SummaryThe professional regulatory cases of the psychiatrist Dr Richard Pool and the neuropathologist Dr Waney Squier have given rise to concerns among expert psychiatric witnesses, and indeed medical experts in general. Here we restate the law on expert evidence with particular reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case ofKennedy v Cordia.We emphasise thatPooldoes not change the law regarding ‘what is expertise’; in particular, the case does not establish restrictive, status-based tests governing the admissibility of expert evidence such as according to whether an expert psychiatric witness has undergone higher training, is on the specialist register as a specialist in a particular field or is a consultant. Rather, expertise continues to be legally defined in terms of a combination of qualification, knowledge and experience. Crucially, the test of medical expertise in legal proceedings is a legal test and not one determined within a medical paradigm.Learning Objectives• Understand the law defining admissible expert evidence, in particular the distinction between ‘admissibility’ of evidence as ‘expert’ and the evidential ‘weight’ that courts may accord to admissible expert evidence• Understand the issues that arose from the cases of Dr Pool and Dr Squier, and why they caused (unnecessary) medical concern• Understand the factual relevance to being an expert witness of having undergone higher training, being on the specialist register as a specialist in a particular field, and being a consultant
Forensic medical expertise and civil law: recommendation of photographic techniques for medical expert evidence
