The Limits of the Public Enforcement of Economic Welfare

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-232
Author(s):  
Richard Dien Winfield
Keyword(s):  
Economic Welfare ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public

7. Articles 101 and 102: public enforcement by the European Commission and national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003

2021 ◽  
pp. 258-310
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Leniency Programme

This chapter explains the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 by European Commission and the national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003. It begins by describing the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, including its power to accept commitments, its leniency programme, the cartel settlement procedure, and its power to impose financial penalties. It then discusses the operation of Regulation 1/2003 in practice, with particular reference to the European Competition Network (‘the ECN’) that brings together the Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States (‘the NCAs’) and the ECN+ Directive that strengthens the powers of the NCAs. The chapter concludes by providing a brief account of judicial review of the Commission’s decisions.

Privacy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Social Services ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Economic Welfare ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
The Public ◽  
Critical Theories ◽  
The Status ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Critical Legal Theory

The distinction between private and public is both central to much legal and political thought and subject to serious challenge on philosophical, practical and political grounds by critics of the status quo. Privacy – the state of being withdrawn from the world, free from public attention, interference or intrusion – is a cherished social value that is being offered ever more protection. Increasingly, laws require people to respect the privacy of others: privacy is recognized as a fundamental right in international documents and national constitutions, and recent customs and social norms forbid intrusions that were once accepted. The concept of privacy is also widely abused: it has been used to justify private racial discrimination and state neglect of domestic violence, as well as social abdication of general economic welfare through laissez-faire policies and the so-called privatization of social services. Critique of the public–private distinction is an important part of many critical theories, especially feminism and critical legal theory. These critics object that the public–private distinction is exaggerated, manipulable or incoherent.

13. Public Enforcement by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities of the Antitrust Provisions

2019 ◽  
pp. 872-1018
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Salient Features ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the public enforcement regime for the application of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003. It explains the system that applied previously under Regulation 17, and the reasons for, and salient features of, the ‘modernisation’ introduced by Regulation 1/2003. The chapter then examines: the complaints procedure; the powers of the Commission, including the investigation and inter partes stages of its procedure; the decisions which the Commission may take, including decisions imposing fines and commitments decisions; judicial review by the EU Courts; the European Competition Network (ECN) and enforcement by national competition authorities, including the changes to be introduced by the ECN+ Directive; and the possibility of sanctions against individuals.. The chapter also considers the application of fundamental rights provisions in EU competition proceedings.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.

scholarly journals The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Mitchell Polinsky ◽  
Steven Shavell
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Repeat Offenders ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
Imperfect Knowledge ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.

Public Enforcement of EU Antitrust Law: A Circle of Trust?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-154
Author(s):  
Naida Dzino ◽  
Catalin S. Rusu
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Core Elements ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
The Eu

The concept of trust is key to effectively enforcing the EU antitrust prohibitions in the ECN multi-level administration context. The manifestation of this concept is identified at different stages of the public enforcement system, where the Commission and the NCAs share the enforcement workload and assist each other's actions. Various EU legislative, soft-law and case-law landmarks have progressively contributed to developing this idea of trust, culminating with the adoption of Directive 2019/1, which aims to render NCAs as more effective enforcers of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In this paper, we intend to determine whether the Directive furthers the trust already established in the last fifteen years of enforcement experience. We first track the development of the trust in the NCAs' EU antitrust enforcement work and assesses the building-blocks on which trust is shaped. Next, we evaluate the Directive's core elements (dealing with institutional design, enforcement and sanctioning powers, leniency, mutual assistance, etc.), in order to gauge their trust-enhancing potential, and to test whether the Directive correctly follows through the EU hard-, soft-, and case-law. We also look into any remaining enforcement gaps, which may undermine the trust between the European antitrust enforcers, and consequently the Directive's core objectives.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document