R v Millward [1994] Crim LR 527 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring another person to cause death by reckless driving. The prosecution case was that the appellant had given one of his employees instructions which involved him using a tractor belonging to the appellant to tow a trailer on a main road. The tractor’s hitch was poorly maintained and during the journey the trailer became detached and hit a car, causing the death of a passenger. The recklessness alleged was confined to the state of the hitch mechanism, and the appellant was said to have procured the offence by his instructions to his employee. It was argued on appeal that there was no reported case of a procurer being convicted following the acquittal of a principal offender. Further, in the instant case, the word ‘reckless’ imported a mental element into the actus reus of the offence. The acquittal thus implied that the actus reus had not been committed. Held, dismissing the appeal: 1 A passage in Blackstone’s Criminal Practice was approved, to the effect that an accessory can be liable provided that there is the actus reus of the principal offence even if the principal offender is entitled to be acquitted because of some defence personal to him. Procuring does not require a joint intention between accessory and principal. The procurer may, therefore, be convicted where the principal lacks the necessary mens rea. 2 In the instant case, the actus reus was taking of the vehicle in its defective condition on to the road so as to cause the death. It was procured by the appellant. 3 The ratio of Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339 was that the driver did not commit the actus reus of careless driving, the offence in that case. He relied on the conductor’s signals. 4 Cogan and Leak [1976] QB 217 was, contrary to the submissions of the defence, essentially a case of procuring rather than aiding and abetting, and could not be distinguished from the present case. Principal offender has a defence not available to the accomplice

1996 ◽  
pp. 425-427
Author(s):  
Richard Holton

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements (the action, the actus reus, and the associated mental element, the mens rea). Rather, murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder.


2021 ◽  
pp. 26-87
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result and negligible causes.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result, and negligible causes.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Brett

In this paper I address a question that has not been a prominent feature of cases or articles which have concerned the issue of consent in relation to sexual offenses. Much work has been done by judges and legal theorists regarding the defendant’s beliefs about the consent of the complainant and the mental element or mens rea of this offense. But, any answers to these questions presuppose some answer to a prior question: What is consent? What must be true of a person who does consent? What must be missing, on the other hand, in a situation where sexual activity takes place without consent?Common sense provides a relatively simple answer to these questions: To consent is to give permission; a person acts without consent where no such permission has been obtained. It is this answer that I want to defend in this paper. This view assumes that talk of consent only makes sense in relation to some autonomy right. Giving consent involves autonomously making changes in a prevailing pattern of rights and obligations. It is a limited withdrawal of a right not to be interfered with; and it will make legally permissible actions that would otherwise be subject to criminal and civil penalties. To me it seems obvious that such a change in the prevailing pattern of rights and obligations can only take place where there is communication between the parties. This means that the question of consent is not just a question about the state of mind or attitude of the complainant. Rather, the matter which should be central to a court’s consideration of consent is the question of what was said or done that could be construed as granting permission to do the acts in question.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter focuses on identifying the circumstances in which an offence will be construed as one of strict liability—that is, where the Crown will not have to establish mens rea in relation to every element of the actus reus. The following controversies are examined: the presumption of mens rea, that is, unless Parliament has indicated otherwise, the appropriate mental element is an unexpressed ingredient of every statutory offence; how to ascertain whether an offence is in fact one of strict liability; whether strict liability infringes Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the merits of strict liability offences.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter focuses on identifying the circumstances in which an offence will be construed as one of strict liability—that is, where the Crown will not have to establish mens rea in relation to every element of the actus reus. The following controversies are examined: the presumption of mens rea, that is, unless Parliament has indicated otherwise, the appropriate mental element is an unexpressed ingredient of every statutory offence; how to ascertain whether an offence is in fact one of strict liability; whether strict liability infringes Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the merits of strict liability offences.


Author(s):  
Mischa Allen

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary, and advice on study skills. This chapter presents sample exam questions on the elements of crime and suggested answers. The traditional starting point for the study of criminal law is the constituents of a criminal offence. These are the fundamental principles of criminal liability: actus reus (often referred to as the prohibited conduct, but more accurately described as the external elements of the offence) and mens rea (often referred to as the mental element, but more accurately described as the fault element). They include the distinction between acts and omissions, causation, and the different levels of fault (intention, recklessness and negligence).


Author(s):  
Mischa Allen

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, and author commentary. This chapter presents sample exam questions on the elements of crime and suggested answers. The traditional starting point for the study of criminal law is the constituents of a criminal offence. These are the fundamental principles of criminal liability: actus reus (often referred to as the prohibited conduct, but more accurately described as the external elements of the offence) and mens rea (often referred to as the mental element, but more accurately described as the fault element). They include the distinction between acts and omissions, causation, and the different levels of fault (intention, recklessness and negligence).


2020 ◽  
pp. 118-161
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Garvey

This chapter begins with United States v. Moore, a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving a heroin addict charged with drug possession. It describes in more detail what the actus reus and mens rea requirements entail when applied to a defendant who realized he was committing a crime. It discusses, in relation to actus reus, free will as the capacity to choose otherwise, proposes a test to help determine if a defendant lacked the capacity to choose otherwise (the Stephen test), and compares the actus reus requirement to the existing defense of insanity. In relation to mens rea, the chapter explains how the Jekyll test (introduced in Chapter 2) applies to defendants who realized there were committing a crime, and then compares mens rea to the existing defenses of duress and provocation, as well as to the problem of the “willing addict.” It concludes with a discussion of the circumstances under which the state can legitimately ascribe guilt to a defendant who lacked actus reus or mens rea at the time of the crime but whose guilt can nonetheless be traced to a prior guilty act or omission.


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