THE IMPLICITNESS PHENOMENON IN LINGUISTIC STUDIES: TRADITIONAL AND MODERN APPROACHES

Статья посвящена изучению научных подходов к феномену имплицитности, представленных в трудах Ч.С. Пирса, Г.П. Грайса и его последователей, в работах Тверской психолингвистической школы под руководством А.А. Залевской. Проведённые исследования доказывают наличие имплицитного выводного компонента в динамической структуре значения единицы языка, активируемого в процессе естественной коммуникации. Имплицитное знание представляет собой интегративную структуру, составную часть внутреннего контекста индивида, репрезентирующую сформированный ранее оптимальный способ идентификации значения познающим субъектом. The article is devoted to the investigation of scientific approaches to the implicitness phenomenon, presented in the works of Ch.S. Peirce, H.P. Grice and his followers, the researches of the Tver School of Psycholinguistics headed by A.A. Zalevskaya. The studies carried out prove the presence of an implicit component in the dynamic structure of a language unit meaning, activated in the process of live communication. Implicit (inferential) knowledge is an integrative structure, an integral part of the internal context of an individual (term by A.A. Zalevskaya), representing the previously formed efficient way of identifying meaning which a person comprehends.

Inference

This chapter introduces the Buddhist theory of inference. It begins with the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” and argues that what is of primary importance in epistemology is the category of “inference for oneself.” The chapter then lays out the standard features of the Buddhist account of inferential knowledge, including Dignāga’s appeal to “the three characteristics” of good evidence and Dharmakīrti’s account of three different types of evidence. The chapter concludes with a section on the topic of epistemic closure principles and how such principles might apply to Buddhist accounts of inferential knowledge.

An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image

The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.

Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief

Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief.

Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?

This chapter argues against Factualism, holding that the thesis fails in both directions: not everything we know is part of our evidence, and not all evidence is knowledge. Fumerton’s thesis (that rational action requires rational beliefs and, as added here, rational credences) is defended from the charge that it leads to unacceptable dilemmas. It is then argued that full beliefs (and not just credences) have a role to play in Bayesian decision theory. The argument that not all knowledge is evidence appeals to inferential knowledge. The main claim of the chapter is that not all evidence is knowledge. It is argued that it can be rational to act on the basis of false beliefs and therefore (given Fumerton’s thesis) that it is rational to believe those false propositions.

ATOMIC: An Atlas of Machine Commonsense for If-Then Reasoning

We present ATOMIC, an atlas of everyday commonsense reasoning, organized through 877k textual descriptions of inferential knowledge. Compared to existing resources that center around taxonomic knowledge, ATOMIC focuses on inferential knowledge organized as typed if-then relations with variables (e.g., “if X pays Y a compliment, then Y will likely return the compliment”). We propose nine if-then relation types to distinguish causes vs. effects, agents vs. themes, voluntary vs. involuntary events, and actions vs. mental states. By generatively training on the rich inferential knowledge described in ATOMIC, we show that neural models can acquire simple commonsense capabilities and reason about previously unseen events. Experimental results demonstrate that multitask models that incorporate the hierarchical structure of if-then relation types lead to more accurate inference compared to models trained in isolation, as measured by both automatic and human evaluation.