is known about the emergence of the tort of negligence in English law comes almost entirely from the printed reports of civil (plea side) cases tried in the three common law courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer). It was not until the 1790s that regular printed reports of jury trials (or nisi prius cases, as they were called) began, and even then, enlightenment from the nisi prius reports was limited. Most of those reports were sketchy, and very few included instructions given to the jury by the trial judge. More importantly, the reports covered only a small fraction of the jury trials that were conducted by the common law courts. The overwhelming majority of civil jury trials ended with the jury verdict (or an occasional nonsuit), with no post-trial proceedings, and what happened in many thousands of these plea-side jury trials in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been something of a black hole in the historical record.

scholarly journals The barratry of the shipmaster in early modern law: the approach of Italian and English law courts

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 504-574
Author(s):  
Guido Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Walk Away ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
The Difference

SummaryFor a long time, the concept of barratry (at least in its maritime meaning) was one and the same on both sides of the Channel. The barratry of the shipmaster was part of the mercantile usages, and it identified the intentionally blameworthy conduct of the master. When law courts began to decide on insurance litigation they were confronted with a notion quite alien to them. Broadly speaking, the shipmaster’s barratry could well be considered a fraud of sort. But in order to decide on its occurrence in a specific case, law courts had to analyse it in legal terms, and so according to the specific legal categories of their own system. The point ceases to be trivially obvious if we think that the different legal framework of civil and common law courts progressively led to very different interpretations of the same thing. Thus, with the shift of insurance litigation from mercantile justice to law courts maritime barratry began to acquire increasingly different features in the two legal systems. Very often, the very same conduct of the shipmaster was considered as negligent by civil law courts and barratrous by common law courts. The difference was of great practical importance, for many policies excluded barratry from the risks insured against. So, depending on the kind of law court, an insurer could be charged with full liability for the mishap or walk away without paying anything. If the beginning of the story was the same, its end could not have been more different.

III. State Treason Trials During the Puritan Revolution, 1640–1660

1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adele Hast
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Direct Link ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Legislative Body ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
The Government ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Council Of State ◽  
Legal Procedures

The government of the parliamentary party during the Puritan Revolution of 1640–60 instituted changes in judicial and legal procedures to maintain its power and subdue its enemies. This study of treason trials conducted by the state will examine their legal basis and the events and activities considered treasonable. It will show the ways in which the concept of treason changed under a revolutionary government, and to what extent those trials conducted during the interregnum differed in their legal—judicial bases and content from those held before the King's death. Although there were hundreds of treason convictions during the interregnum throughout England, either by military courts-martial, or by common-law courts sitting in the provinces — as is shown by the Acts providing for die sale of estates forfeited to the Commonwealth for treason — this discussion will limit itself to trials initiated by the government in London. These state trials illustrate die political use of the treason charge; diey provide a direct link between the enactment of the interregnum treason laws and their implementation by the same legislative body. Not only was the meaning of treason determined, and die machinery of trial set up, by parliament; but who was to be tried was also decided eidier by parliament or die Council of State, and, after 1654, by the Protector and his council. It will dierefore be instructive to examine the types of treasonous action considered sufficiendy threatening to warrant parliamentary attention.

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