scholarly journals IDEA OF FREEDOM IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOMS / NEGATİF VE POZİTİF ÖZGÜRLÜKLER BAĞLAMINDA FELSEFEDE ÖZGÜRLÜK DÜŞÜNCESİ

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Göksel Yıkmış

In this article, I will explore the issue of whether it is coherent to say that one person has more freedom than another by considering negative and positive freedom traditions. First, I will briefly describe the notion of negative and positive freedom. Second, I will begin to make a connection between notions of liberty and one agent having more freedom than another. Third, I will outline the inadequacy of the negative tradition, and then I will discuss the necessity of positive tradition. It is concluded that some notion of positive liberty is needed to make coherent sense of the claim that persons can vary in degree of liberty. However, owing to social contract issues, I conclude that both conceptions are needed. Bu çalışmada, bir kişinin diğerinden daha fazla özgürlüğe sahip olduğunu söylemenin tutarlı olup olmadığı, felsefedeki negatif ve pozitif özgürlük kavramları ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda ilk olarak negatif ve pozitif özgürlük kavramları kısaca açıklanmıştır. Ardından, özgürlük kavramları ile bir kişinin diğerinden daha fazla özgürlüğe sahip olması arasında bir bağlantı kurulmuştur. Son olarak, felsefedeki negatif özgürlük kavramının neden yetersiz olduğunun ana hatları çizilmiş ve ardından pozitif geleneğin gerekliliği ele alınıp tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada, kişilerin özgürlük ve bağımsızlık derecesine göre çeşitlilik gösterebileceği iddiasını tutarlı bir şekilde anlamlandırmak için pozitif özgürlük kavramına ihtiyaç olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Bununla birlikte bu çalışmada, toplum sözleşmesi kavramında yer alan birtakım sorunlar nedeniyle, her iki özgürlük kavramın da özgürlük düşüncesi için gerekli olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. <p> </p><p><strong> Article visualizations:</strong></p><p><img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0630/a.php" alt="Hit counter" /></p>

2021 ◽  

Freedom is widely regarded as a basic social and political value that is deeply connected to the ideals of democracy, equality, liberation, and social recognition. Many insist that freedom must include conditions that go beyond simple “negative” liberty understood as the absence of constraints; only if freedom includes other conditions such as the capability to act, mental and physical control of oneself, and social recognition by others will it deserve its place in the pantheon of basic social values. Positive Freedom is the first volume to examine the idea of positive liberty in detail and from multiple perspectives. With contributions from leading scholars in ethics and political theory, this collection includes both historical studies of the idea of positive freedom and discussions of its connection to important contemporary issues in social and political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Piper L. Bringhurst ◽  
Gerald Gaus

This chapter shows how one understanding of positive liberty—freedom as reasoned control—is presupposed by relations of moral responsibility. Rousseau’s “quixotic quest”—insuring that all subjects of the moral law remain morally free—is necessary to maintain responsibility relations within a moral community. Unless all are free to exercise reasoned control in accepting moral demands, they cannot be held responsible for failure to comply. We then inquire whether the concept of the general will can reconcile positive freedom and moral responsibility with regulation by a common moral law. Rousseau’s account seems inappropriate for a deeply diverse society because it holds that the general will arises from an essential identity of citizens’ interests. Instead, Bosanquet’s work suggests two contemporary proposals for ways in which a diverse society might share a general will, explaining in turn how its members are all fit to be held responsible for violating its moral rules.


2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-422
Author(s):  
Andrés Tutor ◽  

The aim of this article is to provide a critical examination of Berlin’s treatment of positive freedom by offering a review of his standard arguments against this concept. Throughout his essays and particularly in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin connects the idea of positive freedom with such notions as monism, rationalism, and determinism. Each of these connections will be discussed separately. I will argue that most of Berlin’s arguments against positive liberty are somehow flawed. Although Berlin valued positive freedom as one of the ultimate ends of life, his critical view of the concept should be tempered and contextualized since it was mostly based not on logical or conceptual grounds but on historical and interpretative considerations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-52
Author(s):  
Rostyslav Soroka

How can someone be “forced to be free”? Why is the arrest of a drunk driver not actually against their will? This paper answers these questions by drawing parallels between Rousseau’s “Social Contract” and Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”. The coherence of “forced freedom” depends on a specific understanding of “freedom”—namely Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “Positive freedom”. Positive freedom suggests that free actions are those which act in affirmation of a will rather than those acting in the absence of obstacles. Therefore, Positive freedom is concerned with the source of a will. Rousseau’s forced freedom is meant to be applied in cases of incongruence between an individual’s various whims, wills, and deep interests. Forced freedom does not act against a will but acts as a rationalization of an existing will to illuminate what it truly desires. In the case of the drunk driver, their implicit participation in society means that they must understand through some capacity why established drunk driving laws exist. An individual’s belief in Positive freedom is therefore necessary in order for them to internalize the coercion of the state and to allow themselves to be “forced to be free”.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-177
Author(s):  
Egdūnas Račius

Muslim presence in Lithuania, though already addressed from many angles, has not hitherto been approached from either the perspective of the social contract theories or of the compliance with Muslim jurisprudence. The author argues that through choice of non-Muslim Grand Duchy of Lithuania as their adopted Motherland, Muslim Tatars effectively entered into a unique (yet, from the point of Hanafi fiqh, arguably Islamically valid) social contract with the non-Muslim state and society. The article follows the development of this social contract since its inception in the fourteenth century all the way into the nation-state of Lithuania that emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century and continues until the present. The epitome of the social contract under investigation is the official granting in 1995 to Muslim Tatars of a status of one of the nine traditional faiths in Lithuania with all the ensuing political, legal and social consequences for both the Muslim minority and the state.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document