The Baltic states in the EU

2018 ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Liutauras Gudžinskas ◽  
Tomas Bekišas
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
V. V. Vorotnikov

The economic crisis fueled contradictions among the parties and weakened public support of internal and external policies of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Natural necessity to abandon previous one-sided Euro-Atlantic foreign political and foreign economic orientation in favor of more balanced approach towards relations with Eastern neighbours (primarily with Russia) has become the issue of key importance that turned out to be a stumbling block for main political parties (ruling parties, opposition, so called ‚Russian‘ parties) in the Baltic states. The attitude to this problem became crucial during recent political crisis in Latvia, whereas in Lithuania and Estonia it led to changing rhetoric on foreign political issues by opposition parties. It is possible to nominally define the political situation in Lithuania as partisan consensus, whereas in Latvia and Estonia foreign political strategies complicated by unresolved domestic ethnic and language minorities problems are a battlegroud for ruling right-wing conservative coalitions and social-democratic oppositions. So, main social and political forces in the Baltic states faced the task to find a new consensus on foreign political issues in order to efficiently develop national economies under the conditions of financial economic turbulence in the EU and worldwide as well as to support social unity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Tomas Bekišas

This paper aims to determine Lithuania’s, Latvia’s, and Estonia’s parties’ positions on the European Union (EU) and to ascertain whether these party positions mirror their voters’ positions on the EU. Analysis suggests that parties in this region have rather varied positions on the EU, with the exception of hard-Eurosceptic views, which are absent in Baltic states’ party systems. This paper also indicates that parties in the Baltic states tend to mirror, with some exceptions, their voters positions on the EU. This suggests that there may be additional factors determining parties’ positions regarding the EU in the Baltics.


Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Archil Chochia ◽  
Max Atallah

Integration with the European Union has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries owing to their strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture after they regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the accession of these states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings, which heavily influenced problem solving between government and the EU institutions. In general, the controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic with regard to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that often the governments have taken rather compliant positions. The latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm: the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and actual borderlines between policy making- and decision making. Today, in setting up an EU-related agenda, more skills than previously are needed in finding allies and choosing partners. The road the Baltic States took in joining the EU was a difficult one, nor has their role in the EU been easy. Should a small state with a big initiative be allowed to mentor other member states regarding that initiative, meaning in particular Estonia and its digital development? Another peculiar aspect of the Baltic States is their (inter)relationship with Russia. Considering themselves a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives and have also spoken out strongly against intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. This position sometimes complicates any EU attempt to achieve consensus on foreign policy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandr Svetlicinii ◽  
Külliki Lugenberg

ABSTRACT The paper represents a comparative study of the merger remedies practices of the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Based on comprehensive merger control data (2004-2011) and a comparative assessment of merger remedies imposed by the NCAs in the selected economic sectors (telecoms, alcoholic beverages, construction materials, trade in pharmaceuticals) the study identifies trends and tendencies of merger control that are characteristic for small market economies. Despite harmonization of national competition laws and enforcement practices with the EU rules and standards, the study highlights an obvious divergence from the EU guidance expressed in increasing acceptance of behavioral commitments. The results of the assessment indicate the need to develop more specific guidance on behavioral remedies that would better reflect the merger control realities of small market economies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-67
Author(s):  
Christopher Kulander ◽  

At the heart of the European Union (“EU”) energy policy is energy security. Energy security is maintained, in part, by a diversification of supply. Despite the fact that the EU has prioritized diversification, its dependency on Russian natural gas has increased in recent years. Contemporaneously, the politicalrelationship between the EU and Russia has worsened. Construction of NordStream 2(“NS2”) will further establish Russia as the dominant supplier of natural gas to the EU while lessening the diversification of its energy supply. To further the EU’s stated goals of energy diversification and security, another steady source of natural gas imports for the countries along the Baltic Sea is needed. LNG importation assets in Poland and the Baltic states exist for this purpose. Unlike other EU members, these countries have demonstrated the economic and political will to curb the coercive influence of Russian natural gas imports. America is awash in natural gas, with plenty for export and can sendincreasing volumes of LNG worldwide. In contrast to other sources, America is well located to supply Europe with secure LNG, and its importation should be a shared goal of the EU and America. Despite the desire of some American statesmen to use the “shale gas revolution” to further U.S. geopolitical goals; however, the U.S. hydrocarbon industry (unlike in Russia) is overwhelmingly controlled by private landowners and industry. The goal oft he American, Polish, and the Balticstates should therefore be narrowly focusedon establishing free trade agreements and the encouragement of longer-term contractual relationships between America and Poland and the Baltic states.


Subject Survey evidence on Baltic Russophones’ attitudes to the EU and NATO. Significance Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and the 2016 US elections have raised concerns that it may attempt to sow divisions in the Baltic states between those who speak Russian as their first language and other linguistic communities, to shift the former to a more pro-Moscow position. Impacts Significant Russian-speaking minorities will shape how the Baltic states are perceived abroad, including by Russia itself. NATO units being rotated through the Baltics would be well advised to treat Russophones correctly, to help alleviate suspicions. The Centre Party’s participation in government in Estonia brings Russophones into national politics.


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