THE GROUNDS OF PROTECTIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE 21st CENTURY IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

As the importance of tariffs diminishes, to avoid underestimation, analysis of the dynamics of protectionism implies the use of more complex data. Hence, this research explores the Global Trade Alert database, which covers a wide range of measures used by countries within trade policy. Once the dynamics of protectionism in trade is presented, the analysis of its grounds might be undertaken to answer the question: what are the reasons for high levels of protectionist tendencies in the 21 st century? Is this a post-crisis repercussion only? Or is the failure of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the WTO which, in turn, makes space for increased levels of protectionism? While many analyses highlight the indisputable impact of the crisis on the growing protectionist tendencies in the 21 st century, it has been over ten years since the crisis, which requires a search for alternate or additional premises. The hypothesis was therefore adopted that the failure of multilateral negotiations within the Doha Round may make space for increased protectionism in the 21 st century. Taking into consideration all of the negative consequences of protectionism, the analysis of its causes has a justification. Successful treatment requires a diagnosis of the sources of the problem; only once these are identified can an appropriate action be undertaken. The main conclusion from the research is that because of the diversification within the WTO, the multilateral liberalization agenda has been limited. Hence, “next generation” issues are addressed elsewhere, like within regional trade agreements, which, as a result, became very popular after 2001. However, RTAs should not be perceived as an alternative to liberalization under the auspices of the WTO, as they are not free from protectionist tendencies.

Domestic Institutional Design and the National Interest in Trade Negotiations

How do different domestic institutional settings affect the formation of the national interest in trade negotiations? While current evidence suggests that institutions influence such a process even when societal groups dominate policymaking and international factors limit state choices, it remains unclear to what extent the domestic institutional design shape bureaucrats’ perceptions on both internal and foreign constraints. Building upon Brazil’s and India’s cases in World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round between 2003 and 2008, I address that question through process-tracing with the purpose of theory-building. I focus the analysis on the nodal bureaucracy, understood as the institution at the forefront of international bargaining. I argue that if such a bureaucracy is responsible for diplomacy in general, foreign factors prevail in decision-making. In turn, if the nodal bureaucracy is devoted only to trade-related issues, domestic economic factors dominate policymaking. I reach those conclusions through a paired-comparison between Brazil and India.

Demystifying Blue Box Support to Agriculture Under the WTO: Implications for Developing Countries

Developing members at the WTO face a shrinkage in policy space for supporting their agricultural sector due to the limited room available under the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Contrastingly, most developed members can provide high levels of product-specific support without breaching their commitments on account of their support entitlements. For some of these members, the so-called ‘Blue Box’ under the AoA, plays a pivotal role in expanding the policy space with respect to domestic support to agricultural products. Though a lot of scholarship has discussed and examined other support provisions under the AoA, the ‘Blue Box’ remains relatively shrouded in mystery. Testimony to this is the fact that although the Blue Box has found use amongst developed members, no developing member, except for China in 2016, has ever used the Blue Box to support their producers. Given the impasse in the Doha Round of negotiations and limited flexibilities available under the AoA, this paper examines the feasibility and compatibility Blue Box measures with developing members’ socio-economic situation. Findings of this paper bring to fore the variations in member practice and the operational flexibilities available in implementing Blue Box programmes to support agriculture. JEL: F13, F14, F17, Q17

Reshuffling the Negotiation Table

This chapter analyses the participation of the agricultural G-20 coalition within the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization. The strategies, modes of operation, as well as the internal and external articulations of the group from its inception during the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial to its dissolution in 2008 are the object of scrutiny. Based on documental analysis of cables from the achieves of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interviews conducted with stakeholders in the negotiation process, the chapter engages with the contextual circumstances and central factors which both permitted the rise of the G-20 within the negotiation process, but eventually also led to its disintegration.

WTO marginalisation will further fragment world trade

Significance The failure of the Doha Round led states to focus on regional agreements instead, weakening global standards, and latterly US action has compromised the WTO's dispute resolution system. Azevedo's successor faces a daunting task to reverse the sidelining of the WTO and to reinvigorate global trade liberalisation. Impacts Rising geopolitical tension will preclude the possibility of a new WTO trade deal to address state-aid concerns. Divergence from WTO rules will be incremental as long as major economies worry about jeopardising their COVID-19 recovery. The delay of the WTO Ministerial Conference from June 2020 to next year gives the new head a chance to shape the agenda.

La Organización Mundial de Comercio, los acuerdos mega-regionales y los usos estratégicos del regionalismo

The paralysis of the Doha Round, the proliferation of preferential trade agreement and the launching of mega-regional trade negotiations have encouraged the debate about the governance of international trade. In contrast to a benign interpretation of the relationship between “XXI century regionalism” and the multilateral trade regime, we argue that there is a remarkable continuity between the incentives and characteristics of the “new regionalism” and those of “XXI century regionalism”. Even when the content of the regulatory agenda may have reduced the discriminatory nature of the new agreements, the basic conflict between the two modalities of governance of the international trade regime remains in place.

Trade Negotiations at the (Possible) End of Multilateral Institutionalism

Multilateral negotiations are often facilitated through international organizations, but are not coterminous with them. This essay advances a few ‘mid-level’ propositions with respect to the negotiation structure that provides an overall context and the negotiation process where tactics guide the exchange of concessions. In terms of negotiation structure, a stable institutional structure is giving rise to a transitional one resulting in system spoilers in international negotiations leading to deadlocks and no-agreements. The bargaining phases are marked with games of chicken and grand-standing making it hard to effectively practice common negotiation tactics such as coalition-building, trade-offs and linkages. The article provides examples from the Uruguay Round and the breakdown of the Doha Round of trade negotiations through the World Trade Organization. The essay’s propositions address the breakdown of existing multilateralism through international organizations, but also document the continuation of underlying multilateral principles.