scholarly journals Legal Theses of the Kraków Court of Appeal in 1940–1943

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Hubert Mielnik

The German occupiers abolished the Supreme Court in the General Government. In the Polish (non-German) judiciary sector, there was no court of the highest instance to ensure the unification of jurisprudence. The competence to ensure the uniformity of jurisprudence and resolve existing doubts and legal issues was transferred to the courts of appeal. The objective of the present article was to demonstrate the procedure and practice of issuing legal theses by the Court of Appeal in Kraków. The article also presents changes in the composition of the judges and the territorial jurisdiction of the Kraków Court of Appeal. Archival sources constitute the source basis of the work. We also resorted to the latest subject literature. The work is based mainly on the analysis of archival sources and legal acts, so the scientific methods typical of the history of law were applied.

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Elmien Du Plessis

Abstract In 1998 Mr Msiza, a labour tenant, successfully instituted a claim in terms of land reform legislation (the Land Reform (Labour Tenant) Act) for ownership of the land that he and his father occupied for six decades. In terms of this legislation, when the labour tenant is awarding the land, the owner of the land must be compensated for the loss of the land. In 2004, the Land Claims Court confirmed the award of land and ordered the state to make sure that Mr Msiza gets a title deed for the land. The case was heard again in 2016 in the Land Claims Court, where the court this time examined the question of compensation to be paid to the owner. The Land Claims Court ruled that the Constitutional compensation requirement is “just and equitable” compensation, and awarded less-than-market-value compensation by subtracting a seemingly arbitrary amount from the market value of the land. This decision was overturned in 2017 when the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the the just and equitable question were already considered in the calculation of market value, and therefore ruled that no amount be deducted from what the valuers calculated to be market value. The handling of the case, and the different approaches from the two courts, is a symptom of the uncertainty that judges are confronted with when they have to calculate “just and equitable” compensation. A history of the case will reveal that the inability to properly valuate the land, perpetuated the injustice that Mr Msiza is facing, of not having the land registered in his name, despite a valid award in terms of land reform legislation. This paper will show how the compensation requirement is a hurdle to Mr Msiza receiving the title deed to his land. By making use of the valuation reports and the court materials, the paper will endeavour to indicate what a better outcome would be, by focussing on the calculation of “just and equitable” compensation. The paper will argue for a purposive approach when interpreting legislation dealing with compensation, where the Constitutional purpose to “heal the divisions of the past” should play a central role in land reform cases.


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter focuses on explaining the kinds of cases which Ireland’s Supreme Court is authorised to deal with and how it has had very little choice over which cases are brought to it. It analyses relevant legislative provisions, some of which date back to 1924. The relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal is covered, as are the reasons for the rise in the Supreme Court’s workload since the 1990s. The history of reform proposals is set out and the impact of the new Court of Appeal is considered. The chapter also examines the point that pre-1922 legislation is presumed to continue to apply in Ireland unless Parliament has changed it and shows how the Supreme Court has been careful to ensure that people other than judges do not exercise what is in effect a judicial function. The ‘non-justiciable’ principle is also considered.


Author(s):  
Guobadia Ameze

This chapter examines the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in Nigeria. It sketches the history of assertions of judicial power by Nigerian courts, including the 1966 action by the Supreme Court to assert the continued validity of the 1963 constitution in the face of a military coup. It considers the role of the National Judicial Council in appointing and disciplining judges, an important issue in many systems. It recounts the saga surrounding President of the Court of Appeal Justice Salami, which raises the troubling prospect of the Chief Justice ‘packing’ the Council and possibly colluding with the executive to pursue political goals and discusses the issue of disputes over the appointment of state chief justices, who are appointed by governors on the Council’s recommendation. It also offers the Nigerian perspective on control over judicial budgets and administration, before concluding with a review of some significant cases.


2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Sankoff

The Supreme Court of Canada recently denied leave to appeal in Reece v. Edmonton (City), a 2-1 decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, which focused on the right of private parties to seek judicial intervention on behalf of animals. In this article, the author examines the implications of this "lost opportunity" to develop an important area of law relating to public interest standing, explores the important questions that were at stake in the appeal, and suggests why the Supreme Court should have decided otherwise.La Cour suprême du Canada a récemment rejeté la demande d’autorisation d’appel de l’affaire Reece v. Edmonton (Ville), – une décision (2 contre 1) de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta – qui portait sur le droit de simples individus de demander une intervention judiciaire au nom des animaux. Dans le présent article, l’auteur examine les conséquences de cette [TRADUCTION] « occasion ratée » de développer un important domaine du droit relatif à l’intérêt public, et de traiter les questions sérieuses qui étaient soulevées dans l’appel; il tente d’expliquer pourquoi la Cour suprême aurait dû rendre une décision différente.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg

In September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal that the eviction from basic shelter of a mother and her minor children, who did not have legal residence in the Netherlands, was unlawful. This ruling was instigated by a radically new interpretation of the European Social Charter’s personal scope and caused a major shift in Dutch policy. This article provides a case study into the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It argues that, instead of relying on legal doctrinal reasoning for justifying the outcome, both courts referred to factors that the general public relies on to assess people’s deservingness of welfare. This finding raises fundamental questions about the relationship between human rights law and deservingness; and calls, therefore, for further research into the relevance of deservingness criteria in judicial discourse.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


Author(s):  

AbstractThe volumes of the manuscript of the Observationes tumultuariae of Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673–1743) contain loose leaves and endleaves with notes by his hand. Some of these notes, in particular those on the endleaves of volumes IX–XIV, have already been published. Among the unpublished notes, Bijnkershoek's observations on malpractices of President Rosenboom and his fellow judges in the Supreme Court of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland are of special interest: they constitute the basis of the present article. In an appendix the text of these observations is published together with the full text of the endleaves of volumes I–VIII, concerning other everyday matters of the Court.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document