The Logical Status of Deep Structures: Logical Constraints on Syntactic Processes

Rhetorik ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jens Fischer

Abstract According to the self-image of lawyers, jurisprudence is a science: the premises in legal conclusions are truth-apt, as are the conclusions or judgements that follow from them, the cognition of true law is consequently regarded as their task. Against this background, a program that understands and analyzes law as the product of a rhetorical practice is confronted with fierce resistance. According to the research of analytical legal rhetoric, on the other hand, the evidence for a rhetorical imprint on law is overwhelming: starting with the logical status of legal inferences, to the peculiarities of judicial procedure, to the motivational situation of those involved in it, everywhere it becomes apparent that the image of strict truth-orientation inadequately describes the genesis of law. Following Aristotle, who assigned law to the field of phrónēsis and not to epistēmē, contemporary legal rhetoric research aims to draw a realistic picture of the genesis of law. Subdivided into the triad of logos, ethos, and pathos, it attempts to fully grasp the interrelationships involved. It becomes apparent that the rational or argumentative dimension is far from dominating in legal justifications. It is precisely at the neuralgic point, i.e., where arguments are opposed to each other, that the rhetor typically uses a rhetorical figure that links all levels of the triad: the restrictio.


1997 ◽  
pp. 109-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem A. Wagenaar ◽  
Sherrill Mulhern

2008 ◽  
Vol 187 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Mavrotas ◽  
Danae Diakoulaki ◽  
Athanasios Kourentzis
Keyword(s):  

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1114
Author(s):  
Donald VanDeVeer

In his recent book, Moral Principles in Political Philosophy, Felix Oppenheim provides a useful examination of the assumptions of well known figures in the history of political philosophy concerning the logical status of moral principles. Classifying them as cognitivists (if they view fundamental moral principles as either true or false) or noncognitivists (if they view moral principles as neither true nor false), Oppenheim attempts to exhibit the inadequacy of the cognitivist point of view and, importantly, the adequacy of the noncognitivist position. My critique aims at demonstrating the inconclusiveness of Oppenheim’s arguments against cognitivism. Oppenheim presupposes the availability of a plausible and workable criterion for determining when a sentence counts as a statement (statements are for Oppenheim entities which are true or false and, thus, “cognitively meaningful”), but he fails to provide any attractive candidate for that position. Further critical discussion revolves around the following related questions: Is there adequate positive support for the noncognitivist view? Does it allow for the rationality of fundamental moral commitments? And can Oppenheim really justify his case that, far from being irrational or pernicious, noncognitivism is naturally associated with certain humanistic ideals, such as toleration of those of differing moral and political viewpoint?


1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald D. Armstrong ◽  
Douglas H. Jones ◽  
Zhaobo Wang

This article considers the problem of generating a test from an item bank using a criterion based on classical test theory parameters. A mathematical programming model is formulated that maximizes the reliability coefficient α, subject to logical constraints on the choice of items. The special structure of the problem is exploited with network theory and Lagrangian relaxation techniques. An empirical study shows that the method produces tests with high coefficient a subject to various practicable item constraints.


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