scholarly journals BALTIC ETHNOCRACIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU: IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Author(s):  
V. V. Vorotnikov

The economic crisis fueled contradictions among the parties and weakened public support of internal and external policies of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Natural necessity to abandon previous one-sided Euro-Atlantic foreign political and foreign economic orientation in favor of more balanced approach towards relations with Eastern neighbours (primarily with Russia) has become the issue of key importance that turned out to be a stumbling block for main political parties (ruling parties, opposition, so called ‚Russian‘ parties) in the Baltic states. The attitude to this problem became crucial during recent political crisis in Latvia, whereas in Lithuania and Estonia it led to changing rhetoric on foreign political issues by opposition parties. It is possible to nominally define the political situation in Lithuania as partisan consensus, whereas in Latvia and Estonia foreign political strategies complicated by unresolved domestic ethnic and language minorities problems are a battlegroud for ruling right-wing conservative coalitions and social-democratic oppositions. So, main social and political forces in the Baltic states faced the task to find a new consensus on foreign political issues in order to efficiently develop national economies under the conditions of financial economic turbulence in the EU and worldwide as well as to support social unity.

2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VAN ELSUWEGE

The recognition of Baltic independence in 1991 led to a number of challenges in their relationship with Russia. The legal status of large Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, the unresolved border questions, and the particular situation of Kaliningrad have proved to be the most pressing of these. This article tries to link these topical political issues with international law practice on state continuity. It refers to competing visions of Baltic statehood and its political and legal consequences, particularly in the context of the forthcoming enlargement of NATO and the EU.


Author(s):  
Sophie Di Francesco-Mayot

This chapter examines the French Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, PS), which is one of the least successful of the major European social democratic parties. It focuses on the period between the 2008 global financial crisis until the end of François Hollande's presidency in 2017. The crisis of the PS is twofold: first, a political crisis that is revealed by the divisive nature of the Party's internal courants (factions). Whereas the factions initially contributed to the PS's internal democracy, over the past two decades they have significantly affected the PS's cohesiveness and ability to effectively develop and implement necessary policies. And second, an economic crisis that is exemplified by the PS's inability to adapt to its external and internal environments, such as the neoliberal imperatives of the EU, unprecedented high unemployment, and increasing insecurity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Tomas Bekišas

This paper aims to determine Lithuania’s, Latvia’s, and Estonia’s parties’ positions on the European Union (EU) and to ascertain whether these party positions mirror their voters’ positions on the EU. Analysis suggests that parties in this region have rather varied positions on the EU, with the exception of hard-Eurosceptic views, which are absent in Baltic states’ party systems. This paper also indicates that parties in the Baltic states tend to mirror, with some exceptions, their voters positions on the EU. This suggests that there may be additional factors determining parties’ positions regarding the EU in the Baltics.


2018 ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Liutauras Gudžinskas ◽  
Tomas Bekišas
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Archil Chochia ◽  
Max Atallah

Integration with the European Union has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries owing to their strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture after they regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the accession of these states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings, which heavily influenced problem solving between government and the EU institutions. In general, the controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic with regard to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that often the governments have taken rather compliant positions. The latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm: the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and actual borderlines between policy making- and decision making. Today, in setting up an EU-related agenda, more skills than previously are needed in finding allies and choosing partners. The road the Baltic States took in joining the EU was a difficult one, nor has their role in the EU been easy. Should a small state with a big initiative be allowed to mentor other member states regarding that initiative, meaning in particular Estonia and its digital development? Another peculiar aspect of the Baltic States is their (inter)relationship with Russia. Considering themselves a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives and have also spoken out strongly against intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. This position sometimes complicates any EU attempt to achieve consensus on foreign policy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1909-1915
Author(s):  
Daniel Augenstein ◽  
Bert van Roermund

In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council agreed upon a new strategic goal for the European Union: to become the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” One decade and the sobering experience of a global economic crisis later, the European Commission's new 2020 Strategy sets out a vision of Europe's social market economy for the 21st century that “shows how the EU can emerge stronger from the economic crisis and how it can be turned into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion.” If somewhat more modest in its targets, Europe 2020 reiterates the guiding ambition to enhance the EU's economic performance in the internal and global market that already dominated the Lisbon strategy. The lesson learned from Europe's “lost decade” is that the EU needs to replace the “slow and largely uncoordinated pace of reforms” with a “sustainable recovery” in order to regain its competitiveness, boost its productivity, and put it on “an upward path of prosperity.” This is, then, the EU's first “Lisbon” agenda that heavily relies on the internal market and that depicts social inclusion and political stability as conditioned upon further European economic integration. The recipe to defy what has grown from a “merely” economic crisis into a social and political crisis of the Union and its Member States is a combination of “smart,” “sustainable,” and “inclusive” growth.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Vladislavs Vesperis

Abstract In the context of the global financial-economic crisis it becomes important to find a stronger base for assessment of the socio-economic development and, in particular, search for better indicators. Therefore, the hypothesis is set that it is necessary to develop the EU Development Index, which will provide better assessment of an on-going socio-economic change. The objective of the article is to describe the EU Development Index calculation results and compare them with the Human Development Index values for each Member state of the EU. Ranking list of the EU Member States according to the Human Development Index values did not change substantially, suggesting that the Human Development Index inadequately responds to key socioenvironmental changes that occurred during the global financial economic crisis. At the same time, a number of countries show a sharp decline of the EU development index values, reflecting the impact of global economic crisis, while some countries with a high level of public debt and low confidence of the financial markets have remained in their positions by the both indexes in the year 2009. However, these countries most probably will be forced to make the considerable fiscal discipline measures, which inevitably will have an impact on GDP and income indicators in these countries, therefore their rankings in the coming years will deteriorate. Completely impartial assessment will be possible when countries with high debt levels will have balanced their budgets and economic growth will be based mostly on their own income and production instead of external cash flows and investment entering the country. It can be concluded that EU Development Index allows, in a more equitable fashion, to assess disparities of the EU Member States by development level and more rapidly reflect the rapid socio-economic change.


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