scholarly journals From Common Market to EMU: An Historical Perspective on European Economic and Monetary Integration

The Euro ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Arestis ◽  
Kevin McCauley ◽  
Malcolm Sawyer
2009 ◽  
pp. 89-97
Author(s):  
Léonard Laborie

- This article aims at placing in an historical perspective the changes that gave birth in the Eighties and Nineties to the contemporary "transnational and liberalized" European telecommunications landscape. Telecommunications networks are articulated around a triangle linking operators (services providers), manufacturers (gears providers) and regulators (providing operating rules). In Europe, this triangle formed strong national monopoly till the Eighties within each nation: a compartmentalized organisation highly contrasting with the idea and prospect of a common market. This landscape was swept away from the Eighties on, the telecommunications sector becoming an icon of an integrated and dynamic Europe, around a common policy combining technical harmonisation (the GSM standard for instance) and deregulation. This article addresses the questions of the origin, goals and stakeholders of a common policy for a long time impossible to achieve, redefined at several occasions, and, at the end, emblematic.Parole chiave: Telecomunicazioni, Cooperazione europea, Armonizzazione tecnica, CEPT, CEE, GSM Telecommunications, European cooperation, Technical Harmonization, CEPT, CEE, GSM


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 298-329
Author(s):  
Everton Almeida Silva ◽  
Joaquim Carlos Racy

In this paper we intend to analyze the hegemonic position of Germany within the European Union, examining, from a historical perspective, the process of economic integration of the continent, highlighting the haggling process among its Member States and the emergence of power relations among those. Primordially, the economic relations among the States and the circumstances that led European States to pursue the international cooperation, in order to build an international regime, will be analyzed, considering whether such an asymmetrical arrangement. In view of this, the present work has been organized into three sections and a conclusion where we state our opinion on the subject and point out suggestions and referrals on the theme.     Recebido em: agosto/2019. Aprovado em: agosto/2020.


1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Butt

The Common Market as an issue in domestic British politics under the Macmillan government – and distinct from the negotiations, as such, with the European Economic Community – can be considered under three broad heads. First, there is the question how the decision to seek entry for Britain was taken. How far was it a political decision; how far was it motivated by the views of civil servants; how far was it prompted by interest groups in industry and finance ? Secondly, how did the Conservative Party become converted to the idea of British membership of the European Economic Community and how significant was the opposition to the idea that developed in the party ? The third question is what effect, if any, did domestic political opposition to the Common Market have on the French President's eventual veto of the project ?Except by implication, the third question is excluded from consideration here. Only a close student of French domestic politics is competent to evaluate how far, if at all, the hostility to the European idea in a section of the Conservative Party and the official objections of the Labour Party to British membership of EEC on any terms that then seemed negotiable, made it easier for the French President to impose his final veto. Conceivably, the possibility that a successor labour government might disown any treaty that the conservatives had signed may have played a marginal part in assisting the President's attitude in the final stages.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

The creation of a common market was (and is) a central task of the European Economic Community and today the European Union. The 1957 EEC Treaty thereby offered a variety of legal instruments to unite the different national markets into a ‘common’ European market. Originally, it closely followed the GATT suggestions in Article XXIV and outlawed customs duties (and equivalent measures), while it equally prohibited quantitative restrictions (and equivalent measures). The EEC Treaty also contained a non-discrimination provision for imported goods, yet the latter was textually confined to fiscal measures; and the question therefore arose how the 1957 Rome Treaty would regard State regulatory measures that discriminated against out-of-State goods. This chapter explores the constitutional choices made by the original Rome Treaty and the early Court with regard to market integration.


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