Political Challenges in Policy-Level Evaluation for Sustainable Development: The Case of Trade Policy

Author(s):  
Clive George ◽  
Colin Kirkpatrick
2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-287
Author(s):  
Evita Schmieg

Abstract European trade policy is under pressure to comply with sustainability demands. Trade policy can actively contribute to sustainable development, but under certain conditions, amongst them respect for the level of development, the point of departure of the respective countries and the inclusion of specific provisions for sustainability. Trade policy reaches its limitations in internal political and economic framework conditions in partner countries as well as other processes of globalization. This is also reflected in the trade relationship between the EU and African countries.


Author(s):  
Nicolas Hachez ◽  
Axel Marx

This chapter examines the various ways in which European Union trade policy is used to leverage human rights, with a specific focus on the use of conditionality in bilateral and unilateral trade instruments. Bilateral instruments studied are the human rights clauses and ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters in free trade agreements, as well as the provisions relating to foreign direct investment. Unilateral instruments studied are the various versions of Generalised Scheme of Preferences. For each of these instruments, the chapter presents the current state of play, discusses key challenges to effectively promote human rights, and reflects on opportunities for reform. This chapter then formulates recommendations, insisting on the need for more precise and more ambitious commitments, a more systematic and inclusive approach towards monitoring and enforcement; and a more targeted sanctioning system.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Hicks

I present a theoretical account of the politics of privatization that predicts left-wing support for the policy is conditional on the proportionality of the electoral system. In contrast to accounts that see privatization as an inherently right-wing policy, I argue that, like trade policy, it has the feature of creating distributed benefits and concen- trated costs. Less proportional electoral systems create incentives for the Left to be responsive to those who face the concentrated costs, and thus for them to oppose privatization more strongly. More proportional systems reduce these incentives and increase the extent to which distributed benefits are internalized by elected representatives. Hypotheses are derived from this theory at both the individual and macro-policy level, and then tested separately. Quantitative evidence on public opinion from the 1990s and privatization revenues from Western European countries over the period 19802005 supports the argument.


Marine Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 132-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radika Kumar ◽  
Ronald Ravinesh Kumar ◽  
Peter Josef Stauvermann ◽  
Jadhav Chakradhar

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