La corrupción en el seno de las instituciones de la Unión Europea: responsabilidades, investigación administrativa y control judicial

Author(s):  
David ORDÓÑEZ SOLÍS

LABURPENA: Europako Batasunaren erakundeetan ere ustelkeria dagoela egiaztatu da. Bruselako politikariak eta funtzionarioak politika, diziplina eta, jakina, zigor kontroleko prozeduren mende daude. 1999an, eta Europako Batzordean detektatutako ustelkeria dela eta, Europako erakundeak hartutako erabakiari esker, martxan jarri zen Iruzurraren aurkako Borrokatzeko Europako Bulegoa (OLAF), ustelkeria eta ez-betetze larriak ikertzeko. 2009an, Lisboako Tratatuan Europako fiskaltza eratzea proposatu zen, Europako mailan egindako delituen —bereziki, Euro¬pako Batasunaren finantza interesetan eragina duten delituak— ikerketa judizialak egiteko. Kasu bietan, ikerketen ondorioz, diziplina eta zigor neurriak ezar daitezke. Eremu horretan, epaimahaiek xede berezia dute, alegia: politika eta diziplina erantzukizuna badago, justizia auzitegiak du legalitatearen kontrola; aldiz, nazioko zigor epaileek baino ezin dizkiete ezarri zigor zehapenak Europako Batasuneko politikariei eta funtzionarioei. RESUMEN: En el seno de las instituciones de la Unión Europea también se ha comprobado la existencia de corrupción. Los políticos y los funcionarios de Bruselas están sometidos a procedimientos de control político, disciplinario y, desde luego, penal. En 1999 y a raíz de la corrupción detectada en la Comisión Europea se puso en marcha la Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude (OLAF) en virtud de un acuerdo de las instituciones europeas con el fin de investigar la corrupción y los incumplimientos graves. En 2009 el Tratado de Lisboa ha previsto el establecimiento de una Fiscalía Europea que impulse las investigaciones judiciales relacionadas con los delitos europeos, en particular los que afectan a los intereses financieros de la Unión. En ambos casos las investigaciones pueden concluir con la imposición de medidas disciplinarias y penales. En este ámbito los tribunales tienen una misión esencial: en el caso de la responsabilidad política y disciplinaria el control de la legalidad corresponde al Tribunal de Justicia; en cambio, las sanciones penales a los políticos y funcionarios de la Unión Europea solo pueden imponerlas los jueces penales nacionales. ABSTRACT: Corruption also lives within the institutions of the European Union. Members and officials of the European institutions are responsible and submitted to political, disciplinary and criminal actions. As a consequence of the corruption unveiled in the European Commission in 1999, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was set up by the agreement of the European institutions in order to investigate frauds and serious misconducts. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has foreseen the setting up of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office whose mandate is to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment the perpetrators ofoffences against the Union’s financial interests. These organisms allow performing administrative and criminal inquiries regarding European officials. Tribunals, both European and National, are committed to control the disciplinary actions (European Courts) and criminal lawsuits (National Courts) against European politicians and officials.

2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652110273
Author(s):  
Markus Gastinger ◽  
Andreas Dür

In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the literature.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pasquale Annicchino

The implementation of Article 17(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has always been one of the central topics of discussion for legal scholars analysing the relationships between religious groups and European institutions. According to Article 17, the European Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with churches, religious associations or communities, philosophical organisations and non-confessional organisations. In the case in hand, the complainant, the European Humanist Federation (EHF) decided to lodge a complaint before the European Ombudsman when the European Commission rejected the proposal for a dialogue seminar.


2021 ◽  
pp. 3-40
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter surveys the historical evolution of the European Union in four sections. Section 1 starts with the humble origins of the Union: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was set up by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. While limited in its scope, the ECSC introduced a supranational idea that was to become the trademark of the European Economic Community (EEC). Section 2 focuses the EEC, while Section 3 investigates the development of the (old) European Union founded through the Treaty of Maastricht. Finally, Section 4 reviews the reform efforts leading to the Lisbon Treaty, and analyses the structure of the—substantively—new European Union as it exists today. Concentrating on the constitutional evolution of the European Union, the chapter does not present its geographic development.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


elni Review ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Ana Barreira

The European Commission has recognised that “[l]aws do not serve their full purpose unless they are properly applied and enforced”. In addition “[t]he European Institutions and the Member States should continue to develop their work to ensure that Community law is correctly applied and implemented”. There are diverse tools for guaranteeing compliance such as compliance indicators, compliance and enforcement strategies and environmental inspections, the purpose of which is to supervise compliance. This article focuses on the latter. Firstly, the way in which this instrument was incorporated under Community environmental policy is examined. Secondly, the current status of environmental inspections at EU level is briefly analysed. Thereafter, it will concentrate on the proposals for the review of this tool, ending with some recommendations on how environmental inspections should be regulated in the European Union with a focus on the demands of European Environmental Bureau (EEB) on this matter.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romain Badouard

Since the early 2000's, the European Institutions have set up several eParticipation projects. These projects are embedded in different political strategies and are managed by different actors within the institutions. This leads to a wide variety of projects and prevents the European Union to develop a single and concerted strategy in terms of online participation.This paper intends to compare two different models of online consultation : the Commission consultations hosted on the site Your Voice in Europe, and the European Citizens' Consultation 2009. The paper tackles three main subjects : the institutional strategies which frame these sites; the actors that they mobilize; their main and collateral effects. The goal of this synthesis is to identify some key features that fit to the european context, in order to assess the possibilities of sustainability of such political experiments.


