scholarly journals Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
João Rizzio Vicente Fett
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Satisfactory Theory ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Gettier Problem

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179 Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard’s theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard’s theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate.

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.

scholarly journals Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Program Performance ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based epistemology have been the object of serious criticism. This chapter shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.

scholarly journals Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter aims to develop a novel virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief, which gives the view a knowledge first spin. It is virtue epistemological in that it offers accounts of knowledge and justified belief in terms of exercises of epistemic abilities. It has a knowledge first twist because, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the relevant notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know. In addition, this chapter aims to show that the resulting knowledge first virtue epistemology compares favourably with its traditional cousins as it offers an appealing new solution to the Gettier problem.

Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Negative Aspect ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Proof Analysis ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The Gettier Problem is conceived in a specific fashion as the problem of offering an informative (but not necessarily reductive) Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge. A solution is offered to this problem via anti-luck virtue epistemology. This is an account of knowledge which incorporates both an anti-luck condition and a virtue condition, and which is thereby able to avoid problems that face some of the main competing accounts of knowledge, particularly those offered by proponents of robust virtue epistemology. In particular, it is able to accommodate the epistemic dependence of knowledge on external factors, where this has both a positive and a negative aspect. Relatedly, it can also avoid the problem posed by epistemic twin earth cases. Anti-luck virtue epistemology is then motivated and defended in light of a range of objections, in order to demonstrate its potential as a resolution to the Gettier Problem, so conceived.

Gettier Problem

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 58-75
Author(s):  
Timofey S. Demin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Constituent Elements ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by changing the elements in order to avoid the Gettier problem. There are three possible ways of doing so: adding new elements to the justification, changing the justification on the other criteria or strengthen the justification in such a way, that it would resolve any possible Gettier cases. For each strategy analysis of the theories of knowledge is given. In the paper idea of the inescapability of Gettier cases for analysis of knowledge was supported by the argumentation of Linda Zagzebski. In that ground, the analysis of knowledge was refuted. From that perspective, two of the most influenced ways of answering the question “what is knowledge” was proposed. First, the irreducible theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a mere state of the mind. Second, rejection existence of the universal invariant of the knowledge in every case. There are multiple senses of what the knowledge is and none of them is prior to other. The author lives as the open question the right way to think about the knowledge. In the closing part of the paper, the author presents a perspective critique of the knowledge problem as the project of overrated significance, and argues for a need to create new arguments that supporting that problem.

Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Jonathan Reibsamen
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Intellectual Abilities ◽  
Virtue Reliabilism ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism ◽  
The Gettier Problem

According to reliabilist virtue epistemology, or virtue reliabilism, knowledge is true belief that is produced by intellectual excellence (or virtue), where intellectual excellence is understood in terms of reliable, truth-directed cognitive dispositions. This chapter explains why virtue reliabilism is a form of epistemological externalism, is a moderately naturalized epistemology, and is distinct from virtue responsibilism. It explains virtue reliabilism’s answers to various forms of skepticism, its solution to the Gettier Problem, and its explanation of the value of knowledge. The chapter also describes several varieties of contemporary virtue reliabilism. Finally, it offers replies to two recently prominent objections to virtue reliabilism: that it is committed to an untenable epistemological individualism, and that there are empirical reasons to doubt whether people generally have the kinds of intellectual abilities that virtue reliabilism requires for knowledge.

Chained to the Gettier Problem— a Useful Falsehood?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Shope
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Unexpected Effect ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Chapter 5 refines a solution previously proposed to the Gettier Problem focusing on proscribing certain roles for falsehoods in a ‘justification-explaining chain.’ The refinement is partly explained in contrast to Peter D. Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge, which focuses on proscribing certain relations of truths to ‘chains of justifiers.’ Klein eventually revised his defeasibility account in order to allow for instances of knowledge that depend on what he calls ‘useful falsehoods.’ His definition of the latter turns out to face counterexamples. An improved definition allows a role for useful falsehoods in justification-explaining chains. It also has the unexpected effect of pointing toward a solution to the Gettier Problem that obviates the need to appeal to either type of chain.

The Nature of Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Klein
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Good Basis ◽  
Fallible Reasoning ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The purpose of the chapter is to show that the defeasibility theory of knowledge provides the best solution to the most philosophically interesting way of characterizing the Gettier Problem. I will examine Gettier’s presentation of the problem in order to show that the principles that Gettier used to motivate the problem require some important corrections and, even with those corrections, the hard task remains, namely to make clear how fallible reasoning can result in real knowledge by eluding epistemic luck. I argue that various etiology of beliefs theories of knowledge (tracking theories, safety views, reliabilism, and virtue theories) do not provide a good basis for characterizing epistemic luck and depend upon highly speculative empirical claims. In addition, I will argue that among evidentialist theories (defeasibility theories, Dretske’s and Foley’s views) only a well-constructed defeasibility theory can correctly and informatively solve the Gettier Problem.

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