Contract Performance

2020 ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Colin Dobie
Keyword(s):  
Contract Performance

scholarly journals Credible Peer-to-Peer Trading with Double-Layer Energy Blockchain Network in Distributed Electricity Markets

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (15) ◽  
pp. 1815
Author(s):  
Longze Wang ◽  
Yu Xie ◽  
Delong Zhang ◽  
Jinxin Liu ◽  
Siyu Jiang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Double Layer ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Malicious Nodes ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Contract Performance ◽  
Trading Model ◽  
Consensus Information ◽  
Available Information

Blockchain-based peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is one of the most viable solutions to incentivize prosumers in distributed electricity markets. However, P2P energy trading through an open-end blockchain network is not conducive to mutual credit and the privacy protection of stakeholders. Therefore, improving the credibility of P2P energy trading is an urgent problem for distributed electricity markets. In this paper, a novel double-layer energy blockchain network is proposed that stores private trading data separately from publicly available information. This blockchain network is based on optimized cross-chain interoperability technology and fully considers the special attributes of energy trading. Firstly, an optimized ring mapping encryption algorithm is designed to resist malicious nodes. Secondly, a consensus verification subgroup is built according to contract performance, consensus participation and trading enthusiasm. This subgroup verifies the consensus information through the credit-threshold digital signature. Thirdly, an energy trading model is embedded in the blockchain network, featuring dynamic bidding and credit incentives. Finally, the Erenhot distributed electricity market in China is utilized for example analysis, which demonstrates the proposed method could improve the credibility of P2P trading and realize effective supervision.

Ex Post Contract Market Structure: Implications for Performance Over Time

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 588-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia L. Carboni
Keyword(s):  
Management Strategies ◽  
State Level ◽  
Individual Performance ◽  
Contract Management ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Structural Embeddedness ◽  
Contract Performance ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Structural Variables ◽  
Over Time

Government increasingly relies on complex arrangements of providers to deliver public services. There is burgeoning public administration literature on contract management and performance. This literature emphasizes contract management strategies such as contract design and ex post monitoring and relationship building to promote contractor performance. The literature does not examine effects of structural variables on contract performance in ex post contract markets, though work on interorganizational networks has long established that structural factors influence individual performance. This study examines the influence of structural variables on publicly funded contract performance in networked structures of exchange using 5 years of state-level contract data. Network concepts are used to develop contracts as networked exchange structures and develop measures of structural embeddedness for individual programs. Findings include that the structural embeddedness of individual programs influences individual contract performance on quality and cost dimensions over time.

scholarly journals Suggestions to modify Vietnam’s legal provisions on the insurable interest in life insurance

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 38-49
Author(s):  
Bach Thi Nha Nam
Keyword(s):  
Life Insurance ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
Business Law ◽  
Insurable Interest ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Contract Performance ◽  
Insurance Business ◽  
Core Principle

The insurable interest in life insurance is a core principle for the parties to enter into an insurance contract. In case the policyholder does not have insurable interest to the insured, the life insurance contract will become invalid or the life insurance contract will terminate when the policyholder no longer has insurable interest in accordance with Vietnam Insurance Business Law. The practice of life insurance contract performance has raised many issues related to the insurable interest that Vietnam Insurance Business Law has not mentioned or are still lacking. Therefore, the legal provisions on insurable interest are covered with many shortcomings, and inconsistent with the practice of insurance business. On the basis of analysis of caselaw and insurance statutes in US jurisdiction, the author proposes to modify the legal provisions on the insurable interest stipulated in the Vietnam Insurance Business Law..

Referent Cognitions and Budgetary Fairness: A Research Note

2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Libby
Keyword(s):  
Individual Performance ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Production Task ◽  
Process Mean ◽  
Contract Performance ◽  
Stretch Targets ◽  
Referent Cognitions ◽  
Budgeting Process

This study examines the effects of fairness in budgeting on individual performance in a nonparticipative budgeting setting. An experiment was conducted in which subjects performed a production task and were compensated under a budget-based incentive contract. Performance was lowest when an unfair budget target was assigned using an unfair budgeting process. When the budget target assigned was fair, the fairness or unfairness of the budgeting process had no effect on performance. When an unfair budget target was determined using a fair budgeting process, mean performance was not significantly different from mean performance of the subjects assigned fair budget targets. Implications of this result in assigning stretch targets are discussed.

Relationship between governance mechanisms and contract performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dayashankar Maurya ◽  
Amit Kumar Srivastava
Keyword(s):  
Field Research ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Contract Performance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain the variation in the relationship between governance mechanisms and the effect of the relationship on contract performance, especially in controlling partner opportunism. Design/methodology/approach This study conducts a comparative case analysis of contract governance of “National Health Insurance Program” in India. The data are collected using field research through in-depth interviews and direct observation across three states in India. Findings The authors find that the governance mechanisms continue to complement and substitute, both in a dynamic manner, but until aligned with the nature of transaction, they are ineffective to mitigate opportunism, a critical dimension of contract performance. Inappropriate governance mechanisms inflate the gaps in incomplete contracts, resulting in partner opportunism. Research limitations/implications The study draws findings from healthcare context and service-based contracting; therefore, the applicability of this study may vary in other contexts. Practical implications The paper highlights the need for building flexibility in the governance structure while designing contracts. Further, managers need to combine both governance mechanisms dynamically to align with the nature of the transaction to control partner opportunism. Originality/value The authors contribute to the existing debate on the conundrum of the relationship between governance mechanisms and provide a new explanation. The authors propose that it is not the specific governance mechanisms but the alignment of the governance mix with the nature of the transaction that determines the contract performance, especially control of partner opportunism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document