Pompee Valentin Vastey (1781–1820), An Essay on the Causes of the Revolution and Civil Wars of Hayti

2021 ◽  
pp. 212-218
Author(s):  
Katie Barclay ◽  
François Soyer
Keyword(s):  
1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184
Author(s):  
Neera Chandhoke ◽  
Ayi Kwei Armah

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule. The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa “things fall apart.”1 Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune: The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).2 The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein3 is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but “indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved…. The military coup d'etats and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation.”4 The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.5 The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very raison d'etre was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as “Bula Matari” (the crusher of rocks).6 The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.7 In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a “struggle for rulership.”8 Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,


1998 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 1655
Author(s):  
Barbara Evans Clements ◽  
Vladimir N. Brovkin

Author(s):  
Daniel Chirot

This chapter explores how civil wars and foreign intervention can strengthen revolutions. It shows that the repressions of even potential—or sometimes just imagined and falsely accused—counterrevolutionaries in France, Russia, and later Iran were very bloody. In France, the revolution led not only to civil war but also to foreign intervention and a long series of international wars. In Russia, outside involvement contributed to a prolonged, terrible civil war. In Iran, the very costly Iraqi invasion of 1980 and subsequent eight-year war also exacted a high price in lives. The paradox is that outside intervention and civil war actually strengthened the revolutionaries in all three of these cases and significantly contributed to their radicalization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 191-213
Author(s):  
Keith Grint

If mutinies during wartime are amongst the most dangerous to the establishment, mutinies during civil wars generate the most angst, for one-time comrades now become enemies and neither side celebrates success, even if there is a recognition that the day of reckoning has arrived. This chapter begins with the mutinies in the English Civil Wars that saw the Parliamentary side rent between its conservative side, led by Cromwell amongst others, and its radical side, who supported the Levellers. The mutinies also reveal the complexity of the rebels’ cause: some saw the mutiny as a way of securing a more democratic polity, while others were simply intent on securing their backpay before embarking for Ireland to eliminate Irish and Royalist dissent. Nearly 300 years later a similar situation in Russia saw the sailors of Krondstadt rebel against their erstwhile comrades in the Bolshevik Government in a failed attempt to pull the revolution back to its original roots.


Ritual ‘tends to be derided or discarded as the rationalization of society develops’ (Dr Bernstein). Probably to most people in our own society the word suggests what goes on in church or the starchy behaviour of stuffed shirts or gleams of the picturesque and remote woven quaintly into the routine of established institutions. That is to say, it suggests the marginal or the irrelevant, or else the Catholic tradition of religious worship. However, it might be more realistic to think instead of the Chinese in the contemporary act of translating into myth the saga of the revolution: ‘The long battle of the Chinese, first against their foreign enemies and then in the communist phase in three successive civil wars, has been made into a long musical epic which is now to be filmed. It is displayed in exhibits in the new museum of the revolution; it makes the background for songs and stories, the reference point for exhortations and reproach. The past is deliberately kept fresh in the public mind and it is presented with two sides. The embattled, slow triumph of the revolution, and the long prostration of China, mauled and humiliated, the masses wretched and silenced; that too is real to the Chinese.’ ( The Times , 27 April 1965). Here is the classical myth-ritual complex in current idiomatic form.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-494
Author(s):  
Philip Connell

AbstractThis essay reconsiders the character and significance of Edmund Burke's attitude to the seventeenth-century civil wars and interregnum. Burke may have venerated the “revolution principles” of 1688–89 over those of the 1640s, not least in the Reflections on the Revolution in France in which he notoriously compares English dissenting radicals to regicidal Puritans. Yet his response to the first Stuart revolution is more complex than has commonly been allowed and is closely bound up with Burke's earlier parliamentary career as a prominent member of the Rockingham Whig connection. The revival of an anti-Stuart idiom within the extra-parliamentary opposition of the 1760s, together with the mounting conflict with the North American colonies, gave renewed prominence to the memory of the civil wars within English political discourse. The Rockinghamites attempted to exploit this development—without compromising their own, more conservative reading of seventeenth-century history—but they were also its victims. In the years that followed, Burke and his colleagues were repeatedly identified by their political opponents with the spirit of Puritan rebellion and Cromwellian usurpation. These circumstances provide a new perspective on Burke's interpretation of the nation's revolutionary past; they also offer important insights into his writings and speeches in response to the French Revolution.


Author(s):  
Mark Wasserman

The Mexican economy consisted of activities at the international, national, and local levels, including the export of minerals and agricultural commodities, manufactures and agriculture for domestic markets, and production of goods for everyday consumption, respectively. The impact of a decade of civil wars between 1910 and 1920, which comprised the Mexican Revolution, on the economy varied according to which level, the time period, and the geographical region. The crucial aspects of the economy consisted of transportation and communications, banking, mining, export agriculture, and government policies and actions. The important factors were the intensity of the violence, inflation, and the availability of capital. Chronologically, there were several stages to the economic history of the Revolution. The first consisted of the years of the Madero rebellion and presidency, 1910–1913, when there was little damage done and growth continued. The second and worst period was during 1914, 1915, and 1916, when the counterrevolutionary Huerta regime battled the rebel Constitutionalists and after the latter’s victory the ensuing civil war between the divided winners. The third stage occurred with the defeat of the radical factions of the Revolution led by Zapata and Villa and the restoration of a semblance of order in 1917. The fourth included the establishment of the Sonoran dynasty of de la Huerta, Obregón, and Calles and the slow reconstruction of the economy.


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