THEORY REDUCTION AS A MODEL FOR RELATING DISCIPLINES

2013 ◽  
pp. 85-107
Keyword(s):  
Dialogue ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan

In what follows I will sketch a very simple possible-world semantics which will allow us to sharpen the notion of a non-reductive, but materialist, mind-body identity theory. This simple semantics will enable us to characterize the various possible positions on mind-body identity and display the range of positions with respect to psycho-physical reduction. Though I am sympathetic to a non-reductive position which I label “autonomous monism”, I will be concerned here less with presenting positive arguments for that position than with describing a framework in which such arguments can be made and pointing out the issues that the position raises. The discussion achieves its abstract viewpoint at the cost of slightly idealizing the process of theory reduction, but the overview attained is worth the price.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Corvilain

Abstract We show that the pure gauge anomalies of 6d $$ \mathcal{N} $$ N = (1, 0) theories compactified on a circle are captured by field-dependent Chern-Simons terms appearing at one-loop in the 5d effective theories. These terms vanish if and only if anomalies are canceled. In order to obtain this result, it is crucial to integrate out the massive Kaluza-Klein modes in a way that preserves 6d Lorentz invariance; the often-used zeta-function regularization is not sufficient. Since such field-dependent Chern-Simons terms do not arise in the reduction of M-theory on a threefold, six-dimensional F-theory compactifications are automatically anomaly free, whenever the M/F-duality can be used. A perfect match is then found between the 5d $$ \mathcal{N} $$ N = 1 prepotentials of the classical M-theory reduction and one-loop circle compactification of an anomaly free theory. Finally, from this potential, we read off the quantum corrections to the gauge coupling functions.


Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 195 (11) ◽  
pp. 5059-5089 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D’Alessandro
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andreas Hüttemann ◽  
Alan Love

Reduction and reductionism have been central philosophical topics in analytic philosophy of science for more than six decades. Together they encompass a diversity of issues from metaphysics and epistemology. This article provides an introduction to the topic that illuminates how contemporary epistemological discussions took their shape historically and limns the contours of concrete cases of reduction in specific natural sciences. The unity of science and the impulse to accomplish compositional reduction in accord with a layer-cake vision of the sciences, the seminal contributions of Ernest Nagel on theory reduction and how they strongly conditioned subsequent philosophical discussions, and the detailed issues pertaining to different accounts of reduction that arise in both physical and biological science (e.g., limit-case and part-whole reduction in physics, the difference-making principle in genetics, and mechanisms in molecular biology) are explored. The conclusion argues that the epistemological heterogeneity and patchwork organization of the natural sciences encourages a pluralist stance about reduction.


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