2011 ◽  
pp. 2798-2804
Author(s):  
Christian Hunold

According to the European Commission (2003), increased networking of local, regional, and national administrations across the European Union (EU) is creating “a more integrated ‘European public space’ for EU citizens and businesses” (p. 6). This emerging public space owes its existence chiefly to improvements in information and communication technology (ICT). The Commission (2002) believes that e-government initiatives will help to build a more robust European public space capable of engendering in the public’s mind a sense of democratic ownership of European institutions and policies: “E-government is helping to establish a more open, inclusive and productive public sector, in line with good governance” (p. 7). E-government as defined by the Commission (2005) as “the use of information and communication technologies, combined with organisational change and new skills, to improve public services, increase democratic participation and enhance public policy making.” Echoing the literature on e-democracy (Gibson, Rommele, & Ward, 2004), the Commission (2002) contends that e-government can improve EU democratic processes and public support for EU policies in two ways: by giving citizens greater access to information from authorities, which empowers citizens by improving the transparency and accountability of European institutions; and by fostering direct communication between citizens and policy makers, which enables improved mutual accommodation of needs and interests. This article analyzes Commission e-government initiatives, with special emphasis on the Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society (CONECCS) directory, the interactive policy making (IPM) initiative, and the i2010: European Information Society 2010 initiative. IPM seeks to enable the Commission to collect feedback directly from citizens, consumers, and businesses via a single Internet access point for consultations (Your Voice in Europe). i2010 is a five-year strategy launched in 2005 to boost Europe’s digital economy and includes proposals to enhance e-participation in Europe’s emerging public space. Such proposals, I argue, will be more likely to succeed if the Commission were to move from managerial and consultative to participatory models of public involvement (Chadwick & May, 2003).


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-122
Author(s):  
Camilla Buchanan

Case T-262/20 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v. CommissionThe conditions for bringing direct actions before the EU General Court have been opened under Article 263, fourth paragraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) through the introduction of less restrictive rules on legal standing for private applicants challenging regulatory acts. The term “regulatory act” covers all acts of general application apart from legislative acts and includes implementing measures adopted by the European Commission under the comitology procedure. Initial case law provides welcome guidance on the application of the new rules on standing but questions still remain (author's headnote).


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-34
Author(s):  
Gyöngyi Földesi

Can We Talk about European Public Policy in the Field of Sport?Despite the continuous deepening, development and enlargement, the members of the European Union still diverge in their policies and have to find a way to diminish this divergence. The social, economical and cultural significance of sport is well known in the whole of Europe. Accordingly, in the recent past, the various institutions of the European Union have come to pay more attention to sport issues. An important milestone of this was the European Commission issuing a White Paper on sport, and the inclusion of sport in the Lisbon Treaty. However the question is raised: Is there a European public policy of sport? The author's objective was to investigate this question. This paper aims to highlight the European sport policy and tries to find the answer to the following question: can we talk about European public policy in the field of sport? The research examines through the analysis of documents whether sport can be regarded as an element of public policy. We can talk about common public policy of a certain area if it corresponds to the following five criteria: content, social competence, coercive factor, normative orientation and programme. In the first part, the content and the social competence are analyzed, and then some critical issues of the definition, namely of the public policy will be discussed. In the opinion of the author, the most problematic criterion is the programme, which presumes at least a mid-term European sport conception. It is especially important that sport could fulfil its community building, identity-forming role to which it is suited in the continuously enlarging Europe. Finally the author draws the conclusion that the European sport policy corresponds partly to the above-mentioned criteria; however, the realization of the Pierre de Coubertin Action Plan included in the White Paper, and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty can create opportunities for sport to become a public policy of the European Union.


Author(s):  
Gert Würtenberger ◽  
Paul van der Kooij ◽  
Bart Kiewiet ◽  
Martin Ekvad

This chapter is about the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), which was created by Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights or the Basic Regulation. It explains the purpose of the implementation and application of the Basic Regulation. It also describes CPVO as an agency of the European Union (EU), which is a body governed by European public law that is distinct from the EU institutions. This chapter describes the resources that led the European Parliament, the EU Council, and the European Commission to launch an inter-institutional dialogue on decentralized agencies in 2009. It points out, as stated in the Basic Regulation, that the decisions of the CPVO will be taken by a committee of three members of its staff.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document