Competition enforcement: a look at inspections

Author(s):  
Maria De Benedetto
2019 ◽  
pp. 398-413
Author(s):  
Petros C. Mavroidis ◽  
Damien J. Neven

Author(s):  
Ioannis Kokkoris ◽  
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal

World Science ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (11(51)) ◽  
pp. 26-33
Author(s):  
Михальчишин Н. Л. ◽  
Нанівський С. Л.

The competition is flexible and needs to be controlled by competing agencies on the commodity markets. The competition control quality and decision-making speed depends on the competence and professionalism of the competition agencies, which eliminates the control of other state bodies and business structures. The competing agencies independence has also the preventing effect of such agencies use in the fight against competitors, and putting pressure on business. The proposed scientific study analyses the legal status of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine as a competition authority, identifies aspects of improving the efficiency of its activity and proposes ways to reform the system of bodies of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine in accordance with European standards of economic competition protection. The interaction mechanisms between the central apparatus and territorial divisions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine are identified and decentralization ways of control and supervisory functions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine through the antitrust authorities system are proposed. The research focuses on both law making and competition enforcement in relation to the activities of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine.


2021 ◽  
pp. e20210023
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Caio Mário da Silva Pereira Neto

This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.


Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.


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