scholarly journals GOVERNORS & SENIOR PERSONNEL - Denison Miller - Biographical Notes, Club Membership, Family Matters

Keyword(s):  
2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Jonathan Owens
Keyword(s):  

1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holley H. Ulbrich ◽  
Myles S. Wallace

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sai Krupa Das ◽  
Taylor A. Vail ◽  
Namibia Lebrón-Torres ◽  
Kara A. Livingston ◽  
Susan B. Roberts ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Wolfenden ◽  
M. Kingsland ◽  
B. Rowland ◽  
P. Dodds ◽  
M. Sidey ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Arthur J. Caplan

This paper examines how a regulatory authority might ideally promote the formation of “conservation clubs” among households in order to initiate and empower voluntary household-level water and energy conservation efforts. We characterize a socially optimal conservation benchmark and derive the conditions necessary for a club to effectively attain this benchmark on behalf of the wider community. Both theoretical and numerical analyses are used to demonstrate ways in which households choose to become club members and are subsequently empowered to undertake conservation efforts. The avenues through which club membership might empower households include (1) information provision/education that is assumed to alter key parameters of the household’s welfare function, thereby inducing the household to build a stronger “conservation ethic,” and (2) bulk-pricing arrangements that reduce the prices of applicable conservation technologies. Our results highlight key relationships between the regulator and households, as well as between the club and the marketplace, that should be measured empirically before efforts are made to establish conservation clubs in practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137
Author(s):  
César Castellvi

    FR. En partant de l’analyse des clubs de presse japonais, cet article porte sur le rôle joué par les entreprises médiatiques dans les relations des journalistes aux sources institutionnelles. En tant que principale forme d’accès aux sources, les clubs de presse (kisha kurabu) sont des rassemblements de reporters accrédités aux institutions majeures de la société (ministères, administrations, grandes entreprises, commissariats). Ils se distinguent d’autres formes d’associations de journalistes par leur présence systématique à l’ensemble du pays ainsi que par leur modalité d’accès. Seuls les reporters salariés d’une entreprise de la presse quotidienne ou d’une chaîne de télévision peuvent y adhérer. Cela écarte les autres segments de la profession et impose une division du travail où les reporters salariés disposent seuls de l’exclusivité sur la production d’informations institutionnelles. Ce système, souvent critiqué, mais toujours en place, s’explique également par l’organisation des carrières des journalistes. Les parcours des reporters salariés se déroulent en interne des entreprises et sont soumis à une forte mobilité thématique et géographique. Cette mobilité rend difficile l’entretien d’un carnet d’adresses pour beaucoup d’entre eux. L’accréditation aux clubs joue le rôle de facilitateur de mise en relation avec les sources. En contrepartie, il renforce la dépendance des journalistes vis-à-vis des entreprises qui sont les véritables propriétaires de l’accès à la matière première de l’information.   ***   EN. Based on an analysis of Japanese press clubs, this paper examines the role of media companies in journalists' relations with institutional sources. Press clubs (kisha kurabu) consist of reporters accredited by the major institutions of society (ministries, administrations, large companies, police stations) and are the main avenue of access to these sources. They differ from other journalists' associations in their systematic presence throughout the country and how one becomes a member. Only reporters employed by a daily press company or television channel can join. This bars access by other segments of the profession and imposes a division of labor in which staff reporters have the exclusive right to produce institutional news. This system is often criticized, and yet it persists, at least in part because of the career path of journalists, which takes place within companies and are subject to high thematic and geographical mobility. This mobility makes it difficult for many of them to maintain a roster of sources. Club membership facilitates connection with sources. In return, it reinforces journalists' dependence on companies that are the true gatekeepers of access to the raw material of news.   ***   PT. Partindo da análise dos clubes de imprensa japoneses, este artigo enfoca o papel desempenhado pelas empresas de mídia nas relações dos jornalistas com as fontes institucionais. Como principal forma de acesso às fontes, os clubes de imprensa (kisha kurabu) são reuniões de repórteres credenciados em grandes instituições da sociedade (ministérios, administrações, grandes empresas, delegacias de polícia). Distinguem-se de outras formas de associação de jornalistas por sua presença sistemática em todo o país e por sua modalidade de acesso. Somente repórteres que são funcionários de uma empresa de jornais diários ou de um canal de televisão podem participar. Isso exclui outros segmentos da profissão e impõe uma divisão do trabalho em que apenas os repórteres assalariados têm direitos exclusivos sobre a produção de informações institucionais. Esse sistema, frequentemente criticado, mas ainda em vigor, também é explicado pela organização de carreiras de jornalistas. As jornadas dos repórteres assalariados são realizadas internamente pelas empresas e estão sujeitas a uma alta mobilidade temática e geográfica. Essa mobilidade dificulta a manutenção de um catálogo de endereços para muitos deles. O credenciamento de clubes atua como um facilitador para o vínculo com as fontes. Em contrapartida, reforça a dependência dos jornalistas de empresas que são os verdadeiros proprietários do acesso à matéria-prima da informação.   ***


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond R. Ferreira ◽  
Catherine M. Gustafson

Author(s):  
Danita Catherine Burke

Abstract The Arctic Council is frequently called a unique forum but, as this article argues, clubs are common in international politics and in many respects the Arctic Council is a club. This article explores the questions: Why are the Arctic states acting like a club in Arctic politics, and how do internal hierarchies influence how clubs make decisions? As the article illustrates, clubs are the stage for club diplomacy and, in club diplomacy, hierarchies play an important role. Using the Arctic Council as an illustrative case study, this article argues that clubs have internal hierarchies that inform their decision-making processes and their responses to challenges to their status. When clubs try to deal with subjects that extend beyond the boundaries of the sovereignty of club members and the parameters of club membership, club members may suffer from a lack of status and legitimacy to unilaterally deal with the subject.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8638
Author(s):  
Hyunwoong Pyun ◽  
Jeeyoon Kim ◽  
Torsten Schlesinger ◽  
Luca Matto

Hosting sport events is costly, but the positive impact of hosting sport events has not been studied well. We consider the promotion of physical activity, known as the trickle-down effect, to be a new dimension of this kind of impact. Using exogenous variations in promotion and relegation in the Bundesliga 1, we test the effect of the presence of a Bundesliga 1 club on local non-profit football club membership. Using German city-level annual non-profit sport club membership data from the metropolitan Rhine-Ruhr, we group cities with experience of either promotion or relegation as treatment cities and other cities as the comparison group. Difference-in-difference analyses show that promotion (using a strict definition of promotion) of local professional football clubs increases non-profit football club membership by 14% while relegation does not affect membership. The presence of Bundesliga 1 clubs in a city increases non-profit football club membership by 11%. Falsification tests support the idea that the impact of promotion on membership results in a net increase in membership.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document