An effective way to keep power in an institutional cage: legislation and regulation of administrative monopoly

Author(s):  
Xu Shiying
2009 ◽  
pp. 79-116
Author(s):  
Gianni Bianco ◽  
Pierluigi Cecati

- Water will be a basic problem in the future of the world. At the moment in Italy the main problem lies in water reserve reductions facing a growing demand, while for drinkable water more and more administrator authorities are facing a budget deficit. The causes of this national and local situation are the administrative monopoly and the absence of planning and coordination policies, that would rationalize water use without rationing it, starting from an awareness of the costs of different involved variables. The economic quality of spring and consumption water, the oldness of the waterworks and pipe networks, the extreme fragmentation of waterworks (often of minimal dimension), their territorial localisation, the absence of a common method of charges, the scanty use of analysis of management, are some of the causes of a unique and surprising variability of costs, proceeds and tariffs. This paper analyzes the generation and the structure of the costs of drinkable water in an area representative of many national characteristics on the environmental, physic and socio-economic level. The quest for more efficient forms of management and for a more transparent determination of the tariffs has been carried on through the use of custom indexes of productivity and of production. These indexes summarise the existence of scale economies, of pipe network related diseconomies, and of economies of localisation and density of the consumers. The paper presents a synthesis of the observations gathered from about two hundred waterworks subdivided by owner and entrepreneurial typologies


Author(s):  
Aleksandr Ivanovich Sidorkin

The subject of this article is the problems associated with ensuring transportation safety n the Moscovian State of the XVI-XVII centuries. The author examines the conditions and causal links that influenced the choice of certain measures for ensuring transportation safety. Analysis is conducted on the new to the Moscovian State practice of granting administrative monopoly on ensuring transportation safety to meet the interests of the representatives of certain foreign countries and corporations. The factors substantiating the implementation of administrative monopoly are explained. The algorithm for resolving the cases associated with infringement on the security of English transports in the Moscovian State is described. The scientific novelty of this research consists in determination of noncompliance of the goals of ensuring transportation safety that were claimed in the normative documents (Charters of the Russian tsars of the XVI-XVII centuries) with the actual capabilities and practice for its provision. The conclusion is made that the guarantees of the English sea transportation indicated in the charters of Moscovian tsars should be viewed merely as the declaration of good intentions, rather than factual help. The comparative legal analysis of archival documents allows establishing the fact the English kings interpreted charters of the Moscovian tsars on their own behalf, granting the English nationals the rights and privileges in the area of transportation safety.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Guo ◽  
Angang Hu

Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China—administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent.


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